Renaud Barbaras (Université Paris-Sorbonne)
Didier Franck (Université Paris-Nanterre)
Y a-t-il une sensation pure ?
Les Leçons sur la conscince intime du temps que Husserl pronon-ça en 1905 et qui furent éditées par Heidegger en 1928 constituent à n’en pas douter un des textes les plus déterminants de la phénoméno-logie. Elles décrivent la constitution temporelle d’un pur donné de sen-sation et reposent donc sur la compréhension du maintenant temporel (das Jetzt) comme sensation pure. Mais y a-t-il quelque chose de tel et ce que Husserl nomme “impression pure” n’appartient-il pas à une struc-ture plus complexe ? Poser cette question, c’est poser la question de sa-voir si les analyses husserliennes n’aboutissent pas à une dissolution du maintenant ? Quelles en seraient alors les conséquences sur l’intention-nalité ?
Bonnie Mann (University of Oregon)
How to Practice Feminist Phenomenology: The Case of Shame
In this paper I try to make explicit what is different about feminist phenomenology, beginning with the work of Simone de Beauvoir and moving on to more contemporary moments, including comments by Johanna Oksala (2006). In order to make explicit the feminist phenomenological difference, I take up the specific phenomenon of shame. Recent accounts of shame in the work of Anthony Steinbock and Dan Zahavi (both 2014), will be considered in light of the feminist phenomenological difference. Such accounts fail, on a feminist reading, because they are unable to enact a necessary oscillation between the particular and the general that is at the heart of feminist phenomenological practice. Because meaning emerges in the thick tension between lived particularities and deep generalities, these accounts that remain problematically generalized fail to reach or articulate the lived meanings of shame in the experience of those too often crushed by it.
Michael Alan Schwartz (Texas A&M Health Science Center, US)
What phenomenology has to offer psychiatry? Aberrant temporality is a core phenomenon of diverse mental disorders
Disturbances of temporality are core to a wide range of mental disorders, including mania, depression, schizophrenia, dementia, OCD and anxiety disorders and addictions. Nonetheless, temporality is underemphasized in present-day accounts of such disorders. This presentation will focus upon aberrant temporality in the above mental disorders.
Phenomenological insight can help clarify this issue. For all of us, at the doxic level, the future is protended as uncertain; some states of affairs could happen, or others just as well. At the emotional level, some of these states of affairs are intended as very desirable, and others as very undesirable. And at the evaluative level, the desirable states of affairs are protended as the ones which definitely “ought-to- be,” and the undesirable states of affairs as the ones which definitely “ought-not- to-be.” In mania and melancholia, we might say that there is an “arc” stretching over the lived past, present, and future that intends them all as the same. This arc is doxic, affective, evaluative, and conative. Fundamentally, in affective states mania or melancholia, implacably dichotomously – either totally good or totally dismal, temporality is determined and determinative.
The presentation will go on to explore phenomenological aspects of other psychopathological states: schizophrenia, dementia, anxiety and addiction. Finally, neurobiological correlates will be addressed.
Nicolas de Warren (Husserl Archives, KU Leuven)