

ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY
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ABSTRACTS

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KEYNOTE LECTURES

Renaud Barbaras

Université Paris-Sorbonne, France / Renaud.Barbaras@univ-parisi.fr

Appartenance et finitude

Si l'espace de la phénoménologie est bien circonscrit par l'*a priori* universel de la corrélation, il est requis de s'interroger sur la signification de celui-ci et sur ses conditions propres : ce que l'on pourrait nommer l'*a priori* de cet *a priori*. Celui-ci s'avère comporter une double dimension, pour autant que le sujet de la corrélation est caractérisé à la fois par le fait qu'il appartient au monde, selon une communauté ontologique fondamentale, et qu'il s'en distingue radicalement puisqu'il le fait paraître. La première exigence débouche sur une cosmologie singulière pour laquelle le mouvement du sujet procède de l'archi-mouvement d'une *physis*, sa vie d'une archi-vie. Mais, dans le cadre de cette parenté ontologique, la différence du sujet ne peut alors provenir que d'un archi-événement qui affecte le procès du monde sans que celui-ci puisse en être la source et qui n'est autre que l'événement même de la finitude. C'est la raison pour laquelle, en remontant de l'*a priori* de la corrélation vers son *a priori* ultime, on dépasse la phénoménologie vers une cosmologie et une métaphysique.

Didier Franck

Université de Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France; Institut Universitaire de France / adfranck@noos.fr

Y a-t-il une sensation pure ?

Les *Leçons sur la conscience intime du temps* que Husserl prononça en 1905 et qui furent éditées par Heidegger en 1928 constituent à n'en pas douter un des textes les plus déterminants de la phénoménologie. Elles décrivent la constitution temporelle d'un pur donné de sensation et reposent donc sur la compréhension du maintenant temporel (*das Jetzt*) comme sensation pure. Mais y a-t-il quelque chose de tel et ce que Husserl nomme « impression pure » n'appartient-il pas à une structure plus complexe ? Poser cette question, c'est poser la question de savoir si les analyses husserliennes

n'aboutissent pas à une dissolution du maintenant ? Quelles en seraient alors les conséquences sur l'intentionnalité ?

Bonnie Mann
University of Oregon, USA / bmann@uoregon.edu

How to Practice Feminist Phenomenology: The Case of Shame

In this paper I try to make explicit what is different about feminist phenomenology, beginning with the work of Simone de Beauvoir and moving on to more contemporary moments, including comments by Johanna Oksala. In order to make explicit the feminist phenomenological difference, I take up the specific phenomenon of shame. Recent accounts of shame in the work of Anthony Steinbock and Dan Zahavi, will be considered in light of the feminist phenomenological difference. Such accounts fail, on a feminist reading, because they are unable to enact a necessary oscillation between the particular and the general that is at the heart of feminist phenomenological practice. Because meaning emerges in the thick tension between lived particularities and deep generalities, these accounts that remain problematically generalized fail to reach or articulate the lived meanings of shame in the experience of those too often crushed by it.

Michael A. Schwartz, Osborne Wiggins
Texas A&M Health Science Center, USA / schwartz@medicine.tamhsc.edu

What Phenomenology Has to Offer Psychiatry? Aberrant Temporality Is a Core Phenomenon of Diverse Mental Disorders

Disturbances of temporality are core to a wide range of mental disorders, including mania, depression, schizophrenia, dementia, OCD and anxiety disorders and addictions. Nonetheless, temporality is underemphasized in present-day accounts of such disorders. This presentation will focus upon aberrant temporality in the above mental disorders.

Phenomenological insight can help clarify this issue. For all of us, at the doxic level, the future is protended as uncertain; some states of affairs could happen, or others just as well. At the emotional level, some of these states of affairs are intended as very desirable, and others as very undesirable. And at the evaluative level, the desirable states of affairs are protended as the ones which definitely “ought-to-be”, and the undesirable states of affairs as the ones which definitely “ought-not-to-be”. In mania and melancholia, we might say that there is an “arc” stretching over the lived past, present, and future that intends them all as the same. This arc is doxic, affective, evaluative, and conative. Fundamentally, in affective states mania or melancholia, implacably dichotomously – either totally good or totally dismal, temporality is determined and determinative.

The presentation will go on to explore phenomenological aspects of other psychopathological states: schizophrenia, dementia, anxiety and addiction. Finally, neurobiological correlates will be addressed.

Nicolas de Warren
Husserl Archives; Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium /
Nicolas.deWarren@hiw.kuleuven.be

“He’s Mad that Trusts in the Tameness of a Wolf”: Trust in the World and the World in Trust

The aim of this talk is to understand the varied ways in which trust forms the unspoken fabric of our presentness in the world. Through a reading of Shakespeare’s *King Lear*, I shall propose a phenomenological analysis of trust and the lifeworld. In addition to trust in others and self-trust, I shall argue that a fundamental trust in the world forms an integral component of what it means to be at home in the world.

SYMPOSIA

I

Dan Zahavi
University of Copenhagen, Denmark / zahavi@hum.ku.dk

Predictive Coding, Neo-Kantianism, and Transcendental Idealism

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called prediction error minimization theory to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-19th century. Even more importantly, some neo-Kantians eventually came to have serious doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the model. In my talk, I will first argue that this criticism has implications for our assessment of the contemporary theory as well and then show how Husserl's transcendental idealism can be seen as an effort to avoid the empirical idealism of the neuro-representationalists.

Uldis Vēgners (respondent)
Riga Stradiņš University, Latvia; University of Latvia / uldis.vegners@gmail.com

Predictive Coding and Experience

Neuroscience of predictive models works based on assumption that the brain implements some form of Bayesian inference whereby the brain is able to predict the probable causes of sensory input. The models advanced in neuroscience are open to philosophical interpretations about how and to what extent the brain is related to the body and the world. According to one interpretation the brain is strictly cut off from the rest of the body and the world and have to make probabilistic inferences by decoding sensory inputs. According to another, the brain is a part of a larger system of brain-body-environment.

The interpretation that argues for a strict separation between the brain and the rest of the world is committed to a form of internalism and representationalism, while the interpretations that argue for reciprocal interaction among brain–body–environment work in association with embodied, enactivist approaches.

The representationalist interpretation of predictive models, which posits two worlds, the real one and one that is a simulation of the brain, is what Zahavi finds especially problematic. However, one can ask whether, looked from the phenomenological (Husserlian) perspective the embodied, enactivist interpretations are not as problematic as the representationalist one? Because, while the philosophical interpretations of predictive models revolve around the relation between the brain, on the one hand, and the body and the world, on the other, in the phenomenological context a more important question concerns the relation of experience (consciousness), on the one hand, and brain–body–environment, on the other. In other words, the question is not whether the brain can access the rest of the world and whether it is an element in a larger system, but rather how experience relates to both the brain and the world? What is the relation of brain–body–environment as experienced and accessible to phenomenological investigation with physical brain–body–environment? As it will be argued, when Husserl criticizes representationalism and maintains that the world that appears is the only real world, it is not the idea of the brain representing the world that he puts in doubt, but rather the idea of experience representing the world.



Jagna Brudzińska

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland /
jagna.brudzinska@uni-koeln.de

Vom deskriptiven zum relationalen Unbewussten. Zur Phänomenologie der Grunddimensionen psychoanalytischer Erfahrung und des sozialen Ursprungs menschlicher Individuation

Sowohl in der phänomenologischen als auch psychoanalytischen Tradition hat der Begriff des Unbewussten viele verschiedene Bedeutungen und bezieht sich auf verschiedene Dimensionen subjektiver Erfahrung. In meinem Beitrag will ich drei wesentliche Dimensionen jener Erfahrung und dementsprechend drei Begriffe des Unbewussten voneinander unterscheiden: den deskriptiven, den dynamischen und den impliziten bzw. relationalen.

Auf diesem Hintergrund, ausgehend von den Ergebnissen der Psychoanalyse und unter Anwendung der phänomenologischen Methode der genetischen Intentionalanalyse werde ich insbesondere die Rolle des impliziten relationalen Unbewussten im Individuationsprozess, d.h. im Prozess der Selbstwerdung der Person diskutieren.

In diesem Zusammenhang wird ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die frühe intersubjektive Erfahrung gelegt, und zwar auf ihre elementare Form der sympathetischen Partizipation. Neben den Einsichten Freuds wird es dabei vor allem auf die Resultate der Neo-Psychoanalyse und der modernen psychoanalytischen Forschung ankommen.

Daniel Tkatch (respondent)

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium / mail@danieltkatch.net

A Husserlian Account of the Hysterical Unconscious: Making a Case for Passive Noematic Synthesis

In this paper, I focus on *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, a collection of Edmund Husserl's renowned lectures on "passive synthesis" given between 1920 and 1926, and on *Studies on*

Hysteria (1895), a book Sigmund Freud co-authored with Josef Breuer, in which psychoanalysis and, in particular, Freud's theory of the unconscious emerge.

The *Studies* is one of Freud's first works he wrote after his psychological re-orientation: he stopped treating hysteria exclusively on physiological and anatomical grounds and approached it primarily from a psychological or metapsychological standpoint, based primarily on the concepts of "idea" (*Vorstellung*) and "affect". These concepts also play a central role in Husserl's phenomenological analysis of passive synthesis, which he conceived of as his own way to approach Freud's discovery of the unconscious.

I argue, however, that Husserl's account still suffers from Friedrich Herbart's and Franz Brentano's legacy of linking idea and affect too strongly, which results in an overly static idea of unconscious. I thus attempt to incorporate Freud's theoretical separation of idea and affect into Husserl's account of passive synthesis. I do that, among others, by interpreting Husserl's idea of sedimentation as accounting for Freud's idea of hysterical conversion and investigating whether Freud's claim that "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" is compatible with Husserl's account of association.

I conclude that it remains doubtful whether Husserl's noetic synthesis alone can offer a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the complex and dynamic unconscious synthetic processes on the passive level, as Freud would understand them, or how such processes would unfold according to that framework. Moreover, I argue that, in order to combine the two, Husserl's rigid hierarchy between intention and hyletic data – his apparent assumption that hyletic data simply constitutes the "material" for intentional apprehension (*noesis*) – would need to be reconsidered.

While, according to Husserl, hyletic data is never primary but always already mixed and enriched by intentional and sense-based apprehension, this seems to undermine his insistence on the noematic–noetic separation of synthesis along the passive–active division lines. Since unconscious processes, such as the ones Freud observes in hysterics, are examples of noematic synthesis, they too should be treated phenomenologically within the framework of passive synthesis. Hence, I argue, one needs to extend Husserl's theory of passive synthesis with an analysis of passive noematic syntheses.

III

Sara Heinämaa
Academy of Finland; University of Jyväskylä, Finland / sara.heinamaa@helsinki.fi

Embodiment, Personhood, and Sexual Difference

The concept of gender has a central role in contemporary social and human sciences. It covers wide areas of theoretical discourse on human sociality and intersubjectivity, both empirical and philosophical. As distinguished from the concept of sex, the concept of gender is one of the main tools with which we interpret, explain and organize human behavior and life.

The aim of this paper is to offer an alternative to this dominant articulation of human existence on the basis of classical phenomenology. I will argue that Husserl's phenomenological inquiries into the structures of embodiment offer a very different starting point for the investigation of sexual difference than the ideas of gender and sex. Whereas gender-theories aim at explaining observed differences between men's and women's behaviors, dispositions, actions, accomplishments and positions by the interplay of social, cultural and biological forces, phenomenology studies how the sense of sexual difference is established in personal and interpersonal experiences in the first place.

The paper consists of two major parts. The first part (sections 1–4) offers a set of systematic and historical clarifications of the conceptual distinction between gender and sex. The aim is to get clear about the senses in which these concepts are used in contemporary social and human sciences. The latter part (sections 5–6) shows how the phenomenological account of human embodiment differs from the dominant paradigm of sex–gender interaction. It argues that female and male bodies – as thematized, theorized and explained by the biosciences, and as distinguished from gendered roles and gendered performances in the social sciences – are themselves results of complicated processes of objectification

that rest in their sense on two fundamental types of experiencing bodies: 1) living bodies as instruments for intending material things and 2) living bodies as expressions in communicative interaction with others.

This does not mean that the human body would be a mere social construct or cultural artifact. Even if the bio-scientific articulation of the human body is an outcome of complicated scientific practices of objectivization and idealization, the body itself is fundamentally a prescientific object that is co-given to us in action and communication and is not something that we make, fabricate, or invent.

Agata Båk (respondent)

National University of Distance Education in Madrid, Spain / agat.bak@gmail.com

From Exclusion to Difference. Considerations about *The Second Sex*

Simone de Beauvoir mentions in *The Second Sex* that whereas the man is usually conceived as the Subject, the woman is on the contrary meant to be the Other, and so to say excluded from the condition of ego. The whole project of *The Second Sex* can be in fact resumed as an effort to show who woman is, rather than to set the problem of sexual difference aside and leaving it to biology or sociology.

We agree with prof. Heinämaa's statement that de Beauvoir's approach to the femininity is influenced by Husserlian philosophy rather than by Sartrean, with whom she disagrees in the matter of embodiment and personhood. Rather, and this is what we want to highlight, a person, woman or man, is determined by a set of embodied practices from which the biological and the sociological facts can be abstracted; yet, sexual identity cannot be reduced to any of those dimensions, as it is more similar to stylistic unity rather than to any particular feature, biological or not.

The purpose of the present speech is to insist in one of the aspects of the sexual difference, that is, in its embodied and intersubjective context and I will do so by appealing to Husserlian notions of normality and anomaly. These notions are for Husserl not only descriptive, but also normative, and refer to the normal and embodied course of one's experience, in the first place, but then they expand to embrace the whole community of subjects (not exclusively human). We believe that the interplay of these notions enables us to speak properly about the difference rather than privation and exclusion.

Speaking about normality will then serve a twofold purpose: on the one hand, it will make more clear why de Beauvoir accuses philosophy of setting femininity aside as "the absolute Other". On the other side, we believe that the reflection about normality with its nuances enables us to raise important questions in the areas where the feminine could be still considered as "other". That is the case, some authors claim, of some branches of traditional medicine. The stigma of "otherness" then still seems to hover over female patients that are not granted proper care. That is why the "phenomenology offers valuable resources for approaching issues concerning the lived experience of marginalization, invisibility, non-normativity and oppression.

PAPERS IN PARALLEL SESSIONS

Bernardo Ainbinder

Universidad Diego Portales, Chile / bernardo.ainbinder@udp.cl

The Embodied *Dasein*. Heidegger's Conception of the Body and Why It Matters to Cognitive Science

Heidegger's neglect of the body in his existential analytic of *Dasein* has been a favourite target for his critics. Some have claimed that Heidegger's omission of the body is part of a larger neglect of a proper conception of lived spatiality in favour of a temporalized approach to *Dasein*, others have insisted that by putting aside the body Heidegger attempts to ground a simplified neutralized picture of ourselves.

I think this approach is somehow wrongheaded because it fails in acknowledging the reasons that Heidegger himself provides – though not always explicitly – for avoiding the notion of “body” and any associated concepts.

In this paper, I aim to gain a new insight on the question of the body in Heidegger's philosophy. In particular, I aim to show that while Heidegger fails to explicitly address the embodied nature of *Dasein*'s experience in *Being and Time*, this should not be understood as a claim about *Dasein*'s disembodied nature but rather as a criticism of a given way of conceiving such nature through an insufficient understanding of what a body is. In short, Heidegger's argument is the following: human beings are indeed bodily beings. But the way in which they exist in a bodily fashion is permeated and determined by their mode of being, what Heidegger calls *Existenz*. Hence, Heidegger does not reject the embodied character of *Dasein* but a way of conceiving of the body, even within the phenomenological tradition, as a layer of our being that we share with other non-human animals and that somehow preexists and grounds our personalistic being. This is what we may call, following Crowell, phenomenology's naturalistic assumption. This is precisely what Heidegger tries to avoid by not talking about the body in *Being and Time*.

Does that mean that Heidegger's philosophy is utterly inconsistent with any form of naturalism? This would have important consequences, for example for the possibility of a Heideggerian inspired Cognitive Science (see about this the debate between Ratcliffe and Wheeler). I will claim there is a certain sense of naturalism that can be made compatible with Heidegger's analytic of *Dasein*. In order to convey such

sense, I will examine Heidegger's claims (pervasive in his lecture courses throughout the 1920s and especially in the time right after BT's publication) about the nature of life, organisms and functions to provide a model of how *Dasein's* bodily nature should be understood.

As a consequence, I will be able to reassess the possibility of a Heideggerian 4E cognitive science and draw some conclusions about a kind of naturalism, which would be consistent with Heidegger's overall picture.

I will proceed as follows:

- 1) Briefly assess the usual arguments regarding Heidegger's neglect of the body and the way in which it is taken to convey an antinaturalist vein in Heidegger's thought.
- 2) Examine Heidegger's take on the bodily nature of living beings in general and *Dasein* in particular, focusing on GA 26 and GA 29/30 but also drawing from some of his earlier lecture courses.
- 3) Provide a model of the precise sense in which *Dasein* can be taken to be a living embodied being.
- 4) Briefly assess what consequences such a model may have for a Heideggerian cognitive science, in particular for the way in which such a picture would impact some thesis about the embodied extended mind and its advantages vis-à-vis a Merleau-Ponty inspired view such as Varela's.

A **anna Alichniewicz**
Medical University of Łódź, Poland / anna.alichniewicz@umed.lodz.pl

The Experience of Bodily Absence: Drew Leder's Phenomenology of Embodiment

Phenomenology of embodiment has become one of the most important themes in the contemporary phenomenological thought. Nowadays, it is French phenomenology of embodiment that is especially appreciated and influential, whereas other phenomenologists dealing with the problems of body seem to be less known. In my presentation, I would like to draw attention to the American phenomenology of embodiment and focus on Drew Leder's conception of the absent body. Developing the ideas outlined by Merleau-Ponty in his *The Visible and the Invisible*, Leder tries to show that usually explored modalities of perception and motility do not exhaust the question of embodiment. His inquiry is devoted to the bodily states, which involve "experiential absence", like body in sleep, autonomous physiological functions (breathing and circulation), the corpse. He also investigates the phenomenon of bodily absence as one of the main dimensions of the Western intellectual life. Leder argues that the inclination to regard the human being as somewhat "disembodied" is still prevalent in Western style of thinking. Against this background, it is Leder's account of Cartesian dualism that seems especially interesting. Noting how influential the Cartesian quest for "de-corporealization" remains, he challenges the traditional critique of the Cartesian dualist approach. From the phenomenological perspective, the Cartesian dualism is typically criticized as the view overlooking the lived body experience. Leder indicates that, paradoxically, this may be not the case. To the contrary, the phenomenon of bodily self-concealment and the experience of bodily absence support the dualistic view. Leder states that it is the bodily tendency to conceal itself that has contributed to the success of the Cartesian project. Not being a dualist himself, Leder argues that phenomenology of the absent body enables insightful apprehension of previous concepts of the self and the body, and in that way it can also help to explain the strength of the dualist paradigm.

J **on Andersson**
University of Oxford, England / jon.andersson@mansfield.ox.ac.uk

Back to the Music Itself

I will propose solutions to the following three problems in contemporary philosophy of music, using a broadly Husserlian methodology: 1) The Ontological Problem: what is the mode of being of music? 2) The Essence-Problem: First, the general essence-problem: what is the essence of music in general? Second, the specific essence-problem: what is the essence of any specific musical object? 3) The Epistemic Problem: how can we have epistemic access to musical objects?

After an introduction, I proceed step-wise in section 2. The first step is the application of the *epoché*, thus bracketing out the causal origin of any actual occurrence of music, including what its properties

are as understood by physics and questions concerning who made it and how. In the next step, I apply the eidetic variation as presented in *Experience and Judgment* § 86–92. In the third step, I apply the retention–impression–protention schema to the melody, as Husserl himself does. But while Husserl uses the melody as an Archimedean point for other issues, I will take a close look at the melody itself, arguing that for anything to be music, it must be a universal, but also a temporal object with phases corresponding to this schema. I will argue that there can be musical objects with only single chords, since such a musical object will be a temporal object with the chord as its second phase, with the first and third phases being empty. The second phase will then correspond to a primal impression of the chord, with an empty and thereby indeterminate retention and protention, typically fulfilled by the experience of silence before and after the chord sounds. A work of “silent music”, like John Cage’s 4’33 will have its second phase as empty and indeterminate too, where the indeterminacy is typically filled in by random sounds.

In section 3, I respond explicitly to the three problems, and compare them to alternatives, most prominently Ingarden’s, but also later analytic philosophy, especially Levinson and Kivy, along with recent discussion. In section 4, I look at further issues concerning the constitution of musical taste and preconceptions. I argue that Husserl’s later genetic phenomenology can address these issues without risking to fall into historicism, naturalism or psychologism, i.e. to not render music purely mental, material or formal. I finish by arguing that this Husserlian approach to music is potentially emancipatory in the spirit of Walter Benjamin, since it liberates the music from a supposed necessary connection to an individual historical musical genius, thus shifting the emphasis towards the experience and the meaning (genetically) constituted in it, i.e. shifting the focus from the musical composers and performers, instead leading us back the music itself.

Dimitris Apostolopoulos
University of Notre Dame, USA / dapostol@nd.edu

On the Possible Aesthetic Extension of Phenomenology

In a well-known remark, Husserl claims that fiction is “the living essence of phenomenology”. Even if phenomenology uncovers essential and unchanging truths, it still stands to gain from the resources generated by fiction, including works of art. Artworks furnish us with the tools to undertake the sort of imagining needed for intuiting phenomenological essences. In his actual phenomenological reflections, however, Husserl rarely avails himself of these sorts of resources. By contrast, Heidegger’s later writings abound with extensive discussions of artworks. According to Heidegger, poetry is best positioned to disclose the nature of being to us. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger integrates the conclusions he draws from reflection on works of art into his positive claims about “being”, “meaning”, “world”, etc. As a result, among phenomenologists, Heidegger’s approach to the aesthetic dimension of phenomenology has loomed large.

By turning to Merleau-Ponty, my goal in this paper will be to explore an alternative account of how phenomenology might be developed in an aesthetic direction. In his reflections on Heidegger’s work, Merleau-Ponty claims that Heidegger does not adequately recognize the extent to which human activity is needed to disclose, receive, or articulate the meaning of being that is expressed in works of art. The meaning of being, as it is manifested in works of art, is not received passively by us. This is chiefly because a basic task of a phenomenological aesthetics is to develop a mode of expression that can adequately state the meaning of being.

As I will argue, in his account of literature and literary language, Merleau-Ponty develops an account of “operative” language that is aesthetically and poetically informed, but which (unlike in Heidegger) cannot be identified with literature or poetry. By considering his interpretation of Proust and Valéry in courses from 1953–1954, as well as some of his later working notes, I show that Merleau-Ponty thinks that phenomenological expression must embrace the creative, allusive, and suggestive features of literary or poetic expression. But unlike Heidegger, he holds that literary language still provides the resources to develop an account of phenomenological essence, truth, and objectivity, even if his understanding of these concepts is unlike Husserl’s. Merleau-Ponty provides an alternative view of the possible aesthetic

extension of phenomenology that is more proximate to Husserlian phenomenology (despite Merleau-Ponty's significant reservations about some of Husserl's premises).

In addition to providing us with an alternative interpretation of phenomenology's aesthetic commitments, and its reliance on fiction, I conclude by suggesting that the stated conceptual and methodological importance of literature for Merleau-Ponty's thought suggests the need to rethink the overwhelming scholarly emphasis on his reflections on painting and visual art.

Julian Bakula
University of Warsaw, Poland / julek.bakula@gmail.com

Prefigurations of the Phenomenological Method in Friedrich Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*

In my presentation, I am going to consider what I call prefigurations of the phenomenological method in Friedrich Schleiermacher's philosophical and theological work (mainly *The Christian Faith*). Although it cannot be said to have inspired Husserl directly, Schleiermacher's conceptualisation of the religious feeling bears a strong resemblance to Husserl's ideas. Namely, both of these thinkers seem to be profoundly concerned with the topic of consciousness as such not with its specific intellectual or emotional content, but with its constitutive, essential features.

The god-consciousness, related to the feeling of absolute dependence, presents for Schleiermacher a datum of human consciousness as such; it is its inward fact. The self is able to unfold it, discovering its own dependence on God, through observation of an element of partial dependence in each of the various states of consciousness. Theology, in Schleiermacher's understanding, is an exploration of consciousness, and of its particular states inasmuch as they unfold the essential properties of consciousness as such.

I will try to prove that Schleiermacher's method corresponds with Husserl's ideas explained in *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Schleiermacher's abandonment of proofs for the existence of God (an abandonment, which can be viewed as a methodological decision) in the face of inward self-evidence of god-consciousness, resembles Husserl's phenomenological reduction. While Husserl tries to solve the riddle of external world's transcendence by withdrawing to the self-evidence of the immanent, Schleiermacher views the inner religious experience discovered within self-consciousness as a remedy for the essential weakness of previous proofs for the existence of God. I would also like to point out other interesting similarities between these two thinkers, consisting in an attitude of conscientious descriptiveness common to both of them and in the resulting resistance to reductionist tendencies (e.g. to moralism in philosophy of religion or to psychologism in logic).

I am going to indicate an interesting context of the mentioned correspondence, which can be seen in *The Idea of the Holy* by Rudolf Otto, a phenomenologist of religion. In his work, Otto uses phenomenological tools to develop Schleiermacher's ideas, focusing on the mode of givenness of the religious feeling. This method leads him to the recognition of a crucial dichotomy within the numinotic feeling (*mysterium tremendum* and *mysterium fascinans*). I am going to argue that the very nature of Schleiermacher's conception determined Otto's choice of using phenomenological tools to develop it.

Finally, I am planning to indicate the inspiring potential of those theological prefigurations of the phenomenological method. The ambitious task of conceptual explication of the religious feeling set before theology by Schleiermacher can also be adopted by philosophy as a maximalist (and intellectually fruitful) programme. The possibility of proper description of such a feeling within some conceptual framework can be a criterion of its relevance.

Anna Bańbura, Krzysztof Dyga, Weronika Kałwak, Magdalena Wojciechowska,
Małgorzata Opoczyńska-Morasiewicz
Jagiellonian University, Poland / magda.wiktor@gmail.com

Saved in Translation? Phenomenology in Qualitative Research in Psychology

Phenomenology invites us to go "back to things themselves" – to get a better sight of them – by bracketing prior knowledge, certain beliefs and assumptions. In qualitative psychology it is suggested to

suspend evaluation or judgment and to focus on describing the experience, what is inspired by Husserl's *epoché*.

This suggestion is embodied in qualitative research methodology based on individual interviews. There are at least two participants in qualitative study – the interviewee and the interviewer. We obtain a specific *procès-verbal* as a result of a study. The aim of researcher (the interviewer) is to reach, reveal and report on experience of participant (the interviewee) and to abstain from any interpretation.

However, *praxis* of such a research in psychology involves researcher in inquiring about the possibility to follow Husserl's directions. Participant, when describing own experience in the interview, assigns meaning and makes a choice what to talk about. The manner of talking about experience (the particular wording, language, nonverbal expression etc.) is then read by researcher during the live dialogue, listening the recorded interview and making transcription respectively. Finally, the analysis of transcription is to refer to original experience.

Considering how many moments of translation there are in the research process, is the researcher able to report on clear experience of participant? The aim of our speech is to reflect on whether and how to meet classical phenomenological requirement of pure experience description in qualitative research in psychology. We illustrate our argument with the examples of our own studies.

Ryan W. Beitz

University of Helsinki; Aalto University, Finland / ryanwilliambeitz@gmail.com,
ryan.beitz@aalto.fi

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of the Body in Contemporary Architecture Theory

Since at least the 1979 publication of Christian Norburg-Schulz's *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture*, contemporary architectural thought has been marked by a sustained interest in the tradition of phenomenological philosophy. Figures like Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have served as rich conceptual reserves from which various architectural thinkers have drawn. One reason for their interest is the methodological primacy phenomenology awards to experience. In particular, it is phenomenology's insistence on the constitutive role of the body in our everyday experiences of the world that entices these architectural thinkers.

Indeed, of the many philosophers whose method might be described as "phenomenological", it is Merleau-Ponty that has been the most influential in architectural thinking. As architect Juhani Pallasmaa writes, the "merging of space and self is one of the founding ideas of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy that offers a fertile conceptual ground for the understanding of artistic, architectural, and existential phenomena". Similarly, architect Steven Holl writes, "Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* [...] contains an astonishing chapter: *The Intertwining – The Chiasm*. (It was, in fact, the source of the name I gave my 1992 competition entry for the Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki – Chiasm was changed to Kiasma, there being no "C" in Finnish)".

But while it is clear that these architectural thinkers have found in Merleau-Ponty's thought useful, there remains a risk in their application. This risk stems from the fact that there are two competing readings of Merleau-Ponty's conception of the body. The first reading advocates a transcendental or foundationalist understanding of the body and stresses that the body be understood as an unchanging, *a priori* structure upon which an ethics – whether architectural or otherwise – should be grounded. Thus, the risk here is a surreptitious naturalization of present conceptions of the body – conceptions which can be shown to be historically-constituted.

The second reading of Merleau-Ponty nullifies this risk. This reading, recently put forth by Johanna Oksala, argues that Merleau-Ponty conceives of the body as historically-constituted, thereby barring any conception of the body as transcendent or biological brute fact. After all, Merleau-Ponty says, "Man is a historical idea, not a natural species" (*Phenomenology of Perception*).

To show why this latter reading is superior, this paper moves through three sections. First, I will show the ways in which recent architectural thinking has employed the insights of Merleau-Ponty concerning the body. While the use of Merleau-Ponty has led to many useful practical insights in architectural thinking, the unclarified status of the body leaves these thinkers open a risk of naïve foundationalism. Next, I clarify the two competing readings of Merleau-Ponty on the body. I argue that the foundationalist

risk is alleviated through by reading Merleau-Ponty's conception of the body as a historically-constituted condition of the possibility of experience. Finally, I outline the stakes entailed in each reading as they pertain to the domain of architectural thinking. I argue that the historically-constituted reading of the body provides architecture with the conceptual tools for countering today's mechanisms of control that force architecture to operate against its own potential as a force for positive social change.

Philipp Berghofer

University of Graz, Austria / philipp.berghofer@uni-graz.at

Perceiving Other Minds

It is one of the most fundamental questions of philosophy of mind how knowledge of other minds is possible. How is it possible to know that other people have minds? Or even more challenging: How is it possible to know that a specific person is in a specific mental state? To be sure, virtually no one doubts that knowledge of other minds is possible. When I see somebody squatting in a corner and crying, it is safe to say that this person feels miserable. My belief that this person feels miserable is justified, but what kind of justification do I have? Here, one of the most central questions is: Is my justification for this belief inferential or non-inferential? Does my belief that this person feels miserable epistemically depend on other beliefs or is my perceiving this person as miserable sufficient for justifiably believing that this person feels miserable? And what do I perceive when I look at this person in the corner? Apart from the posture and the tears, can I also perceive this person's mental state, this person's misery? Such questions are of crucial importance for any theory of intersubjectivity.

Concerning the question of whether beliefs about other people's mental states can be non-inferentially justified or not, there is an interesting divide between approaches of so-called analytic philosophy and phenomenological approaches. Current analytic philosophers tend to hold that such beliefs can only be inferentially justified. Classical phenomenologists like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty claim that such knowledge can be immediate, i.e., non-inferential. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, however, do not agree on what it is that can be perceived. Merleau-Ponty claims that it is possible to literally see the other person's mental state. I can see the person's misery. Husserl, on the other hand, holds that the other person's mental states can only be in the horizon of my perceptual experience. The person's posture and tears are given originally within my experience. The person's misery, however, only is co-given.

Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty agree that immediate justification concerning other people's mental states is possible, but they disagree on how this is possible and on how the other person's mind is given within one's experiences. Both phenomenological approaches have recently been championed. In my contribution, I shall defend and refine the Husserlian approach.

The structure of my paper is threefold. First, I argue against the widespread assumption that knowledge of other people's mental states can only be inferential. Secondly, I will introduce Husserl's concepts of horizon-intentionality and co-giveness; and, thirdly, I shall show that what is co-given can be known immediately and that this account can perfectly explain how immediate knowledge of other's mental states is possible.

Roberta Bocca

École Normale Supérieure, France / robi.bocca@gmail.com

Dépossession et dépersonnalisation : vers une primauté de l'anonyme chez Merleau-Ponty ?

Si l'anonymat est une question majeure dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, les commentaires critiques font souvent de ce sujet l'un des aspects difficiles à démêler, entraînant à la lecture d'un « deuxième Merleau-Ponty » comme si nous avions affaire à une brusque reconversion ou à un virage de sa pensée phénoménologique.

Sans nier une évolution qui se produit tout au long de la production merleau-pontienne et qui vise à assumer, de différentes manières et par différents chemins, la question relative à la conjonction de l'âme et du corps, notre attention se porte sur la maturation de cette évolution et sur la présence de

la thématique de l'anonymat dès sa *Phénoménologie de la perception*, et de façon constante jusqu'à la fin de sa production intellectuelle. Cette persistance dans le temps, qui n'exprime pas une immuabilité et univocité totale de signification comme sa raison d'être mais plutôt une pensée en devenir, nous amène à y entrevoir un ancrage dans sa conception de la chair, formulation qui mûrit presque au même rythme.

Nous voudrions donc aborder cette problématique à partir de trois questions majeures, qui nous semblent bien résumer l'enjeu impliqué : si, dans une philosophie phénoménologique comme celle inaugurée par Merleau-Ponty, nous pouvons observer un intérêt constant pour l'homme concrètement saisi, comment concevoir cette « survenance d'anonymat » ? À quoi se réfère notre auteur quand il parle d'anonymat, de dépossession de soi et de dépersonnalisation ? Est-il possible de penser l'anonyme en dehors d'une liaison ou d'un primat entretenu avec la conscience ou avec le sujet ?

Les questions pourraient se multiplier encore. Nous en avons esquissé quelques-unes afin de montrer une difficulté qui traverse l'interprétation de la pensée merleau-pontienne ; cependant, « une telle démarche n'est pas seulement récompensée par une meilleure compréhension de ce que nous devons à Merleau-Ponty, mais aussi de ce que la phénoménologie toute entière, et jusque dans son questionnement le plus contemporain, a reçu et peut encore recevoir de lui ».

Elodie Boubil

Le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France / elo.boubil@gmail.com

Vulnérabilité et phénoménologie de l'intersubjectivité

S'appuyant sur une analyse phénoménologique du « trauma vicariant » ou « fatigue de compassion », à la lumière des travaux récents de la psychiatrie phénoménologique sur l'intercorporité, cette présentation s'interroge sur la vulnérabilité qui caractérise la subjectivité et la phénoménologie de l'intersubjectivité qui en procède.

En s'opposant au paradigme de la subjectivité transcendantale, Merleau-Ponty soutient que la vulnérabilité de la conscience, la vulnérabilité du sujet, et in fine la vulnérabilité du monde comme chair précèdent les pouvoirs constituants de la conscience et les moments de la réflexivité et de la maîtrise. Le corps propre est vulnérable et ouvert aux transformations de son environnement, de son histoire et de ses relations. La vulnérabilité ne se définit plus alors seulement comme une susceptibilité d'être blessé, renvoyant à des expériences de violence et de victimisation qui menaceraient la subjectivité. La vulnérabilité opérerait aussi, comme Erin Gilson l'indique, en tant que « condition transcendantale, qui fait signe vers une ouverture et une plasticité qui rend possible la transformation du sujet ».

Nous montrerons ainsi que la vulnérabilité est relationnelle au sens où elle présuppose une ouverture et une donation commune de moi-même, des autres et du monde ; elle est également relationnelle au sens où nos relations et nos liens sont en eux-mêmes vulnérables et précaires. Une « éthique indirecte » pourrait alors se déployer, où la responsabilité, le soin et le souci seraient intégrés aux processus d'individuation du sujet – la contribution de la phénoménologie de l'intersubjectivité à l'analyse de la vulnérabilité ouvrirait alors des perspectives fécondes pour penser à la fois la clinique du trauma vicariant et l'éthique du soin qui lui est associée.

Megan M. Burke

Oklahoma State University, USA / megan.burke@okstate.edu

Toward a Feminist Political Phenomenology of Imagination

In this essay, I draw attention to feminist phenomenological accounts of the imagination and the imaginary domain as deeply political (Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, Bonnie Mann, Iris Marion Young). In particular, I show how feminist phenomenologists are acutely attentive to the ways that imagination is generative of women's subordination in general and (hetero)sexual subjectification in particular. I contend that this adds a necessary dimension of political depth to a phenomenology of imagination. For instance, whereas for Maurice Merleau-Ponty the imagination is the domain that widens the space in which we think, feel, and sense and thus opens and expands up the real, a feminist phenomenology, as a political phenomenology, suggests that the imagination is also that which closes

the space in which we think, feel and sense the world. As such, I argue that the feminist account keys us into the political relationship between the concrete experience of gender oppression and the imagination. I pay particular attention to how the patriarchal sexual subordination of women relies requires a restrictive imagination. I conclude by thinking through “the feminist imagination” in feminist phenomenology (Luce Irigaray, Iris Marion Mann, Mariana Ortega) in order to account for how and when the imaginary domain becomes liberatory.

Veronica Cibotaru

Université Paris-Sorbonne, France; Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Belgium /
veronica_cibotaru@hotmail.com

La description phénoménologique de la relation à Dieu

Le geste fondateur de la phénoménologie a été conçu par Husserl comme une réduction du vécu du sujet à une évidence donatrice de sens. Ce geste nous dévoile un nouveau domaine, à savoir celui du vécu du sujet transcendantal et nous propose à la fois une nouvelle méthode philosophique, à savoir la description phénoménologique comme description d’une évidence originaire qui donne sens au vécu.

Cela implique que si on décrit un vécu phénoménologiquement on doit aussi s’interroger sur quelle évidence s’appuie ce vécu. Or qu’en est-il de la description phénoménologique de la relation du croyant à Dieu ?

Mon propos sera de montrer qu’une telle description est problématique, si on garde le souci de ne pas simplifier cette expérience, et de suggérer à la fois comment on pourrait décrire cette expérience en gardant l’exigence de la méthode phénoménologique.

L’enjeu et à la fois la difficulté sera de décrire cette relation comme une relation à un être qui est à la fois présent et infiniment éloigné. Cela nécessite toutefois de sortir du cadre phénoménologique husserlien, sans pour autant abandonner ses exigences fondamentales. Ceci non pas parce que la description de cette relation est pratiquement absente dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, mais plutôt parce que la relation à Dieu échappe à deux éléments fondateurs de sa phénoménologie, à savoir l’ego transcendantal comme source de tout sens et l’intersubjectivité comme structure essentielle de la subjectivité transcendantale. En effet, la relation du croyant à Dieu est une expérience absolument individuelle, c’est pourquoi elle ne peut pas être par essence intersubjective, même si le croyant peut essayer de la décrire et donc de la partager avec d’autres sujets. Ensuite, la relation à Dieu inverse le rapport intentionnel entre le sujet transcendantal et l’objet intentionné. Dieu a un sens originaire pour le croyant, qui se révèle à lui, ce n’est pas lui qui le constitue. Ici, la source originaire de la donation du sens n’est pas l’ego transcendantal mais Dieu lui-même.

Nous voyons ainsi que la relation du croyant à Dieu remet en question le rapport intentionnel de façon analogue au thème d’Autrui tel qu’il est compris par Lévinas. En effet, selon Lévinas Autrui brise le rapport intentionnel, parce qu’il implique un pensé qui n’est plus à la mesure de la pensée, comme il le montre dans *Totalité et Infini*. C’est pourquoi nous prendrons la phénoménologie de Lévinas comme source d’inspiration afin de suggérer une description phénoménologique de la relation du croyant à Dieu. Ainsi toute la question sera de comprendre quelle est l’évidence qui donne tout son sens à la présence de Dieu pour le croyant. Cette présence originaire peut-elle être décrite comme la présence d’un Autrui, mais d’un Autrui sans visage à proprement parler, puisque le visage présuppose déjà la chair? Si Dieu n’a pas un visage comme « trace » qui se manifeste à travers la chair, quelle est alors l’évidence qui atteste sa présence pour le croyant?

Cristian Ciocan

University of Bucharest, Romania / cristian.ciocan@icub.unibuc.ro

Embodiment and Animality

This talk is focused on the relation between human and animal embodiment, starting from the following questions: Does the phenomenology of the living body address human and animal corporeality in an indistinctly and uniformly manner? How can we differentiate between the specific embodied

human experience and what is accessible to us (by a modified empathy and transfer) in relation to the corporeality of the animal? How can we trace the border between the phenomenology of body and the phenomenology of animality? I will try to answer these questions by contrasting the positions of Husserl and Heidegger. On the one hand, Husserl defines the animal as an abnormal variation of the human being, as a disfigured human in its bodily aspect, thus understanding the question of animality through the lens of the bodily typicality, and through the tension between normality and abnormality. On the other hand, Heidegger argues that, in spite of the abysmal bodily kinship with the animal, there is an essential difference between the human body and the animal organism, thus opposing the tendencies of humanizing the animal and of animalizing the human. Starting from this polarity, I will question the possibility of articulating the similarity and difference between the human body and the animal body. What is crucial is not only to see the common share of these problematic spheres, but also to describe their specific irreducibilities.

A nna Caterina Dalmasso

Jean Moulin University Lyon 3, France; University of Milan, Italy /
annacate.dalmasso@gmail.com

Thinking Embodied Mediation in Contemporary Technoculture

Screens and media technologies have radically transformed – and are still transforming – our cognitive and social practices, and ultimately, our embodied existence. Screens have become the interfaces through which we encounter the world; they work as prosthesis expanding human possibilities of knowledge and action. Indeed, the coupling of body and technics has never been so evident as in the last decades, and it has important, indeed urgent, political, ethical and social implications for our historical moment. As it has been pointed out, such a massive exteriorisation of human capacities into technologies could entail a dematerialization of our embodied experiences. As a result, should we infer that this transformation would yield to an elision of our body and elicit a progressive insensibilisation of it? In other words, are our technologized bodies becoming themselves prosthesis of media? Or, alternatively, are we simply facing a further stage of the exteriorization of technics, in which Leroi-Gourhan saw the very germ of human evolution? What is at stake in such set of problems is the question of mediation, which, despite widespread theorizing about media, still remains undertheorized and represents one of the central intellectual challenges of the 21st century. Now, if we think of mediation as the function or performance of particular media technologies, we only consider a very late stage of mediation and we miss the embodied structure which still is the very condition of possibility of our experiences – even those we tend to refer to as being “virtual”. What I aim to show is that, from a phenomenological point of view, mediation needs to be understood ontologically as the very condition of possibility of our encounter with the world and others, and historically as an embodied structure engaged in a constant activity of reconfiguration. In this perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s powerful account of the living body and the radical mediation it performs offers a very productive direction of research. Merleau-Ponty thinks of the body itself as a medium and of the flesh as an element of “self-mediation”. In so doing, the philosopher breaks free from a conception of the medium as a means or as an intermediate term, allowing us to redirect our attention to the mediateness of any appearance and to the body’s significance as the primary source of mediation. The mediation of the body, to which Merleau-Ponty refers, does not simply connect the human to the world, but links things to one another: the relation between an object and its entourage, just like the relations between objects themselves, passes through our body and is always mediated by the virtual structure of our body. In particular, Merleau-Ponty’s notions of body schema and intercorporeity, are not only decisive concepts to think of living body’s technicity, i.e., its capacity to expand its functions and annex objects as prosthesis or quasi-organs, but, significantly, it offers an effective paradigm for an account of contemporary mediascapes as embodied environments. Therefore, developing further such conception of mediation, would enable us to understand our bodily experience within – rather than against – our contemporary technoculture.

Gunnar Declerck
University of Technology of Compiègne, France / gunnar.declerck@utc.fr

Do We Need Others to Perceive Objects? On the Relation (or Absence of Relation) between Horizontal Intentionality and Transcendental Intersubjectivity

For Husserl, every object one perceives under a given “profile” presents itself – in virtue of its noematic sense (*Sinn*) – as possessing other profiles which are not currently perceived but could be if the perceptual conditions were different, typically a back side. These “absent profiles” are not perceived in the strict sense – they are “appresented” as the noematic correlates of mere possibilities (*Vermöglichkeiten*) of perception: as Husserl says, they only appear “improperly” (*Uneigentlich*) – but this is because of their somewhat “presence” that we are aware of transcendent objects in perception, rather than of mere sense-data. The appearing of these “absent profiles” is supported by a special kind of intentionality, which Husserl calls horizontal intentionality.

In a series of works, Dan Zahavi has developed an account of horizontal intentionality based on the contention that transcendental intersubjectivity is involved much earlier in the constitution of the layers of objectivity than what Husserl generally tends to admit when he performs the primordial reduction, i.e. reduction to the “sphere of ownness”. According to this proposition, horizontal intentionality entails structural references to the perceptions of possible others: absent profiles are appresented as profiles others could (have) see(n) at the moment when I myself access the object from one given side. Transcendental intersubjectivity is conditional to the constitution of the inner horizon, thus to the constitution of objects.

Zahavi’s defense of this claim (let’s call it the “intersubjectivity solution”) is, to a substantial extent, negative, in the sense that it is based on the analysis of other possible propositions, which are maybe more straightforward at first sight, but – this is Zahavi’s contention – happen to be flawed or to face significant counterarguments when examined more thoroughly. The two following propositions are addressed by Zahavi:

“The absent profiles are appresented as profiles given in past or possible future perceptions”, i.e. as profiles “which I have seen, or which I would be able to perceive in a future perception”;

“The absent profiles are appresented as the correlates of fictitious co-present perceptions. They are correlated with the perceptions which I would have had, if it had been possible for me to be there now (instead of here)”.

In this presentation, I will scrutinize the arguments presented by Zahavi to reject these propositions. I will argue that those arguments are disputable, either because they are ill-founded, or because, contrary to what is claimed by Zahavi, they in fact do not apply to these propositions. The main point missed by Zahavi in my opinion is that the possible perceptions to which absent profiles refer are defined by a strong form of counterfactuality: they should not be understood as possibilities that are effectively realizable, i.e. as *de facto* possibilities, but as *de jure* possibilities, possibilities that I could enjoy (or could have enjoyed) in principle, but that are maybe beyond my reach considering my concrete factual powers and opportunities. Consequently, the intersubjectivity solution cannot be considered a default explanation of the intentional process responsible for the horizontal appresentation of absent profiles. Until proven otherwise, one does not need others to perceive objects.

Maxime Doyon
Université de Montréal, Canada / maxime.doyon@umontreal.ca

Perceptual Optimality and Kinesthetic Experience in Husserl

In his research manuscripts on the constitution of space, Husserl has devoted much of his attention to the notions of perceptual normativity and optimality, especially in their relation to the experiencing body. The topology of the visual landscape is such that appearances are intentionally interconnected and organized around an optimum – the “central image” (*das zentrale Bild*) – to which they intentionally refer. Husserl’s basic idea is that the unfolding of perceptual experience is guided by our implicit awareness of how each point of the visual landscape could be optimally experienced if we were to effectuate the right movements. The actualization of such a possibility is an experience of optimization

(*Optimalisierung*) that provides the experiencing subject with more determinate content. Consistent with this, Husserl defines perceptual optimality in terms of “maximal clarity” (*maximale Klarheit*) and “richness of content” (*Inhaltsreichtum*). Interestingly, Husserl contends that the kinaesthetic paths, too, should be regarded from the point of view of the optimum. Unless a particular difficulty arises, we, as perceptual agents, automatically tend to opt for the optimal path and move our body such as to optimize our view. We are, in other words, habitually oriented toward the optimum, insofar as our habitual bodies provide our experience with some kind of basic, but still norm-sensitive orientation or direction towards “optimal givenness”. The kind of kinaesthetic freedom we enjoy is therefore not total liberty, since of all the things “we can” do, only some will resonate with our habitualized tendencies and appear suited or appropriate with regard to our perceptual goal. In brief, then, the norm of perception – optimal givenness – is kinesthetically experienced as an intentional tension between our actual position and the optimal perspective we aspire to. This is the idea the paper will unfold and critically assess against the background of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of normativity and optimality.

Odé Ekaterina
Ecole Normale Supérieure, France / ode.ekaterina@gmail.com

Vers la question de la « phantasia perceptive » dans la nouvelle phénoménologie française : la phénoménologie du cinéma, comment est-elle possible ?

La phénoménologie classique ne s’est guère intéressée au cinéma: Husserl n’évoque l’expérience cinématographique que très brièvement dans les chapitres sur la conscience d’image lorsqu’il évoque la phantasia perceptive qui, faisant partie de l’imagination, participe de la constitution de l’image perçue. Cependant, la discussion autour de la phantasia perceptive et de l’expérience cinématographique trouve un prolongement chez les représentants de la nouvelle phénoménologie française : Merleau-Ponty le premier cherche à expliquer la nature de la perception visuelle au cinéma en termes phénoménologiques, Ricœur s’interroge sur la relation de l’imagination à l’image-souvenir, Derrida (sans pour autant attribuer au cinéma une place importante dans la philosophie) tente de considérer le cinéma comme une forme d’écriture où la voix prend la position principale dans ce qu’on appelle le corps filmique habité par des simulacres et des fantômes ; Marc Richir consacre certaines de ses œuvres à la phantasia perceptive afin de montrer dans quelle mesure « l’imagination » et l’imaginaire structurent l’expérience quotidienne.

Cependant, phénoménologiquement nous pouvons distinguer, depuis Husserl, entre l’action de phantasia perceptive au théâtre et celle qu’elle exerce au cinéma. Cette différence passe par la notion husserlienne du « conflit » entre la « chose-image » et « l’objet-image ». Pour cette raison et pour d’autres, Marc Richir, par exemple, s’oppose à la possibilité de développer une phénoménologie du cinéma : le cinéma (comme la photographie ou le tableau) ne nous renvoie à la réalité effective que par l’intermédiaire de la phénoménalité « coupée » et choisie par l’artiste, adaptée d’une certaine manière à notre perception en tant que spectateur, au contexte culturel de l’époque et au schéma concret des références et des significations. Néanmoins, la considération derridienne du cinéma comme une forme de l’écriture est prolongée par Lucie Roy, où l’écriture est vue comme l’empreinte des choses empruntées au monde, à la *Lebenswelt*. Ici, l’image-empreinte est comprise comme chargée de phénomènes-du-monde, comme une trace ou un lien direct avec la réalité effective.

Dans notre contribution nous chercherons à présenter quelques arguments pour une phénoménologie du cinéma afin de répondre à la question essentielle de savoir comment elle est même possible. Nous étudierons ainsi l’élaboration du sujet de la phantasia perceptive dans la nouvelle phénoménologie française où elle est considérée comme faisant partie de l’intentionnalité. Nous développerons une interrogation critique de la position théorique (richirienne) de la passivité du spectateur au cinéma, nous parlerons pour cette raison de la voix acousmatique au cinéma où l’acousmètre est un personnage destiné à être imaginé par le spectateur. Tout en insistant sur la position active du spectateur, nous affronterons la question de la relation entre le montage et la narration au cinéma, question posée par Deleuze mais présente également chez les formalistes russes dans leur projet de poétique du cinéma.

Christian Ferencz-Flatz

University of Bucharest, Romania; University of Cologne, Germany /
christian.ferencz@phenomenology.ro

Abnormality and Perceptual Communication. Husserl on Animals, Children and Madmen

As is well known, the concept of “normality” is first used by Husserl in relation to what he terms as “psycho-physical conditionalities”: the conditional correlation between the physiological state of the subject’s body and the constitution of his perceived objects. In this perspective, Husserl contrasts the case of “ortho-aesthetic” or normal perception, wherein the subject’s sense organs function concordantly, with the case of an abnormally functioning organ. Later on, this model of synaesthetic collaboration also serves Husserl as a paradigm for understanding the more complex processes of intersubjective experiential cooperation, leading to a wider use of the terms “normality” and correspondingly “abnormality”. Following this analogy between the synaesthetic and the intersubjective concordances and discordances of experience – an analogy which later on also becomes central for Merleau-Ponty’s conception of “intercorporeality” – Husserl often illustrates his concepts of normality and abnormality by addressing the manner in which intersubjectivity comes to regulate sheer sensory perception. In this context, he explicitly states that “the plurality of subjects function analogically like a subject which gains a unitary experience throughout the individual subjects and their senses: every individual subject obtains this experience by experiencing through the others”. Regarded solely in this perspective – because the notion of normality of course also comes to cover different meanings in Husserl as well – normality would designate the ideal situation in which the communicative, intersubjective moment of perception runs unhindered. The following presentation will start with a detailed critical analysis of Husserl’s conception of the intersubjective communication of perceptions. On its grounds, it will then question the manner in which Husserl is led to thematize the various forms of experiential abnormality in the case of animals, infants and madmen as forms of hindered perceptual communication. Finally, it will address some of the ethical concerns pertaining to this account of abnormality.

Anthony Fernandez

Dalhousie University, USA / avf@mail.usf.edu

Race, Gender, and Psychopathology: Reflections on the Phenomenology of Difference

Much of what goes on under the label of “applied phenomenology” – e.g. studies of race, gender, and psychopathology – might be characterized as a “phenomenology of difference”. These studies articulate the diverse ways in which one’s subjectivity and embodiment might diverge from accounts offered by the classical phenomenologists, including Husserl and Heidegger. When articulating these alterations and differences, phenomenologists often claim that certain kinds of subjects have a distinct “structure” of existence. In light of this, they call for a phenomenological approach in which the “structure” of human existence is understood as historically contingent, rather than as necessary and universal. Such a conception of human existence would allow phenomenologists to study the particularity of different kinds of subjects, as well as how individual subjects might alter and develop over a lifetime.

I agree that we should employ a phenomenological approach that is sensitive to contingency and difference. I argue, however, that the terminology currently used to convey such contingency and difference is poorly defined. The term “structure” refers to at least three distinct layers of phenomenological research: 1) “prejudices”, i.e., the set of tacit biases passed down through generations; 2) “modes”, i.e., our diverse manners of comportment; and 3) “existentials”, i.e., the fundamental, categorial structures that are assumed to hold for any human subject, such as intentionality, temporality, and affectivity.

I argue that once we distinguish these three senses of “structure”, we can better understand the kinds of alteration and difference investigated across the various subfields of phenomenology, and better articulate what we mean by historically contingent “structures” of human existence. I show that phenomenological studies of racial and gender embodiment are typically concerned with “prejudices” and “modes”. They reveal how the meaning of one’s environment can differ because of the tacit biases or

traditions at play. And they show how such biases produce new modes of comportment, e.g. inhibited intentionality in feminine experience, or hyper-reflexivity in racialized embodiment.

Phenomenological studies of psychopathology, however, go a step further. They posit alterations in the existentials themselves. For example, recent literature on schizophrenia suggests a fundamental disturbance in the existential of selfhood, resulting in pathological experiences of agency and self-ownership. And studies of depression suggest a loss of affective attunement, rather than a mere change from one mode of attunement to another. Such disturbances go beyond the kinds of alteration and difference that we find in studies of race and gender, and they are not easily accommodated within the classical phenomenological frameworks. These more fundamental disturbances, I argue, require a phenomenological approach that accommodates what we might call “ontological” or “transcendental” contingency – that is, contingency in the most fundamental features of human existence, those features that the classical phenomenologists assumed were necessary components of any human subjectivity.

Devin Fitzpatrick

University of Oregon, USA / dfitzpat@uoregon.edu

Impure Phenomenologies

Contemporary phenomenology is beset by methodological tensions that reveal themselves at its intersections with other disciplines, most notably with cognitive science and feminist philosophy, and which the traditional distinction between transcendental and existential phenomenology is insufficient to resolve. Transcendental phenomenology affirms its Husserlian heritage and is positioned as a reflective discipline that offers pure descriptions of the structure of consciousness. Existential phenomenology is a vague category that generally refers to those thinkers who distance themselves from Husserl’s vision of phenomenology as a rigorous science meant to ground the natural sciences. Transcendental phenomenology depends upon the suspension of the natural attitude via some form of the phenomenological reduction for the validity of its insights, as in Fink’s *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*; existential phenomenology, by contrast, is that which affirms or implicitly accepts that it does not fully suspend the natural attitude at the cost of apodictic certainty about its conclusions, as in Merleau-Ponty’s embrace of a “philosophy of ambiguity”. The distinction is loose and I think best understood as a matter of degree that gauges how reliant any given phenomenologist is upon transcendental argumentation that presents its conclusions as value-neutral or unbiased descriptions that are in principle incontestable by empirical evidence. The usefulness of the distinction today lies in exposing how a phenomenologist’s methodology shapes their position at the intersection of phenomenology and other disciplines. Among phenomenologists at the intersection with cognitive science, those who defend the necessity of a transcendental method, like Dan Zahavi, contest phenomenology’s naturalization while those that do not, like Evan Thompson, argue for it; at stake is the authority of phenomenology over the sciences and vice-versa. Among phenomenologists at the intersection with feminist philosophy, the classic question of what a descriptive method may contribute to normative questions (in this case, the inherently political concerns of feminism) becomes a challenge to the purely descriptive status of phenomenology and a split between those, like Sara Heinämaa, who are dedicated to the transcendental status of phenomenology and those, like Lisa Guenther, who are openly guided by a critical project.

The problem is that neither transcendental nor existential phenomenologies currently have methodologies adequate to justify intervention in science or politics. The transcendental status of phenomenology depends upon the possibility of performing the phenomenological reduction, but as an investigation of the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*’s “phenomenology of phenomenology” shows, this possibility has never been adequately demonstrated and may not in principle be articulable. Unless it can be proven that transcendental phenomenology offers pure descriptions of the structure of consciousness, it cannot resolve cognitive science’s explanatory gap and it has failed to examine its own political entanglements. But simply embracing ambiguity and the impossibility of pure description cannot be the answer. Existential phenomenology is defined by its inattentiveness to its method, but phenomenology that both cannot show how it gets at the structures of consciousness and does not see this as a problem risks becoming bad psychology. I coin the term “impure phenomenologies” to investigate what a rigorous

phenomenological method that denies the possibility of pure phenomenological description could be and offer to empirical science and critical inquiry.

A **anna Petronella Foutier**

Stockholm University, Sweden / anna.petronella.foutier@philosophy.su.se

Beauvoir's Reading of Sade: The Other as a Sexual Being

In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty stated that the human being “is a historical idea and not a natural species”, and that sexuality is an original intentionality rather than a biological mechanism. However, although he painstakingly analyses this process of “escaping” (*échappement*) in which a factual situation is taken up and transformed into actions, expressions, ideas and works of art, his analysis of sexuality is, at most, a sketch. As we know, Simone de Beauvoir took the inquiry further in *The Second Sex* and shows how the transcendental ego is in fact constituted as a male hegemonic subject through the relegation of woman into the position as other; sexuality is of course chief importance in this process.

In the essay *Must We Burn de Sade?* written around two years later (1951–1952), Beauvoir approaches this issue from another angle, in presenting an intriguing examination of the famous writer and libertine Marquis de Sade. With all his human and literary shortcomings, despite his self-centred and often cruel behaviour, Sade is portrayed as a “great moralist” who “made an ethic of his sexuality”. Judith Butler has proposed an interpretation of this essay and tried to show how its rather counterintuitive claims might suggest “a philosophy of sexual freedom”.

In this paper, I will approach the essay from the ontological rather than ethical perspective of being-for-others. What does sexuality reveal about human existence if it is explored, not, as Merleau-Ponty does, through the example of pathological behaviour where its expression is largely restricted, but instead in a form of eroticism that transgresses the behaviour constructed as normal. In Beauvoir's reading, it is the very vileness of Sade's eroticism that reveals him as flesh – that even “realizes him as flesh”, which means that “separated individuals are reunited”. Despite the “isolatism” that Beauvoir attributes to Sade (the term is invented by Sade and occurs several times in his works) his destiny shows the radical dependency of embodied subjectivity upon the other: in the inmost depths of his libidinous life he is in need of other people.

I **ngo Frank**

Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Germany / frank@ios-regensburg.de

Phenomenology as Mechanistic Explanation of Consciousness – Ontological and Methodological Investigations towards an Explanatory Framework for Interdisciplinary Cognitive Sciences

Neurophenomenology as introduced by Varela is characterized as interdisciplinary study of consciousness by a combination of phenomenology and neuroscience. The question is, how a “mutual enlightenment” between this two methodologically and epistemologically quite different disciplines should work. An explanatory framework for neurophenomenological explanation has to be constructed not only by a “naturalization of phenomenology”, but also by a “phenomenologization of neuroscience”. This paradigm shift of the neurophenomenology research program indeed moves us away from the problematic conceptual framework of the “hard problem”, but causes methodological and ontological issues regarding the integration of the disciplines. In my talk I will focus on neglected ontological and methodological aspects of this paradigm shift in order to tackle these issues. By doing this I discuss the relevance of phenomenological ontology and philosophy of cognitive science for the construction of an explanatory framework for neurophenomenological explanation of consciousness. Regarding the issue of integrating phenomenology into the cognitive sciences – i.e. the controversial problem of the “naturalization of phenomenology” – I will argue for my thesis that Husserl's genetic phenomenology is mechanistic explanation of consciousness. My idea is to apply the mechanistic model of scientific explanation to Husserl's phenomenological analysis. I show how Husserl's phenomenology is in principle compatible with the mechanistic explanations characteristic of the cognitive sciences,

including neuroscience. Because Husserl's laws of essence do not explain e.g. the passive synthesis of inner time consciousness, but only describe its self-constitution, in a sense, laws of essence themselves must be explained by analyzing the mechanisms behind them. So, genetic phenomenology should aim for mechanistic explanation, not (deductive-)nomological explanation. Similarly, Varela's dynamical model only describes, but does not explain the self-organization process of the brain. If we could not conceptualize dynamic models as mechanistic explanations, we would not be able to understand dynamical systems. Therefore, dynamical systems must be explained mechanistically: dynamical explanation should be mechanistic explanation. Regarding the problem of the "phenomenologization of neuroscience" I use Husserl's phenomenological ontology to extend the explanatory framework of mechanistic explanation with levels of region to support motivational causation in the region of consciousness. The ontological as well as phenomenological informed framework will finally serve as a "field-guide to levels" for further investigations. In order to clarify the explanatory character of the neurophenomenological explanation some case studies will be examined. The results are two different views of the regions of consciousness and nature/neuroscience. On the one hand regions can be seen as levels of organization. On the other hand regions can be seen as levels of analysis. The controversies of both differing views will be discussed in the context of the "mereological gap" or categorical border between (pure) consciousness and nature and Husserl's own proposal of a *rechtmäßige[n]* "Naturalisierung" des Bewußtseins.

Federica Frattaroli

Università di Roma Tor Vergata, Italy / federicafrattaroli.mail@gmail.com

Langage, art, expression chez M. Merleau-Ponty et M. Dufrenne. Éléments pour une comparaison

Une réflexion sur les thèmes du langage et de l'expressions en leur rapport avec le phénomène artistique au sein de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty et de Dufrenne a comme objectif celui de reconstituer un parcours qui mène de la théorie phénoménologique ayant comme objet le langage, jusqu'aux problèmes d'esthétique phénoménologique.

Le noyau de cette analyse est la notion d'expression qui ouvre la possibilité de relier le discours sur le langage, qu'on retrouve chez Merleau-Ponty – essais *Sur la phénoménologie du langage* et *Le langage indirect ou les voix du silence* –, à l'interrogation de Dufrenne sur les caractéristiques de l'objet esthétique, à partir d'une phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique.

Que le langage et la signification doivent s'inscrire davantage dans les gestes ou pouvoirs du Corps, selon l'héritage husserlien de l'analyse du *Leib*, c'est affirmé déjà dans *Phénoménologie de la perception* ; le signifié conceptuel se forme sur un signifié gestuel, donc à travers le corps de la parole qui exprime le sens comme style ou comme une modulation de l'existence unitaire – organique – et percevable. Dans cette approche on retrouve la distinction entre « parole parlée », une utilisation empirique du langage qui porte sur un sens déjà constitué, et « parole parlante », une parole expressive qui manifeste la genèse du sens et de l'intention signifiante. De cette façon la réflexion de Merleau-Ponty porte sur le problème diachronique de la nature inépuisable du sens du point de vue soit perceptif soit linguistique.

En considérant la définition d'expression que Merleau-Ponty formule dans son cours *Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression* – et différemment dans *La prose du monde* –, on voit que sur un fond de langage qui possède une signification donnée et déjà structurée, un nouveau sens peut surgir, peut naître à la communication comme une forme, selon le modèle de la Gestaltpsychologie. L'expression est cette propriété qui au niveau du phénomène en permet le surgissement d'un autre qui n'a jamais été donné.

En reprenant les assomptions fondamentales de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty et en se détachant des modèles sémiologiques qui considèrent l'art un ensemble discret de signes ou un code, Dufrenne, dans son essai *L'art est-il langage ?*, réfléchit sur les rapports entre la signification et le statut de l'œuvre comme objet esthétique. Contrairement au langage, l'art se caractérise comme une unité organique qui se développe selon une nécessité, selon laquelle elle doit refaire les instruments qu'elle possède. En ce sens la création esthétique est parole parlante, restructuration expressive d'un code préexistant, formulation

d'un sens nouveau. C'est dans Le poétique que Dufrenne peut joindre le problème de l'information et de la signification à celui de l'expression poétique des mots originaires : ils expriment un sens ambigu, surdéterminé, n'étant que le symbole de la richesse des images de la Nature en tant que puissance créatrice.

Sans quitter le niveau esthétique et perceptif, l'expression devient témoignage du principe de nécessité – d'une « condamnation au sens » – et d'une possibilité d'être créée, non pas à travers une puissance théologique extérieure, mais par le pouvoir transcendantale de renouvellement du réel, que l'art peut exprimer.

Peter Gaitsch, Sebastjan Vörös

University of Graz, Austria / peter.gaitsch@uni-graz.at
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia / sebastjan.voros@ff.uni-lj.si

Bottoming from the Top: Phenomenology and the Life–Mind Continuity Thesis

In the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in phenomenology among philosophers of mind and cognitive (neuro)scientists. It has been claimed that the work of Husserl (but also of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger) contains invaluable conceptual and methodological resources that could complement and improve contemporary scientific approaches to mind and consciousness. To this end, Francisco Varela and his colleagues put forward a scientific model (enactivism) and a correlative research program (neurophenomenology) based on the idea of a constant back-and-forth exchange between first-person (phenomenological) and third-person (scientific) accounts. The approach has been rapidly gaining in recognition, and has been successful in introducing some of the central phenomenological concepts into the mainstream scientific community.

However, despite the posited circulation between phenomenology and science, the field has been predominantly centered around the bottom-up issues, i.e., approaches exploring whether, and how, it is possible to successfully integrate phenomenology into the framework of natural sciences (so-called “naturalization of phenomenology”). The reciprocal, and equally important, “top-down” approaches, i.e. approaches exploring whether, and how, phenomenology might modify our understanding of nature and natural sciences (so called “phenomenologization of nature”), have been chronically understudied. To remedy this asymmetry, this paper purports to examine how phenomenological methodology might be applied to one of the central tenets of enactivism: the life–mind continuity thesis (cf. Evan Thompson). According to this thesis, there is a strong (structural) continuity between life and mind: mind is said to be “life-like”, while life is said to be “mind-like”.

Here, a particular challenge for the top-down approaches is to show how they could account for the seemingly non-sentient life forms (e.g. plant life), without falling prey to (naïve) anthropocentrism. To address this issue, the paper will proceed in three steps. First, we intend to explore whether a modified version of Husserl's somatology, “the science of the lived body”, could serve as a fundamental methodological framework for a phenomenological (top-down) re-construal of life sciences. In the second step, we will argue that, in tackling this issue, Husserlian phenomenology could profit from some of the insights put forward by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Helmuth Plessner. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty's later work on the “neither-nor” ontology of the Flesh may serve as good ontological grounding for Husserl's ideas on embodiment. On the other hand, Plessner's theory of positionality might provide useful methodological guidelines for differentiating specific modes of embodiment as manifested in different forms of the living (plant, animal, human life). Finally, drawing on these different sources, we will try to flesh out a unified phenomenological framework of the living, whose main tenet (somatic continuity thesis) may serve as a complement to, and enrichment of, currently prevalent bio-phenomenological approaches (life-mind continuity thesis).

Paula Galhardo

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France / paulagalhardocepil@gmail.com

Entre perception et pulsion : Merleau-Ponty sur le « désir de voir »

Au cœur du dialogue entre phénoménologie et psychanalyse se situe la question de savoir si la phénoménologie, en tant que discours sur ce qui apparaît, est capable de rendre compte de la dimension du désir telle qu'elle a été formulée par la psychanalyse freudienne, c'est-à-dire comme ce qui est ancré dans une dimension pulsionnelle. Chez Maurice Merleau-Ponty, la tentative d'articuler perception et désir constitue un effort central, surtout dans la dernière période de sa pensée. La question de savoir si cette tentative est réussie reste pourtant controversée parmi les commentateurs : alors que certains auteurs insistent sur l'insuffisance de la perspective merleau-pontyenne sur ce point, d'autres affirment que le dernier Merleau-Ponty aurait précisément réussi à dépasser la distinction entre désir et expérience sensible à partir de l'élaboration du concept de « chair ». Dans notre intervention, nous voudrions revenir sur cette question presque classique – celle de l'articulation entre désir et perception – dans le but d'y apporter une nouvelle réponse. En effet, nous voudrions soutenir que les élaborations merleau-pontyennes autour de « l'énigme de la visibilité » permettent d'envisager une nouvelle articulation entre perception et désir, à partir de la problématique d'un « désir de voir » – ou dans un vocabulaire plus psychanalytique, de la « pulsion scopique ». Nous chercherons à montrer comment les réflexions du dernier Merleau-Ponty autour de la connivence ontologique entre le sujet et monde offrent des pistes précieuses pour penser le lien entre visibilité et incarnation. D'une part, ce lien nous renvoie à une reformulation de la question du sujet connaissant comme étant d'abord un corps qui s'émeut – comme le dit Merleau-Ponty, « l'œil est ce qui a été ému par un certain impact du monde ». D'autre part, le lien entre visibilité et incarnation nous amène aussi à une réflexion sur l'articulation entre le « sujet-voyant » et le « sujet-visible », c'est-à-dire sur un sujet qui, à la fois, voit et est regardé. En suivant la réflexion du dernier Merleau-Ponty sur la question d'un « désir de voir », nous serons donc conduits à examiner, d'un côté, la question du corps comme le siège des pulsions, et de l'autre, celle du sujet comme un entre-lacs entre la vision et le regard.

Erik Garrett

Duquesne University, USA / garrette@duq.edu

Intersubjectivity and the Phenomenology of an Urban Home

This is part of a larger future book project looking at a phenomenology of urban life. I am interested in the historical constitution of our urban intersubjectivity. This presentation will focus on Husserl's notion of "homeworld" (*Heimwelt*) and "alienworld" (*Fremdwelt*) in relation to the idea of the home. In particular, the phenomenological meaning of stranger will be explored starting in Husserl and then working through the concept in Alfred Schutz and Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that a phenomenological explication of the notion of home and the idea of a stranger show that we must resist the tendency to reduce these terms to a naturalized spatial location. Instead, they are to be thought of in terms of how meaning and history are co-constituted over time. Therefore, the terms stranger and home refer to a form of "expressive communication" and a threshold border that is to be transcended.

This piece not only explicates the phenomenological writings on home and stranger, but also seeks to apply them to an urban context. For the first time in human history more people live together in cities than in the countryside. Scholars in urban studies, communication, sociology, and geography can gain insight from a proper phenomenological analysis that comes from a phenomenological analysis of "urban homeworlds". The urban home also provides an important contemporary context for any phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Yet, merely living together does not mean that the social dimension of intersubjectivity is one of social closeness.

Using the phenomenological research into the understanding of "place" by Edward Casey, I provide a case study of how one particular neighborhood was deemed to be "placeless" because of various prejudicial and racist assumptions. Through a study of archival pictures I will show how the neighborhood was literally cut off via the design of urban planners. I argue that we must account for the taken-for-granted edges in both history and the present that divide communities and block or limit the

possibility of establishing intersubjective communities across borders. Cities will only be sustainable when we overcome the way that segregation has become historicized into the very fabric of urban living.

As Levinas reminds us, the idea of a home should not be the end of human activity, but its commencement. Meaning that because of the instability of the rhetorical concept we have a phenomenological duty to help others build a home in the world side-by-side. This can only be done if we reject accepted binaries and cross a threshold that allows us to enter the world of the stranger and bring them into our own home. As Anthony Steinbock has astutely pointed out, in phenomenology, the home has always been “beyond”. Ultimately this piece attempts to cross the threshold of home and look at its lived intersubjective relevance.

Saulius Geniusas

Chinese University of Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China / geniusas@cuhk.edu.hk

The Pathos of Time: Chronic Pain and Temporality

The paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of the temporality of chronic pain. First, I maintain that the field of presence constitutes the exhaustive horizon within which chronic pain is lived. I maintain that chronic pain is lived as the waxing of the present and the waning of the past and the future. Secondly, I argue that chronic pain is a form of depersonalization in that it cuts the field of presence from the past and the future: either the past and the future appear unreal, or the field of presence is marked by irreality. Thirdly, drawing on recent phenomenological and neurological findings, I argue that the past and the future, despite their apparent irreality, continue to affect the present either through implicit bodily memory, or through implicit bodily anticipation. Thus even though the subject in pain is locked in the field of presence, and even though she cannot resynthesize this field with the past and future, these other temporal modalities continue to determine the ways in which she suffers pain. This means that despite its depersonalizing effects, chronic pain is lived as *principium individuationis*. Thus even in the case of chronic pain, what is given in the field of presence continues to be surrounded by the horizons of the past and the future.

My goal is to articulate the therapeutic significance of such a phenomenology of embodied temporality. As S. Kay Toombs has argued, “the further one moves from the lived experience, the greater is the sense of alienation from one’s body”. Moreover, the greater the alienation from one’s body, the stronger the feeling that pain is an alien force, which invades one’s body from without, as though there were no inner ties that bind it to one’s past and future. The established conception of chronicity thereby intensifies the depersonalizing effects of chronic pain while at the same time downplaying the significance of its personal characteristics.

Within such a framework, phenomenology of chronic pain obtains its therapeutic significance. The phenomenological recognition of the central role that implicit memory and implicit anticipation play in pain experience leads to the following realization: if it is indeed true that chronic pain is nested in our memories and anticipations, then one cannot be liberated from it without transforming their effects and significance. A necessary condition for this is the recognition that chronic pain is an irreducibly temporal phenomenon and that implicit bodily memory and implicit bodily anticipation play a vital role in one’s pain experience.

The outlined phenomenology of chronic pains thereby leads to the realization that dialogue should play a preeminent role in the clinical encounter. What is especially called for is listening, which would be oriented not only to the content of the patient’s narrative, but also to its temporal course, images, associated subplots, silences, as well as the patient’s gestures, expressions, and body positions.

Valerie Giovanini

The European Graduate School, Switzerland / valerie.giovanini@egs.edu

Persecution and the Ethics of Alterity

It is valuable to contrast Levinas’s and Freud’s ideas on persecution because they both take seriously a hermeneutics of suspicion regarding the self’s motives, the insufficiency of abstract and universal

moral injunctions, and an inability to calculate consequences for arbitrating moral goodness. They both question the role of a self-sufficient subject and consider the ethical implications for this subject who is always caught in asymmetrical relations, either from social or psychological demands. Freud locates a frustrated homosexual component in emotional life as the nucleus of all delusions of persecution. Homosexual components of an emotional life are responsible for building social bonds that begin with others who are similar to oneself in significant ways, similar to Levinas who characterize these others as the “same”. A fruitful distinction between their works answer whether a subject can reach beyond itself, or what Levinas calls the same, in the affected life it leads. Persecution is an affective state that both Levinas and Freud attribute to an embodied subject who always stands in relation to another. A valuable difference between their approaches is Levinas’s thinking through the subject as primarily ethical in its incapacity to be indifferent to others, its proximity to others, and formulates an intentionality of search that must negotiate the subject conflicted between its phenomenal and infinite aspects. Significantly for Levinas, the subject who is persecuted in itself can go toward another for a change to an ethical subject. Even if Freud did not reach the conclusions about an ethical subject that Levinas does, this project looks toward relational, or inter-subjective, approaches in psychoanalysis to find converging ideas on the persecutory subject. After grouping characteristics for the persecutory subject as unknowable, relational, and vulnerable in both Levinas and Freud’s approaches to a subject who persecutes, I ultimately argue that such a subject who is inherently affected without a choice of preventing these relations can initiate new forms of moral sensibilities, such as ones of attunement to particular vulnerabilities without the precondition of understanding where and how the persecutory relation was formed that lead to inaction and indifference. I also suggest ways in which an intentionality of search can negotiate the ethical relation of proximity for a relational subject who always stands in psychological, social and ontologically asymmetrical relations to the other.

Maria Gołębiewska

Académie Polonaise des Sciences, Poland / mgolebie@ifispan.waw.pl

La question de la normativité culturelle dans le contexte de la phénoménologie du droit

Le but du texte est une reconstitution de la conception de normativité culturelle que nous pouvons retrouver dans la philosophie phénoménologique du droit. Le point d’issue du texte est le discernement entre normativité culturelle et normativité dans la culture. Ce discernement est basé sur une instance extra-culturelle qui n’est pas extra-humaine – elle est transcendante par rapport aux œuvres de l’homme et à son monde, mais toujours liée à l’équipement de l’homme, aux caractères de l’être humain spécifique et de son existence. Nous retrouvons ces conceptions de la culture et de la normativité qui lui est propre, avec des sources transcendantes, dans les philosophies de la culture de Hegel, Dilthey, Cassirer, et aussi dans la phénoménologie d’Edmund Husserl. C’est une normativité culturelle comme telle, strictement liée à une normativité de la raison et de la logique mais appliquée à la pratique. La normativité culturelle moderne ainsi comprise trouve ses sources essentialistes – transcendantes par rapport au monde de la culture créé par l’homme mais également présentes dans l’équipement essentiellement compris de l’être humain – avant tout dans la rationalité. La normativité culturelle est donc immanente à l’homme en tant qu’être spécifique. Elle est une condition a-priori des règles concrètes d’action, constituées et réalisées dans une culture définie, c’est-à-dire d’une « normativité dans la culture ».

La normativité culturelle a un domaine d’application plus large que la normativité morale et juridique avec laquelle elle est liée par des relations réciproques. La normativité culturelle n’est pas réduite à d’autres normativités à l’égard de l’enracinement des normes concernant l’action individuelle dans un monde intersubjectif commun, créé et co-créé en tant que monde social de la culture. On peut retrouver ces liaisons spécifiques entre la normativité culturelle et la normativité juridique dans les conceptions phénoménologiques du droit qui se réfèrent aux thèses transcendantales et essentialistes de Husserl. La phénoménologie du droit tente de donner une réponse aux questions sur les sources, le statut ontologique et épistémologique de la normativité comme telle. La question contemporaine sur la normativité culturelle confronte les présuppositions essentialistes avec une relativisation culturelle

réelle des normes et des valeurs, c'est-à-dire avec la « normativité dans la culture ». C'est pourtant la culture qui est reconnue comme la source et la base des normes et valeurs. Dans mon texte je me rapporte aux trois conceptions phénoménologiques du droit qui ont comme point d'issue commun les thèses phénoménologiques de Husserl: 1) à la conception égologique du droit de Carlos Cossio (la culture comme sphère d'expérimentation des valeurs et comme base de la constitution du droit), 2) aux thèses de Simone Goyard-Fabre (la constitution du droit comme conséquence du dévoilement de la normativité essentielle par le sujet du droit – transcendantal et en même temps empirique – qui est également une source de la culture), 3) aux thèses de Paul Amselek (qui complète les références phénoménologiques par des références à la phénoménologie linguistique de John L. Austin et au normativisme de Hans Kelsen).

Sandro Gorgone

Università degli Studi di Messina, Italy / sgorgone@unime.it, sandro.gorgone@gmail.com

A New Phenomenology of Nature: The Ecological Aesthetics of Gernot Böhme

The paper aims to interpret and discuss the proposal of the German philosopher Gernot Böhme of an ecological aesthetics; it represents an original development of the classical phenomenology in the sense of a general theory perception, with reference to the new phenomenology of Hermann Schmitz. In the wake of the traditional phenomenological understanding of the body (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) Böhme emphasizes the concrete human bodily experience in the natural environment with the practical (ethical and political) purpose to show that humans are a part of nature.

The starting point is the basic principle, deriving from the famous motto of Jean-Jacques Rousseau back to nature, that nature is not something lying beyond human beings, but that nature is “before us” (*vor uns*), i.e. it is a task for us, a challenge for our future self-understanding and our bodily existence. The consciousness that the body is part of nature – which we also belong to – makes it possible to integrate nature in itself and nature for us. The environment where we live is not only an issue related to nature itself; instead nature must be considered and preserved as a living space. The critical theory of Nature that Böhme promotes treats Nature not as wilderness, but as something historical shaped from culture, technique and civilization, as anthropogene Nature.

The aesthetic view of the natural phenomenon shouldn't, therefore, centre traditionally on the issue of beauty, but on the fact that we shape natural facts through our social, technological and economic activities, so that an ecological phenomenology of Nature must analyse the humane, socialized nature as living-fundament for men in its ecological structures, in order to define the limits and the forms not only of a sustainable but also a design-able development.

On the other hand, Nature influences our own feeling of being-there (*Befindlichkeit*) through our sensibility. Böhme names atmosphere – that which brings together the human situation and the quality of environment. The atmosphere is also the phenomenological core of nature, strictly related to the human bodily and physical location. In this sense human beings are not separated from the natural environment, but are in a continuous symbiotic relationship with their surroundings. This relationship has a primarily aesthetic character, in so far as aesthetics means, referring to the original definition of Baumgartner, a pathical philosophy of sensibility.

At this point I will discuss the matter of the origin and the technical-artistic creation of atmosphere: Böhme interprets the atmospheres as irradiation and evocation of spaces, things and human beings, bodily resonances of lived physical, architectonical and natural environments that we can perceive through particular aesthesiological experiences. The physiognomic and exposing power of things, persons and (artistic) works reveal the essential affective character of Böhmes ecological aesthetics and its wide spectrum of phenomenological application.

The phenomenon Nature in our technological time cannot also mean a counterpart to the culture of technology, but can be primarily considered as a pole of a new aesthetic design of human environment.

Tudi Gozé
University of Toulouse, France / t.goze@hotmail.fr

Providing New Insight in Affectivity From Marc Richir's Genetic Phenomenology

For Karl Jaspers, schizophrenia is characterized by its radical incomprehensibility, at both reflexive and pre-reflexive levels of intersubjective awareness. According to Bleuler, the most severe cases of schizophrenic autism could be associated with an absence of a genuine affective contact. If we take seriously this radical otherness, how is it epistemologically possible to think a second person perspective in psychopathology? In contrast to current opinion which locates mental states as affectivity within our head, phenomenologically oriented psychopathology regards it as encompassing phenomena that connects body, self, and world. This phenomenological tradition has been largely influenced by Martin Heidegger's notion of *Stimmung*. This means that the Being is "in the world" in a certain affective disposition which always-already colors the world of familiarity. The *Stimmung* qualify the tonality of *Dasein's* openness to the world and the others. The phenomenological literature of the early 1920s offered a rich and comprehensive perspective on affectivity in schizophrenia. By focusing on the existential dimension of affectivity, this approach remains partially insufficient to understand the somatic and emotional dimensions involved in affectivity, and thus may neglect corporeity. In our opinion, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of flesh opened a new perspective in understanding the relationship of being and the world as an embodied phenomenon. Thus, affectivity, and the affective relationship between my own flesh and other's flesh could constitute a crucial basis for intersubjectivity. This model, applied to social understanding, is regarded as an intertwinement of embodied affectivity. How to understand this embodied affective resonance? How to explain that affectivity is so "contagious"? Following such an embodied intersubjective approach, affectivity remains problematic in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. The French philosopher Marc Richir (1943–2015) proposed an internal division of the *Stimmung* able to rethink the affectivity's relationship to internal (*Innenleiblichkeit*) and external (*Aussenleiblichkeit*) flesh body. This work will be an opportunity to discuss the psychiatric relevance of Richir's work, which remains insufficiently known or translated.

Māra Grīnfelde
University of Latvia; Riga Stradiņš University, Latvia / mara.grinfeld@gmail.com

Lived Body in Illness as the Saturated Phenomenon

Phenomenology in its multiple ways of development has been and still is engaging in an ongoing dialogue with different disciplines. One of the partners of this dialogue has been medicine. During the last few decades many philosophers (Drew Leder, S. Kay Toombs, Havi Carel and Fredrik Svenaeus among others) have argued for the importance of phenomenological approach to medical practice, especially in understanding the experience of illness. Not surprisingly, the notion of lived body has occupied the central role of this research. Even though Husserl's ideas about lived body (*Leib*) as a bearer of sensations are mentioned, Merleau-Ponty's description of lived body (*le corps vécu*) as embodied agency of "I can" has been especially influential. In referring to this functional dimension of embodiment, phenomenologically oriented thinkers have described the experience of being ill as a disruption of one's lived body or "inability to" engage in a world in a habitual way.

The aim of this paper is to argue that the notion of lived body as the saturated phenomenon found in Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology opens up a richer account of experience of illness, incorporating not only functional, but also sensing dimension of embodiment. In order to illuminate this claim, the paper will focus on Marion's notion of lived body as the saturated phenomenon. In Marion's phenomenology lived body is described as givenness that is "saturated" with intuition instead of being shaped by intention or, in other words, as unconditional self-givenness exceeding any activity of subjectivity. As such, experience of one's lived body is characterized as inexpressible, incomparable and unpredictable givenness of sensations. It is argued that these characterizations can help one to gain new phenomenological insights into the structure of experience of illness. Lived body in illness appears to us precisely as the saturated phenomenon, namely, as a phenomenon that resists any kind of intentional activity coming from the subjectivity. Viewed as such, experience of illness exceeds the horizon of

meaning and time (thus shattering the habitual horizon of world and time, as well the sense of the active ego), and appears as an excess of intuition (thus shuttering any attempts in containing it conceptually). When one is feeling ill, both the experience of world, time and self is altered in unpredictable ways (functional dimension of embodiment), and one is confronted with inexpressible givenness of sensations (sensing dimension of embodiment). At the end of the paper it is suggested that the understanding of lived body in illness as the saturated phenomenon has some potentially important consequences for medical practice.

Till D.A. Grohmann

University of Wuppertal, Germany / grohmann@uni-wuppertal.de

Aesthetic Experience in Autism Spectrum Disorder

In this paper, I address sensorimotor problems of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) from a phenomenological perspective. I will draw the attention to a specific kind of sensorial states which, in my view, are particular for autism. What I will call “aesthetic experiences” are hyperaesthetic moments of strong sensorial bodily affection, which are not yet sufficiently considered by today research.

There is indeed a general agreement on sensorimotor and perceptive impairments in autism which lead to fundamental difficulties in the subject’s orientation in the world. Contemporary neurocognitive research on ASD therefore considers experience in severe autism to be “fragmented” and “chaotic”. However, the subjective dimension of such a fragmented and chaotic world is never fully addressed. By mainly drawing on autobiographical writings of individuals with autism, I will put forth the idea that besides the stressful moments of perceptive and sensorial fragmentation, ASD also includes more positive subjective states, in which the individuals feel safe and secure – and which are no less concerned with fragmented and intense sensorial events. As a matter of fact, people with autism often report experiences of great aesthetic intensity, which they compare themselves to quasi “hypnotic” states. As I will try to show, these are moments of profound calm, reproduced in a repetitive manner and which involve no anxiety.

Unfortunately, these moments are hardly discussed by today research. If ever, they are only mentioned in relation to attention disorders, where hypotheses reach from exaggerated or over focused selective attention to an impairment in shifting attention away from the perceptively selected items. According to these interpretations, people with autism are captured by some seemingly contingent perceptive details because their attention mainly operates on a local and lower perceptive level.

In contrast to these interpretation, Hanne De Jaegher recently noticed that in autism “an often-ignored factor in perception is the aesthetic element”. The aesthetic element of experience concerns the way a subject refers to his/her own experiencing. Its understanding presupposes to take into account the intimate relationship of a subject to his/her own body and the experiences s/he makes of it. The realist and functional perspective of the majority of today research on autism has enormous difficulties to conceive such an “aesthetic” dimension of experience. This is, however, a problem, since autobiographical writings of individuals with autism are full of examples.

Rico Gutschmidt

University of Chicago, USA / rgutschmidt@uchicago.edu

The Late Heidegger and a Post-Theistic Understanding of Religion

The relation of Heidegger’s philosophy to theology is a problem that remains of current interest, particularly because Heidegger’s later philosophy offers some hints towards an interpretation of religious language between theism and non-cognitivism. According to this post-theistic reading, the talk about god neither refers to an existent being, nor simply expresses religious feelings. Instead, religious language can be interpreted as describing in its own way the groundlessness of the world. In my presentation, I will discuss Heidegger’s later philosophy against this background.

In particular, I will focus on the questionable status of religious language from a philosophical perspective. From this perspective, religious language is typically either interpreted as referring to

a divine being in the sense of theism, as in natural theology and in recent analytical philosophy of religion, or as the non-cognitive expression of subjective states or religious feelings, what can be traced back at least to some readings of Schleiermacher. This seems to be a strong alternative. Nevertheless, I will explore a third way of interpreting religious language, which is inspired by the works of D.Z. Phillips. I call this third way a post-theistic understanding of religion. I will show that the combination of Heidegger's philosophy with a Wittgensteinian account of religion is fruitful to develop a post-theistic reading of religious language. What is more, this investigation will not only contribute to a philosophical understanding of religious language, but also yields a new interpretation of Heidegger's later philosophy.

In the first part, I will start with some brief background remarks on theism and the cosmological argument in order to establish the overall question of the presentation and its relation to Heidegger's philosophy. In the second part, then, I will draw upon the work of Wittgenstein to read Heidegger in terms of a post-theistic understanding of religion, one which avoids the shortcomings of both theistic and non-cognitive approaches. This is in line with current debates in philosophy of religion, which try to establish non-metaphysical readings of religious language, and also with corresponding attempts in post-modern Christian theology, which in part is directly influenced by Heidegger's philosophy.

In the second part of my presentation I will show with the help of Wittgenstein and Heidegger that a post-theistic understanding of religious language is plausible in general. The third part, finally, will explore in more detail what religious language is talking about according to this understanding. If it is neither referring to a theistic god nor simply expresses religious feelings, something has to be said about its contents. In this regard, I will show that religious language can be interpreted as a representation of the groundlessness of the world. For this purpose, I will discuss Heidegger's concept of being (*Sein*) and its relation to the cosmological argument. I will argue that both concepts, Heidegger's being as well as the cosmological argument, can be interpreted as a reference to the groundlessness of the world.

Christos Hadjioannou

Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellowship; University College Dublin, Ireland;
University of Sussex, England / chadjioannou@gmail.com

Phenomenology of Desire: *Liebe* and *Angst* in Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life

Heidegger's 1920 lecture course *Phenomenology of Religious Experience* offers one of the most compelling phenomenological analyses of theology. His analysis of religious experience redefined phenomenology itself, not least in that it offered the first phenomenological analysis of *Angst*, which in *Being and Time* pushed the borders of phenomenological ontology itself. Even though a lot has been written on these lectures, almost nothing has been written on how Heidegger's "discovery" of *Angst* resulted from an analysis of godly love and desire of truth. If we were to redefine the limits of phenomenology by further analyzing such phenomena as *Angst* and love, we would benefit from a closer examination of how Heidegger did it in the first place.

The proposed paper looks at Heidegger's interpretation of St. Augustine. The paper looks at Heidegger's accounts of love (*Liebe*) and joy (*Freude*) as they figure in the aforementioned lectures, so as to better contextualizes the emergence of *Angst* in his phenomenological discourse. The paper looks at Heidegger's early focus on factual life in terms of its motivations and tendencies as an attempt to account for the deeper originary foundations out of which philosophy springs, in an attempt to go even deeper than the cognitive accounts that the early Husserl gave. Heidegger speaks of the origin of intentional life, and of philosophy itself, in terms of motivation (as opposed to a reflective *epoché*) – and the first motivation that Heidegger identifies is love (*ερωσ*).

Heidegger arrives at the phenomenon of *Angst*, as indicative of understanding of the ungroundedness of the self, through Augustine's existential account on love that seems to be the motivation directing the various ways of self-understanding of factual life, i.e. the various ways of having factual life. Love is what characterizes the way Augustine has his own experience. Heidegger, following Augustine, identifies conflicting tendencies of love, centered around the distinction between the authentic way of how oneself

“has” this love, that is how the “having-of-oneself” is enacted as the authentic having of historical facticity, and the inauthentic ones which give in to the possibility of “falling”, that is, of becoming self-absorbed and lost in the secular world. The former will be identified by being directed and keeping with the love of God, sustained by continence (*continentia*), which enacts the overcoming of inauthentic “having”. The latter will be identified with the manifold ways that love diverges into the various ways that love directs itself at the secular world.

This is the originary context in which the fundamental mood of *Angst* emerges. *Angst* is the counterpart of a “fallen” relation to, an inauthentic having of, factual life’s desire to fulfilment of truth. In desiring fulfilment, the self identifies the readily given with truth and fulfills its desire. To repeat this in Augustinian parlance: the love of God and the desire for the good life manifests itself as a concern for joy, conveniently fulfilled by that which is given in secular everydayness. God’s (divine love’s) absence develops an aversion to vacuity, an aversion to shock and *Angst*, and this aversion makes the self find truth in facticity.

Adam Hernas
Tischner Institute, Poland / ahernas@kki.pl

The Phenomenality of the Close One

Why have philosophies of the other and the stranger turned out to be a way out of the blind alley of solipsism into which contemporary phenomenology had stumbled, and yet there have been no attempts to understand another as the close one? Of course, we cannot ignore the conceptions that derive from the axiom of community (Scheler, Stein) and are continued in social phenomenologies and various versions of the philosophy of dialogue. The latter assumes the necessity of the meeting of separate entities that approach one another. However, my primary aim is to perform a source analysis of the very moment of going beyond one’s own consciousness and the field of one’s own experience and to reveal its shortcomings within the scope of what can be called the immediate cognition of another. This is possible if we assume that another does not become the object of intentional perception, but is originally within me as the presence of the close. For this reason, another appearing as the non-I, the second self, the other or the stranger within the scope of the cognitive process is a secondary (derivative) phenomenon. It is also a result of the axiomatic structure of the entity as the cognitive center that refers to its environment in a specific way.

The close one does not actually appear, at least in some respect, as it tightly fills the entire horizon of appearance with itself. It is like the air that we breathe without knowing of its existence. However, I do not mean any exaggeration of phenomenality, satiation or excess here. This is rather a normal condition – fullness that does not exceed the normal maximum point, which means that it is a sound phenomenon that fulfils a certain measure of completeness. Closeness is never strange or surprising, even when we discover it again, as if once more from the very beginning. Surprise can refer at most to the fact that closeness can be recognised each time as something that is not new. Closeness is always something known, something that fits within the ready register of our structural sensitivity, as if we had another separate sense: the sense of experiencing closeness. It is close to us regardless of whether we are connected with another through a bond of closeness. We always retain some memory of closeness, even if we are doomed only to formalised social relations.

The particularity of the close one lies in the fact that it gives itself to another to the same extent to which another close one gives itself to the close one. However, the sense of “giving oneself” is not reduced here to phenomenological donation; according to some ethical semantics of the gift, this means an immediate, disinterested act of giving oneself to another, who also performs the disinterested act of giving itself. The mutual giving of oneself to the other unconditionally is the key to experiencing closeness in full. Closeness means being completely open to the full and unconditional opening of another. It is a double act of giving, yet not an exchange. This is what makes closeness different from economic relations, which belong to the general category of self-interested social relations.

The aim of this analysis is to show how the phenomenon of the close one opens up an alternative possibility of finding a way out of the blind alley of solipsism and to what extent it remains a hidden dimension of thinking about another as the other.

Carl Humphries
Jesuit University Ignatianum, Poland / humgin4@interia.pl

Descriptive Phenomenology, Other Lives, and the Problem of Temporal Standpoint-Dependence

In the context of philosophy, phenomenology justifies itself by appealing to its significance as a descriptive rather than explanatory activity. It does so by pointing to the idea that what a perspicuous phenomenological description reveals goes beyond a mere structure of non-eidetic surface appearance contingent on purely circumstantial features or factors pertaining to a human subject or person, be they epistemic, cognitive-perceptual, or bound up with someone's personal life-history. At the same time, the recent evolution of phenomenology has laid increasing importance on the inherently context-dependent character of human experience – stressing not only the constitutive rationality of the human bearer of such experiences in respect of their relations to their surroundings and to others (Husserl), but also the enworlded (Heidegger), embodied (Merleau-Ponty), practice-situated (Wittgenstein), and, more generally, the enhistoried and encultured character of these relations.

I will argue that this latter tendency generates a problem for phenomenology specifically as it relates to the idea of temporal standpoint-dependence (i.e. the idea that the intelligibility or import of certain phenomena depends on our being temporally located relative to them in some particular way, from a standpoint that is required, for some reason or other, to be temporally anterior or posterior to the phenomenon itself). The problem consists in this: that the more thickly/richly defined we allow the implied human bearer of our phenomenological descriptions to be, the harder it becomes to leave room for an appreciation of anything whose distinctive significance could really be a function of our being located relative to it in temporal terms in this standpoint-dependent kind of way. This reflects the fact that phenomenology's appeal to a non-circumstantial status for its objects of description is normally grounded in a conception of humans as standing in some sort of more or less determinate, minimally necessary, but also fundamentally non-temporal-standpoint-dependent, relation to their surroundings and to others. Such an appeal then seems bound to conflict with any intuitions we may have about this or that actual human life showing itself to be irreducibly significant in temporal-standpoint-dependent terms (e.g. because it turns out to depend for its overarching meaning or value on its relation to some specific past events or outcome of events, or some anticipated – because already in some way determined – future event).

I will propose a solution to this problem involving an analysis of the relationship between temporal-standpoint-dependent and non-temporal-standpoint-dependent forms of intelligibility. In so doing, I will offer a range of examples whose purpose is to suggest that the possibilities for phenomenological analysis and description resulting from this constitute a positive development – not just for phenomenology, but also for certain more broadly conceived areas of philosophy.

Andrew Inkpin
University of Melbourne, Australia / ainkpin@unimelb.edu.au

Merleau-Ponty and the Significance of Style

The notion of style is a central and distinctive feature of Merleau-Ponty's discussions of both artistic production and the perceptual and cognitive functioning of the lived body. This notion is to reflect their commonality and their realization of meaning (sens) in a way differing from both the causal mechanisms of "empiricism" and the rational idealizations of "intellectualism". This paper considers the significance of this notion of style both in and beyond Merleau-Ponty's work by addressing two questions: What kind of meaning or sense does style comprise? And what use or application does this kind of stylistic meaning have?

In response to the first question I consider how Merleau-Ponty's somewhat enigmatic characterizations of style as a "mode of formulation", a "system of equivalents", or a "coherent deformation" are to be understood. These characterizations aim to distinguish style from both mere form (syntax) and determinate causal or rational rules. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's discussions of painting and his appropriation of Saussure, I argue that style is to be understood as 1) applying to configurations

of forms or patterns that are inherently meaningful but lack full determinacy of meaning, and 2) standing for a relation between particulars and general features that – in contrast to rules – is governed not by identity but by similarity, resulting in an overall organization that is analogical rather than logical.

I then suggest a twofold response to the second question. First, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's conception of style is of critical relevance to theories of pictorial representation because it highlights how pictures produced in a freehand manner by human agents differ in their formal and semantic character from mechanically generated images (such as photographs). However, second, the broader significance of this conception emerges by thinking of painting not in terms of its aesthetic value, but as an example of human intelligence as involving capacities that are embodied, enacted, scaffolded on an external medium, and representational but non-linguistic in form. Viewed in this way, painting serves as a model of specifically human intelligence that is free from reliance on traditionally favoured paradigms of language and/or idealized rules, pointing the way to the possibility of a dialogue with recent cognitive science in the embodied-embedded tradition.

Provided its importance is not one-sidedly exaggerated (human intelligence may also be exercised in “mechanical” or lawlike ways), I conclude that Merleau-Ponty's basic thought is vindicated. The notion of style is useful in capturing characteristic traits of human intelligence in action – its loose nonmechanical cohesion, flexibility, and openness to particularity – and thus in acknowledging the significance of the “human touch” that has traditionally been neglected in idealizing accounts of human rationality.

Leonor Irarrázaval

Universidad Diego Portales, Chile; University Clinic Heidelberg, Germany /
leonor.irarrazaval@udp.cl

Intersubjectivity in Schizophrenia

Mainstream positivist paradigm within psychiatry, and the subsequently establishment of standardized systems of diagnosis, aiming at becoming more “scientific”, have excluded subjectivity almost completely. Furthermore, symptoms are usually presented in the diagnostic manuals of mental illnesses as divorced from the life context in which they are manifested. Obviously, such exclusions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity have serious consequences for the validity of psychiatric diagnosis, for empirical research and, above all, for psychotherapeutic purposes. On the contrary, in the field of phenomenological psychopathology, pathological experiences have traditionally been considered from a more comprehensive perspective: they are embedded in the person's life thus their contents and meanings can only be understood within the context of that life. Accordingly, contemporary psychopathology regards schizophrenia as a paradigmatic disturbance of embodiment and intersubjectivity. From this approach, the intersubjective dimension may shed light not only on the interpersonal processes involved in schizophrenia, but also on the psychotherapeutic interventions. However, current treatments are primarily with medication and focused on reducing “positive symptoms”, including electroconvulsive treatments in acute phases, thus following a medical-biological model that does not seem sufficient for a complete recovery.

Jarosław Jakubowski

Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland / j.jakub@ukw.edu.pl

Le moment phénoménologique de la configuration narrative de soi-même chez Ricœur

Où chercher le moment phénoménologique de la configuration narrative de soi-même ? D'après Ricœur c'est la formule inspirée de Proust, conformément à laquelle « pas moyen d'être le narrateur de sa propre vie sans en être le lecteur », qui peut servir de fil conducteur à cette recherche. Si l'acte de raconter sa propre vie consiste à mettre en ordre (selon le principe de « discordant concordance » provenant d'Aristote) les événements constituant cette vie, il consiste aussi à découvrir que ces événements sont déjà dans une certaine mesure ordonnés, structurés en un récit. Quelle est l'origine de ce récit ? Il provient d'autrui. Je me reconnais moi-même comme quelqu'un qui est enchevêtré dans des histoires

(W. Schapp) élaborées par des autres, parmi lesquelles il y a des histoires dont il est le héros. C'est en partant de ces histoires dans lesquelles je suis enchevêtré que j'essaie de raconter ma propre vie. Mon récit autobiographique se révèle, à chaque fois, être médiatisé par celles-ci. Mais si c'est vrai que la lecture des histoires que je rencontre, conditionne mon acte de raconter ma vie, comment dans ce cas-là, s'effectue précisément, la lecture de moi-même ? J'effectue cette lecture en jettant sur moi-même « le regard de l'appréciation » dont le prototype est la réflexion sur soi-même pratiquée par Socrate. Ce regard, inspiré plus ou moins des histoires auxquelles je suis confronté en tant qu'être jeté-dans-le-monde, est tourné d'un côté vers mes actions considérées comme un effort pour « tenir mes promesses » (alors vers ce qui fonde mon identité *ipse*) et d'un autre côté vers mon caractère (alors vers ce qui fonde mon identité *idem*). C'est dans la mesure où mon regard réflexif réussit à saisir l'unité de mon caractère et de mes actions ayant pour but de tenir mes promesses, que la configuration narrative de moi-même devient plus effective.

A **anna Jani**
Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary / anna.vargajani@gmail.com

The Idealism of Husserl and the Question on Being: An Original Linking between Phenomenology and Theology

Well known is the fact that Husserl's *Ideas I*, published in 1913, made a strong disappointment in the phenomenological circle around Husserl, and started a reinterpretation of the Husserlian phenomenology. The problem of the constitution was a real dilemma for the studentship of Munich – Göttingen. More of Husserl's students from his Göttingen years reflected in the 1930th on the transcendental idealism, which they originated from the *Ideas* and found fulfilled in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Adolf Reinach's *Was ist Phänomenologie?*, the *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt* by Hedwig-Conrad Martius, Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Theodor Celms's *Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls*, Roman Ingarden's *Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus – Realismus*, Max Scheler's *Idealismus – Realismus*, and Edith Stein's *Exkurs über den transzendentalen Idealismus* are documentations of the deep interesting in the phenomenological transcendentalism of Husserl. The remarkable similarity between these papers is the questioning on being incorporated in the problematic of the method in the Husserlian phenomenology. This parallelism in the problem reveals the origin of the religious phenomenon in the Husserlian phenomenology. Adolf Reinach's religious terms as gratitude (*Dankbarkeit*), charity (*Barmherzigkeit*), etc., Heidegger's notion of being as finiteness, Edith Stein's concept about the finite and eternal being are originating in the problem of constitution in the transcendental phenomenology on the one hand, but these phenomenon point at the constitution theologically. In my presentation I would like to show the relationship between the critique on the Husserlian transcendental idealism and the roots of the experience of religious life by the phenomenological problem of being.

D **alius Jonkus**
Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania / phenolt@yahoo.com

Nicolai Hartmann's and Vasily Sesemann's Aesthetics: Derealisation, Correlation and Phenomenological Reduction

In many ways Vasily Sesemann's (1884–1963) aesthetics is connected with Moritz Geiger (1880–1937) and Nicolai Hartmann's (1882–1950) expanded analysis of the aesthetic reality. All three authors are against subjectivism in aesthetics, but they also reject naturalistic and objectivistic explanations of the aesthetic phenomena. However, unlike Geiger, Sesemann and Hartmann focus their attention not only on the specific aesthetic experiences, but also attempt to reveal the internal relation of intentionality between these experiences and the structure of the aesthetic objects. They argue that aesthetics is fundamentally connected with phenomenology, because in order to understand aesthetic values the observing subject must possess a special kind of intuition. It is impossible to analyze any aesthetic object

without at the same time attempting to understand how its elements are expressed in the aesthetic perception itself.

The objective of this paper is to show that Hartmann and Sesemann's aesthetics can be discussed in the light of phenomenological philosophy. The most important of Hartmann's characteristics of the aesthetic object's perception is derealisation or dematerialisation. The aesthetic object's meaning and value are only revealed by doing that kind of action. Sesemann's aesthetics's many aspects are similar to that of Hartmann's. Both philosophers argue that there must be a correlation between an object and the act of its aesthetic experience (in Husserl's phenomenology it is called the correlation between the intentional object and the intentional act). This correlation can be discovered only by using the method of phenomenological reduction.

Phenomenological aesthetics should also be able to show how the structure of any given aesthetic object is connected with the experience of that object, as well as to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the aesthetic experience itself. In order to do so, one must argue against one-sided assumptions, such as the aesthetic objectivism's supposition that beauty is exclusively the trait of reality not at all dependent on the subject's experience of it, or its opposite belief that beauty is essentially and solely the projection of the subjective taste onto the things in the world.

This paper will first explain the conception of the aesthetic object's structure in Hartman and Sezemann's aesthetics: real versus unreal; sensations in connection with meaning; etc. Later, it will examine the aesthetic perception in Hartman and Sezemann's aesthetics. Finally, the paper will argue that Hartman and Sezemann's aesthetics is essentially based on the method of phenomenological reduction. In the end I hope to demonstrate that phenomenology can become practical philosophy by means of its effective use of the phenomenological reduction in aesthetics.

Andrzej Kapusta

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland / andrzej-kapusta@tlen.pl

Phenomenological Psychopathology and Decision Making

Phenomenological psychopathology pays a particular attention to the experiential aspects of mental disorders where the patient is the main expert on her decision-making. Without a proper description of the first-person perspective all attempts to explain mental disorders will be incomplete.

The aim of the presentation is to demonstrate the specificity of human action and decision-making processes in the context of psychopathology and clinical diagnosis. In turn, the concept of action and decision is analysed from the perspective of human experience and experiential structure of self-determination. The cases of mental disorders will be presented and important aspects of human action (background structure) and prereflective intention of anticipation will be revealed.

Analysis may allow to describe the structure of the experience of people with mental disorders in terms of their intentions, beliefs and desires, and especially the role they play in the process of decision-making and to what extent the patient has the possibility to revise their beliefs and attitudes, and to find alternative forms of experience.

The proposed theoretical approach refers to the phenomenological method of analysis, and is a part of the narrative/qualitative research tradition (Merleau-Ponty, H. Dreyfus, S. Gallagher, Varela, C. Fuchs, G. Stanghellini, A. Kępiński).

Svetlana Konacheva

Russian State University for Humanities, Russia / konacheva@mail.ru

“Theopoetic Turn” in Post-Phenomenology: To the Question of the Possibility to Think Phenomenality of God

The paper is devoted to the “theopoetic turn” in contemporary phenomenology. We argue that in contemporary phenomenology aesthetic experience and event are used as the basic conceptual schemes of understanding deep phenomena of human existence. We will also question epistemological axioms of modern theological aesthetics and its own methodological principles, as well as show that modern

theology also treats aesthetical experience as its basic model of describing experience of the divine. This theological aesthetics involves two main approaches: new understanding of beauty and considering the perception, “intuition” of God which is not accompanied by conceptual structures. For some modern theologians (David Bentley Hart, John Panteleimon Manoussakis) the understanding of beauty as call and attraction has become one of the grounds for reconsideration of the concept of aesthetics. We can speak about the double character of aesthetics: as the doctrine of perception of the sensible and as the doctrine of attractive, drawing power of beauty. So theological aesthetics considers God as possible object of our experience. In the works of Hans Urs von Balthasar and David Hart exploration of beauty, combining the perception (*Wahrnehmung*), gestalt vision (*Gestaltschauen*) and attraction, determines the theological understanding of the divine glory. The glory of God manifests itself in the beautiful as gracious and inviting, as something perceived and transmitted to other. Theopoetical way of thinking proclaims also a new version of phenomenology liberated from transcendental stricture. Intentional act is not understood here as a strategy of subjective consciousness, rather as a response movement of consciousness, captured by the beauty of the Other. Such “transcending phenomenology” attempts to see in the event of manifestation and the simultaneity of phenomenon and perception a light that exceeds them as an ever more eminent phenomenality.

In the second part of our paper we consider the structures of perception as the horizon, in which the phenomenon of God is given to intentional consciousness. We examine the paradigm of counter-experiences in theological aesthetics. Since God could never be given as an object (which is impossible), counter-experience is the way to recognize how the divine touch to our immanence. The possibility to think of God as God and not as disguised idol associated with reinterpretation the cornerstone of phenomenology – Husserl’s “principle of all principles”. Is it possible to reverse the Husserl’s model and to think the intuition that exceeds any intention? We argue that in the theological aesthetics we deal with the radical transformation of the phenomenological method, it means that intentionality becomes counter-intentionality; I see God only in the moment being seen by Him, being touched by Him. We are also to investigate within which limits this analogy between certain forms of experience in religion, aesthetics and phenomenology is still legitimate.

Elizaveta Kostrova

Saint Tikhon’s Orthodox University, Russia / elizakos@mail.ru

The Third Party: Interpretations and Meaning in Phenomenology and Science

Georg Simmel was probably the first to draw attention to the role of the third party. Defining the object of sociology Simmel tries to draw the line between “society” and “non-society”. In the search for the simplest sociological relationship he rejects both singularity and dyad. As Simmel points out, the invasion of the third party changes the relationship between the two in a radical way, while the further growth of the group does not lead to a qualitative leap. Third party brings a new dimension into the relation of the two, creates new options to remove the antagonism or to incite it.

Third party appears in a new context in anthropology, in particular, in the gift exchange analysis. Inclusion of a third party in the circle seems to be an important element in ensuring the functioning of the whole system: an object should not be given back to the one who gave it and should not stay in the hands of the one who accepted, but should pass to a new party. The third can have a specific position: in Marshall Sahlins’s *Stone Age Economics*, this role is played by the priest. Again, in correspondence with Simmel, it is precisely the inclusion of the third party in the gift exchange that makes it a means of community building, not just a relationship of two individuals.

The third party plays an important role in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, where it is used to raise the face-to-face relationship with the Other to a broader social perspective. The figure of the third party is paradoxical. The face-to-face relation cannot be observed, otherwise I and the Other would be totalized and generalized by the spectator. However, it is precisely the “third dimension” that makes the ethical relationship to the Other radically different from the erotic intimacy of the two, and that is the reality of the society on the other side of the Face. Levinas tries to open a new path to sociality, which would not lead to the totality of the “unity of genus”, but to the “kinship of men”, which he calls “fraternity”. This fraternal “We” cannot be attributed to the multiplicity united in ethnic, religious, or

ideological totality, but only to a truly pluralistic society, which is based on the acceptance of the Other. The essential appeal to the third party in any dialogue comes to replace the general appeal of the We to God.

The report will attempt to clarify the relationship between the position of the third party in the analysis of society, on the one hand, and phenomenological philosophy, on the other, and to understand whether there is a certain parallelism or whether the resemblance is only superficial.

A nastasia Kozyreva

Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany / kozyreva.a@gmail.com

Phenomenology of Uncertainty: Towards a Phenomenological Approach to Experience of Uncertainty and Uncertainty of Experience

The world is uncertain and uncertainty is everywhere. One can encounter these or similar statements in many fields of human life and knowledge, which indicates that uncertainty has been acknowledged as an important feature in our modern world-understanding. The remarkable rise of attention towards uncertainty and kindred topics of risk, complexity, and unpredictability is essentially interdisciplinary. Psychologists inquire into the way people make decisions when the outcomes of their actions are unknown. Economists are interested in understanding economic behavior under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Statisticians and mathematicians bring forward models for quantifying uncertainty. Physicists and philosophers face the question of how to understand the nondeterministic universe. From a psychopathological perspective, uncertainty is studied in its effects on mental health, and regarded as a major factor across anxiety disorders. Despite the ubiquitous presence and importance of uncertainty in the modern world, most of scientific attention has been paid to quantitative approaches, which rely on the assumption that uncertainty can be measured and expressed numerically. However, from people's personal perspectives, numerical representation of risk and uncertainty can be both misleading and sometimes even meaningless. In this talk, I will discuss how phenomenological philosophy can fill this gap and contribute to the interdisciplinary discussion on decision-making under uncertainty. My claim is that, contrary to representations of uncertainty that rely on probabilistic concepts, phenomenology urges us to focus on the experience of uncertainty, i.e. on the way people actually face uncertainty and on the strategies they use to overcome or reduce it. The proposed phenomenology of uncertainty is subdivided into two aspects: First, a constitutive aspect that addresses uncertainty as an inherent characteristic of subjective experience in the complex world; and second, a descriptive aspect that inquires into the ways people experience uncertainty and seeks to specify what types of experiences are particularly prone to the feeling of uncertainty.

K wok-Ying Lau

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, People's Republic of China / kylau@cuhk.edu.hk

De la chair à la chair culturelle : vers une phénoménologie de l'interculturalité

Dans notre ouvrage récent, *Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding: Toward a New Cultural Flesh*, nous avons proposé la notion de la chair culturelle afin de conceptualiser le chemin d'entrer dans l'horizon d'une autre culture comme une étape préliminaire dans l'immense travail de l'entente interculturelle en philosophie. Le terme de la chair culturelle est une extension du terme ontologique de la chair adoptée tout d'abord d'une manière systématique par le dernier Merleau-Ponty. Il sert à capturer les caractéristiques de base de l'expérience interculturelle, notamment celle d'interpénétration, d'entrelacs, d'empiètement, de promiscuité, et de chiasme d'un côté, et de l'autre celle de la convergence avec l'écart, de la réversibilité sans coïncidence complète, et de l'ipséité au sein de l'intersubjectivité, l'intercorporéité, l'identité dans la différence. Si la clef à l'entente interculturelle est d'augmenter notre capacité de pénétrer dans l'horizon des cultures autres que celle de la nôtre, le moyen principal est de renforcer notre sensibilité culturelle à l'égard de ces autres cultures. Cela peut se faire par le greffe de la chair culturelle d'une autre culture, comme une prothèse, sur notre chair culturelle d'origine,

notamment par l'enroulement de la chair culturelle des autres sur notre chair culturelle d'origine. Il s'agit de la rencontre avec des autres cultures, avec ce qui est non-familier, non-prévu, inattendu, étrange et différent des habitudes, des sensibilités, et du raisonnement de notre culture d'origine qui forment pourtant l'arrière-plan, souvent pré-réflexif, de nos pensées, sentiments, choix, et actions. La rencontre avec l'alterité culturelle est toujours ponctuée par la surprise et l'incompréhension de la première heure. Il est donc légitime de se poser la question suivante : sur notre chemin d'enquêter sur la condition de possibilité de l'entente interculturelle et des moyens de l'améliorer, pourquoi nous ne nous sommes pas inspirés tout d'abord par les philosophies de l'autrui, comme celle de Lévinas, ou des philosophies de la différance ou de la différence, comme celle de Derrida, ou des philosophies de l'événement, comme celle de Deleuze ? Pourquoi trouvons-nous le concept ontologique de la chair proposé par Merleau-Ponty dans des manuscrits et des notes de travail attachés à la publication posthume du *Le visible et l'invisible* rend un meilleur service pour notre propos ? Pourquoi la philosophie de l'incarnation proposée par l'autre phénoménologue français Michel Henry, qui peut se résumer comme une conception théocentrique de la chair, ne peut pas remplir l'exigence de l'entente interculturelle en philosophie ? Qu'est-ce qui est nouveau dans notre concept de la chair culturelle ? Ce travail donne quelques réflexions sur ces problèmes.

Kamil Lemanek
University of Warsaw, Poland / KamilLemanek@gmail.com

Body in Merleau-Ponty: Delimiting Habit

I will argue that interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's notion of "body" dependent upon habit/use are necessarily insufficient. In order to illustrate this I provide a schematic of pertinent concepts which Merleau-Ponty introduces, along with a couple of external notions to help clarify the structure. What follows is a distinction between two different, though textually undistinguished, uses of the term "habit": one pertaining to the incorporation of objects into the body and the other pertaining to the use of the body itself. Habit appears to be dependent on a presupposition of body, rather than antecedent to it. The result is a potentially controversial idea – that habit, although concerned with body, is not capable of defining it. On the one hand, it does indeed define a limited spectrum of bodyhood (canes, instruments), but on the other it necessarily fails to account for body in its entirety. Additionally, this negative appraisal of habit indirectly runs against a number of enactivist views by implying a certain deep passivity of body, despite the fact that enactivists tend to be fond of Merleau-Ponty's paradigm.

Although I am able to provide a supplementary positive picture to account for body in Merleau-Ponty, I believe the negative aspect above will take up the time allotted.

Patricia Limido
Université Rennes 2, France / patricia.limido@univ-rennes2.fr

Pour une phénoménologie esthétique de nos paysages environnants

Tout en m'inscrivant dans la continuité des grandes thèses de Husserl, Ingarden et Dufrenne, je propose d'envisager la possibilité d'une phénoménologie esthétique adaptée aux paysages de notre monde environnant actuel. Non pas les grands « paysages remarquables » qui relèvent des catégories classiques de l'esthétique, ni à l'extrémité inverse, les paysages résolument détruits, tels que les *Infected Landscapes* de Shai Kremer ou les *Man-altered landscapes* des New Topographics, mais les paysages communs, urbains, périurbains ou ruraux, qui constituent le cadre de notre *Umwelt*, et s'entrelacent quotidiennement à nos vies. Ces paysages mixtes, banals, représentent un nouveau type d'objet qui, en retour et corrélativement, impose à l'attitude esthétique de repenser ses actes et ses modalités ; car, il n'est pas certain que dans ce nouveau contexte les schémas classiques de l'expérience soient encore opérants.

Le regard désintéressé, la suspension de l'existence sont-ils envisageables s'agissant de ce monde quotidien qui nous concerne de si près ? Les catégories esthétiques traditionnelles ne sont-elles pas devenues obsolètes pour notre monde qui oscille entre un patrimoine classé Unesco et des zones

suburbaines « sensibles », c'est-à-dire sinistrées ? Enfin comment envisager un plaisir esthétique « pur », quand les enjeux écologiques et économiques sont continûment associés à l'aménagement de nos cités et de nos espaces ruraux ?

Cette approche trouve son fondement dans certaines des analyses que Roman Ingarden consacre à l'œuvre architecturale car celles-ci peuvent servir de modèle pour penser le paysage comme une œuvre en train de se faire et de se lire sous les pas du marcheur ou du flâneur. On passe ainsi d'un point de vue statique à un point de vue mobile intégrant les variations kinesthésiques et le fusionnement dynamique des aspects visibles.

Par cette entrée, il est aussi possible de confronter la perspective phénoménologique à d'autres approches actuelles de l'esthétique. D'une part, les principes généraux de l'esthétique environnementale, soutenue par exemple par Allen Carlson, et qui entend extraire l'esthétique de son cantonnement au monde de l'art. D'autre part, la théorie des aspects et de la dépeinture de Dominic McIver Lopes qui permet de repenser la perception et la lecture des images qui nous environnent, et dont le paysage fait partie, par-delà une approche purement symbolique. En dialoguant avec ces perspectives, on peut renouveler l'analyse de l'expérience esthétique de notre *Umwelt* en l'orientant sur de nouveaux objets et en redonnant une place sensible et signifiante aux divers aspects perceptifs. Ce faisant, on peut encore considérer avec Ingarden, que la phénoménologie reste un outil pertinent pour penser notre monde, dans sa réalité comme dans ses valeurs esthétiques.

Elisa Magri
University College Dublin, Ireland / elisa.magri@ucd.ie

Habit and Social Sensitivity. Towards a Phenomenology of Habitual Embodied Agency

My paper is concerned with the problem of habit and its relation to agency and our sensitivity to reason. More specifically, I shall interrogate to what extent the dimension of habit is responsible for our capacity to inhabit situations and to feel spontaneously acquainted with other subjects as well as to grasp the meaning of situations and events. Nowadays, philosophers have widely dismantled the myth according to which habits are blind mechanisms, for habit consists in acquired dispositions that improve or facilitate an agent's performance. However, there is no clear consensus yet on the nature of the processes involved in habit formation. To be sure, habitual learning has been linked to taken-for-granted knowledge, knowing-how, body-schema and body-memory, pre-cognitive embodied ability, bodily attunement and affective framing, and operative intentionality. Habit is also crucial in studies of personality and character, where the problem of habituality overlaps questions concerning virtue and moral behaviour. Despite this wide array of conceptual explanations, it is not settled whether habits differ from mere reflexes because they retain some direct power to monitor and control or because they involve a more substantial role of care, attention, and kinetic awareness. Furthermore, it has yet to be shown whether the type of selfhood involved in habit can account for self-agency and practical choice. Contemporary debates on naturalism have brought back to life the problem of normativity with regard to activities and skills that fall under the domain of "absorbed coping", i.e. actions performed without any conscious awareness of the subject. However, while most of these debates have focused on the conceptual status of skills and practices (e.g. in what sense passive coping is conceptual or non-conceptual), the relation between habit, *praxis*, and social life is often neglected.

Here, I wish to restrict my analysis to a more general problem concerning the very possibility of discussing agency in light of habit. With regard to this, I shall consider the transformation of Aristotle's concept of habit in Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis. The philosophical method developed by Husserl is the point of departure for my contention that our sensitivity to reasons and norms requires a theoretical exploration of the teleological structure of habit. On the one hand, I shall refer to the strategy that Husserl proposes under the title of passive synthesis, which offers the tools to investigate the pre-reflective level of experience, where the concept of habit plays a key role. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty's writings on selfhood and intersubjectivity will be employed in order to identify the sense-enabling structure of habit at stake in social understanding. From a phenomenological view, to form habits means to become sensitive to the qualities and intensities of situations. It is precisely in terms of the development of such sensitivity that the acquaintance with others can be explained.

By developing the philosophical transformation of the concept of habit, I shall bring to light a tension between two main contemporary senses of habituality, i.e. habitual body and social sensitivity. I shall argue that this tension cannot be found in Aristotle, and that Husserl's genetic phenomenology offers the tools to elaborate a taxonomy of habits that does not reduce habituality either to a mechanism or to absorbed coping.

Emanuele Mariani

University of Lisbon, Portugal / emanuelemariani76@yahoo.it

No Time, No Bridge: A Phenomenological Counter-Critique of the Recent Return to Subjectivity in the Light of the "Explanatory Gap"

In cognitive sciences, as is well known, a growing attention has been given to the subjectivity issue by means of an inquiring into the gap that separates the two ingredients our experience is composed of: phenomenality and intentionality. A paradigm shift has thus been determined by the need to explain what is called "mental phenomena", the subjective correlates of Any form of cognition, described as secondary qualities, sensations, emotions, or to sum it up in one word: qualia. The philosophical challenge, from this perspective, is basically to understand the very relationship of these two heterogeneous, and yet connected, dimensions: what we experience (the objective content) of our cognitive activity – the taste of a cherry, for instance – and the experience we have about tasting a cherry (the subjective content), that is "what it is like", to quote T. Nagel's famous expression. Phenomenology, in spite of the misunderstandings to which the name is exposed due to its manifold practices, has generally contributed to the debate by reframing the gap in terms of a correlation. A correlation which would result in an interdependency, or a co-emergency, between the consciousness and the world. This is by way of example Dan Zahavi's authoritative interpretation, one of the most sensitive to the meeting between phenomenology and cognitive sciences.

"Being-in-the world", to say it in Heideggerian terms, is then what would best express the foundation on which subjectivity is grounded – as Zahavi argues. From this perspective, the popular distinction between "easy" and "hard" problems – following D. Chalmers classification – would have no more relevance, since consciousness is essentially turned to its other, the world, and has to be understood in terms of an ontological openness.

In our paper, we would like to show that the phenomenological correlation can be understood differently, in a manner which Has been barely practiced in the debate with cognitive sciences. To put in a nutshell, there would be no need to think of experience as "being-in-the-world" in order to bridge the explanatory gap concerning this twofold structure and for a better account of it, we should rather take advantage of Husserl's analysis on temporality, as the basic form of intentionality that gives us a whole new way of thinking about the correlation. Facing the subjectivity issue, that would eventually enable us to grasp different forms of consciousness not only "embodied", "embedded", "extended" or "enacted" – the 4E expressed by the cognitive sciences mainstream – but also "absolute", as Husserl argues, which is still intentional, yet not worldly, and grounds the very subjective dimension of any phenomenality. By investigating the deepest level of the correlation, we hope in this way to contribute to the debate with cognitive sciences through a phenomenological counter-critique of the well-established phenomenological critique.

Bence Peter Marosan

Budapest Business School; Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Hungary / bencemarosan@gmail.com

Border-fields of Phenomenological Somatology: Animal Bodies – or Does a Microbe Have a Body?

In my lecture I would like to analyze some special cases of phenomenological biology, which I think will be of ever greater importance for future phenomenology. It concerns the problem of phenomena of animal corporeality, with a special regard of the bodies of lower level animals (invertebrates). In my

opinion closer studies of this field could help us in a better understanding concerning the origins of subjectivity, that is to say: the first emergence of consciousness in the natural world. The central question of my lecture is: when can we characterize an animal, living body as an incarnated subjectivity? When can we assert that a living organism is a subjective being and not merely a self-sustaining, material process? It is about the problem how to attribute subjectivity to an organism in a phenomenologically legitimate manner. When can we interpret the body of an organism as a bodily consciousness? On the problem-horizon of legitimate attribution of consciousness the key concepts are: behavior and processing of sensory information. Following Merleau-Ponty we keep in mind the body-environment correlation in the interpretation of animal behavior. Behavior – in this view – is a fundamental mode of relating to the surrounding world, is a fundamental mode of being-in-the-world. When a behavior is complex and flexible enough, to make it necessary to introduce the concept of motivation, and motivated (versus: mechanical) behavior, then we have a good reason to attribute conscious activity in the living being in question. In this framework legitimate attribution of consciousness is intimately bound to the concept of motivation and motivated behavior. On the other hand, as for information: it is also a fundamental question how a living being processes and integrates (sensory and other) information concerning its (his or her) internal and external environment. When the information processing system and behavior is complex enough to attribute consciously motivated activity to a living being, then we have no philosophical, scientific or whatsoever reason to deny that we are experiencing another conscious subject, who possesses phenomenal consciousness, in a similar way like we.

Body in this context means first of all: bodily consciousness, incarnated subjectivity, that is to say: lived body (*Leib, chair*). We can attribute in this manner body to organisms who have consciousness in a phenomenologically documentable way, (that is to say: we can attribute to them consciousness in a phenomenologically legitimate way). In this manner we can also raise the question – which, on the long run, I believe proves to be a phenomenologically fundamental problem – whether a unicellular organism, a microbe has a consciousness, if its behavior and information processing activity are proven to be complex and flexible enough, and in this way: whether it has a body in the sense of bodily consciousness, of incarnation? This question leads us to a comparative analysis of the bodily activity, of behavior of higher level unicellular organisms and of lower level animals.

Patrick Martin

University of Helsinki, Finland / patrick.martin@helsinki.fi

The Universality of the Hermeneutic Perspective: An Examination of the Aesthetic Experience in Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics

This paper deals with the question of the relationship between aesthetics and hermeneutics. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to examine what becomes of the aesthetic experience when Hans-Georg Gadamer aims to save the experience of truth “that comes to us through the work of art”.

In *Aesthetics and Hermeneutics*, Gadamer boldly states that the “universality of the hermeneutical perspective is all-encompassing”, which means that aesthetics becomes placed under hermeneutics. Gadamer's conclusion that aesthetics belongs to hermeneutics follows from his initial premise that the work of art affords us an experience of truth. For this means that the experience of the artwork includes understanding, representing a hermeneutic phenomenon.

Viewed from Gadamer's position, however, the question arises as to the aesthetic in the experience: what has become of the sensuality, the pleasure we usually attribute to the experience of enjoying art? What does it mean that Gadamer characterizes the experience of art in terms of *Erfahrung*, dismissing the concept of *Erlebnis* as inappropriate in this context? Employing Heidegger's framework, we could ask in what way understanding is attuned in the encounter with the work of art. Is there a role for affectivity, in the “anti-aesthetic” philosophy of Gadamer – as Jean Grondin somewhat provocatively phrases it?

In the paper, I will proceed as follows: I will first consider Gadamer's criticism of the aesthetic consciousness as he presents it in the first part of *Truth and Method*, supplementing it with an examination of the position defended in *Aesthetics and Hermeneutics*. Then, I will consider some

objections to Gadamer's position, taking into account especially the arguments of Gianni Vattimo and his defence of the importance of affectivity in the experience of the artwork.

Corijn van Mazijk

University of Groningen, Netherlands; Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium /
corijnvanmazijk@hotmail.com

A Husserlian Reply to Crane's Impure Intentionalist Construal of Pain

Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in discussing consciousness. Over the past two decades, intentionalism has developed into one of the most promising candidates for offering a viable "mark of the mental".

Intentionalism (weak or strong) is identical to representationalism. The central idea here is that consciousness can be exhaustively described in terms of its representational contents alone. Put differently, what it is like to enjoy any particular experience can be assessed sufficiently in terms of what that experience represents. Usually, the what-content of experience is then taken to have propositional structure.

Crane recently developed an alternative to intentionalism, which he coins impure intentionalism (in Crane's terminology, mainstream intentionalism is called pure intentionalism). Impure intentionalism objects to intentionalism's sole obsession with the what-content of experience (Crane also objects to its sole concern with propositional content, which I bypass here). According to Crane, consciousness is better assessed in terms of content, mode, and object.

Crane's account thus adds mode and object to the standard intentionalist model. The mode can be understood as similar to what Husserl calls act-quality in *Logical Investigations* (perceiving, thinking, etc). Crane's account of the object is somewhat more opaque, which is complicated by him adopting a naturalist view and rejecting an idealist (Husserl) or immanentist (Brentano) approach. In any case, the object is what is referred to in the content (which is, metaphysical issues aside, similar to Husserl's account in *Ideas I*, where the *noema* contains a reference to an object).

It is perhaps questionable whether impure intentionalism is preferable over its alternatives in terms of its scientific merits. But it is certainly phenomenologically superior. Crane also notes explicitly that impure intentionalism is a phenomenological theory. This further means a comparison to Husserl should be less problematic than with mainstream intentionalism.

My problem with Crane's impure intentionalism does not so much concern its application to intentional consciousness. What I am concerned about is its construal of sensation contents, of which pain can serve as example. Since Crane considers impure intentionalism as a complete account of consciousness, he needs to posit a mode-content-object structure also at the level of non-conceptual sensory experiences. This commits him, among others, to saying sensory experiences must involve reference to an object (Crane suggests location as object).

But do sensory experiences necessarily involve an object? Certainly I might feel pain in my lower arm and direct my attention at it. This is an intentional experience of pain involving an object (my hurting arm). But it seems that what makes pain such an iconic philosophical problem is precisely not answered by this intentionalist construal. The essence of pain does not lie in the way it can figure in higher level intentional acts.

For my reply to Crane I draw on Husserl's genetic account of fields of sense, which, I argue, is essentially a form of pre-intentional synthesis, i.e. without *ego*, *noesis*, *noema*, or object, and which instead relies on two other non-intentional laws: affection and immanent association.

Jeffrey McCurry
Duquesne University, USA / mcurryj@duq.edu

A Phenomenological Embrace of the Phenomena: Psychology, Moralism, and Therapeutic Action in the Very Early Freud

When considering convergences of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, the very early Freud is fascinating. This is Freud before his structural model of mind of the 1920s (a model challenged by phenomenologists for its mechanistic explanations of processes beneath and outside experience), and even before his topographical model of the 1900s.

This very early Freud of the case studies on hysteria of 1895 really has no theory of mind. Rather, he is concerned with what psychoanalysis calls therapeutic action, the treatment releasing a patient from symptomatic suffering.

Here we discover that Freud's therapeutic action involves inviting patients to take up a new phenomenological approach to their psychological experience. This approach to psychological experience arises from Freud's belief that the mind becomes psychopathological when it, paradoxically, refuses to know its experience. When psychological life refuses to acknowledge its very own stream of spontaneous, immediate, natural experience, neurotic symptoms arise. That is, Freud discovered that living a human life where a subject is fully open to knowing his psychological experience – where a subject is phenomenological – is necessary, since refusing to embrace the full gamut of our affect and desire sickens us.

This sickness arises because of a certain position a subject can take up vis-à-vis her psychological experience: a moralistic position, one that would have us believe that our psychological experience itself should always be moral. That is, the neurotic believes that not only her concrete actions in the world should be moral, but that her very interior economy of affect and desire should always be moral. Elisabeth von R., one of Freud's famous early cases, suffers a mysterious inability to walk. After listening to her, Freud deduces that her neurotic symptom is psychosomatic: its cause is her moralistic approach to her psychological experience, which Freud wishes to replace with a phenomenological approach. Elisabeth von R. cannot be a person who merely lives a chaste life – she has to be a kind of subject who never even experiences illicit sexual affect or desire within herself at all. Her cure comes when she becomes a subject who can feel her feelings, desire her desires, and describe it all to herself, and Freud, without resistance (all the while, we might add, as she continues to act blamelessly).

This is to say, the very early Freud is phenomenological because he is interested in liberating the flow of consciousness. Freud's therapeutic action allows the patient to embrace her plane of psychological experience phenomenologically, just as it is experienced, instead of moralistically. Perhaps surprisingly, the neurotic needs to take up the attitude of phenomenology in order to heal. Becoming a kind of psychological phenomenologist – a subject open to the fullness of her emotional and libidinal experience and the unprejudiced ownership and description of its entire gamut of possibilities – restores her psyche from fragmentation to health.

Perhaps all of us, after Freud, need to see the commitment to phenomenology as not just a scholarly or reflective commitment but as a matter of psychological health.

Simone A. Medina Polo
Concordia University of Edmonton, Canada / ramiro.medina.polo@gmail.com

Language(s), Dwelling, and Being in Positions

Following Martin Heidegger's work, I seek to explore language as an environment and a situation one dwells in by virtue of being-there (*Dasein*). This claim opposes the view that language is a tool, which

reduces the region of concern of language to a technical and extrinsic means by which the task and essence of languages comes to realization.

To approach language as a situation re-inaugurates the openness of language by assuming its ontological incompleteness. For, ontically, the one who dwells in language stumbles through the determinations of its terrain and the indeterminations that exceed the sovereignty of language.

We shall move on to introduce the exploration of languages as opposed to language. The trail of Heidegger leads us to Jacques Derrida and his concerns with what it means to be at home in language in the face of the plurality of languages – this comes through his discussions of monolingualism and the poet Paul Celan. If, as Heidegger states, language is the house of Being, then what becomes of this theme upon the face of languages? This is the first part concerning the encounter in language(s).

The second part begins with psychoanalysis to the Lacanian concepts of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real while positioning the phenomenological encounter in language(s) as the Imaginary. Taking on the Imaginary, as both Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek point out, it is not merely the pure Imaginary as both it has Symbolic aspects (Imaginary–Symbolic) and Real aspects (Imaginary–Real). Thus, I wish to work on the unconscious in language and its affects on Imaginary ego constitution.

The problem raised, as framed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, concerns the imposition of the Oedipal triangle through the Imaginary–Symbolic–Real triad and its suppositions on the stability and unity of the ego in constitution. What if one jumps from one language to another? How does this affect the way by which the next language comes to reveal itself as a terrain one transverses through? What does this entail for the originary language in which the ego is constituted? In switching from one language to the next, with full immersion entailed, is the ego constituted by both languages in question? If so, is the ego consistent to the intelligible demands ordained by any of these languages' Symbolic order?

Through Deleuze, Guattari, Lacan, and Žižek's the concept of the split subject, one can account for these displacements which dispense of the conditions for our interpretations of ego and subject presentations in distinct social positions: for example, accents entailing someone's national or regional origin as well as the intelligible character imposed by the Symbolic order, like a Texan accent standing out in a crowd, thus making the speaker perceived through the character of the uneducated Texan cowboy. Another example being that a language's Symbolic order can impose a limit upon the articulations it deems intelligible – one can play with the English language through gender neutrality, as opposed to the Spanish language where the resonance of gender awaits at every corner.

Bogdan Minca

Université de Bucarest, Roumanie; Société Roumaine de Phénoménologie /
bogdan.minca@phenomenology.ro

Marion et Heidegger sur l'*Ereignis* comme donation et retrait. Théologie mystique ou pensée de l'être?

Les ouvrages de Marion qui contiennent des références substantielles à la pensée de Heidegger sont : *Réduction et donation* (1989), *Étant donné* (1997), *De surcroît* (2001), et finalement, *Figures de phénoménologie* (2012). Il suffit de regarder rapidement l'index de tous ces ouvrages pour voir que Heidegger est, à côté de Husserl, le philosophe le plus présent. Le débat avec Heidegger constitue, à notre avis, une pièce importante du problème de la donation, qui est le thème principal des susdits ouvrages.

Le § 3 d'*Étant donné*, *L'objectivité et l'étantité*, contient la dispute de Marion avec Heidegger sur la question de l'*Ereignis* et la donation dans la conférence *Temps et Être* (*Zeit und Sein*). C'est sur ce point que nous allons concentrer le premier part de notre exposé, en montrant que la critique de Marion à l'adresse de l'*Ereignis* heideggérien n'arrive pas à saisir le rapport subtil entre donation et *Ereignis*. Marion ignore le fait que le rôle de ce mot, *Ereignis*, est, chez Heidegger, d'expliquer le dynamisme de la donation, c'est-à-dire le pli entre donner (qui se retire comme tel) et donation : le retrait est la façon dont le donner reste dans sa donation.

Dans le deuxième part de notre exposé, nous allons aborder un problème très intéressant du dialogue de Marion avec Heidegger, effleuré seulement à la fin du *De surcroît*, dans le chapitre « Au nom ou

comment le taire ». Ce problème concerne la « dé-nomination » qui dépasse les voies kataphatique et apophatique, donc le dire (affirmation–négarion), pour se constituer comme « une pragmatique théologique de l'absence – où le nom se donne comme sans nom, comme ne donnant pas l'essence et n'ayant justement que cette absence à rendre manifeste ». Louange et prière ne veulent pas nommer en propre Dieu, mais « le viser en toute impropriété ». Cette pure dé-nomination serait la troisième voie, une voie qui prend son sens et sa direction de l'absence-présence de Dieu.

Or, nous croyons que Heidegger a essayé, au moins dans ses ouvrages tardifs, de penser cette dé-nomination comme dé-nomination (en partant) de l'être en tant qu'*Ereignis*, comme un pur nommer ou dire qui dérive – comme dire-à-partir-de... (*Ent-sagen*) – d'un préalable se montrer (de l'être), se montrer qui est, essentiellement, retraits et absence. La pensée n'arrive à dé-nommer qu'en obtenant son dire du dire préalable de l'*Ereignis*.

La dé-nomination libre de l' « en tant que... » et dépendante du se-montrer de l'être serait-elle donc plus apte à caractériser ce que Marion envisage par la troisième voie? Ainsi s'ouvrent des perspectives très intéressantes sur le rapport entre théologie (mystique) et la pensée de l'être.

Gabriella de Mita, Giovanni Giordano
University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy / giovanni.giordano@uniba.it; gabriella.demita@uniba.it

For an Anthropology of Communication. Phenomenological Studies on Communicative Relationship in Edmund Husserl's Thought

The work of theoretical in-depth study I present falls in particular into the discussion about "Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity". It concerns the contribution of Husserl's phenomenological study on the topical and complex problem of communication and its repercussions on the anthropological-relational level.

I regained and delved into the theoretical-phenomenological path Edmund Husserl walked to redeem the anthropological aspect of communication, intersubjectively founded, from the reductivistic swerves of the prevailing naturalism.

The problem of the relational constituent of communication crosses obliquely Husserl's thought and the phenomenological survey since the studies made on *Logische Untersuchungen* until the writings of anthropological nature on *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*.

On this route of research are grafted the specific insights he carries out on the problem of the Phenomenology of Communication (*Phänomenologie der Mitteilung*) and which he delivers to (records in) the pages of his manuscripts from 1932 to 1935, collected and organized in the Husserliana Series of the Husserl Archive in Leuven by Iso Kern in the III volume *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*.

The contribution that the Husserlian phenomenology gives through the method of investigation and through the attitude lying under it to the problem of communication is as topical as ever. It enables: 1) to wander about the complexity of the relational dimension determining the communication phenomenon and conferring sense and signification to the possible forms of mediation through which it could be revealed without being reduced to a trendy or trite topic; 2) to give back to the communication forms and procedures the sense of relational rootedness in the inseparable nexus between *Körper* and *Leib* in order to connect the intentional nexuses of subjective life founded on the "being-with" (*Mit Sein*); 3) to

recognise the constitutive dimension of communication as carrier of sense and significant intentionality of the interpersonal and intersubjective relationship.

The theoretical survey Husserl made, provides the opportunity to reconsider and resignify in the current scenario the phenomenological prerequisites which have to be explored for an anthropological analysis of the phenomenon of communication.

The communicative intentionality and transcendental *epoché* are the main phenomenological coordinates enabling to recognise and to maintain the “relational space” where the communication is not mere mechanistic application of standard models.

My work settles in the multi-decade research performed at the Interuniversity Research Centre “Laboratory of Group. Analysis and Epistemology” (C.I.R.La.G.E.) at the Universities of Bari, Perugia and Verona.

C.I.R.La.G.E. results from the academic research commitment of Maria Giordano, Professor of Philosophy and Epistemology of Human Sciences at the University of Bari. She fosters and combines the basic and applied interdisciplinary research with the aim of training researchers and professionals helping the critical–methodological–epistemological attitude in the field of research and of professional environment and of encouraging the interactional and communicative competence within working environments.

Marcin Moskalewicz, Michael A. Schwartz

University of Oxford, England; Poznań University of Medical Sciences, Poland /
moskalewicz@gmail.com

Texas A&M Health Science Center, USA / schwartz@medicine.tamhsc.edu

Phenomenology of Temporal Experience in Mania

Numerous studies of time perception in mania found that as far as short durations (at the seconds range) are concerned, manic patients tend to underestimate clock time in time production tasks and overestimate clock time in temporal durations tasks. With change in focus from perception to duration of longer intervals manic patients tend to experience longer durations as shorter durations. It might be that a positive emotional attitude leads to underestimation of longer duration (in hours range) and to the experience of the external time as passing more quickly.

Moreover, there is experimental evidence that fast thinking itself leads not only the increase in positive affect, but also extends beyond mood towards feelings of power, creativity and grandiosity. In addition, the variability of thoughts adds to the effect. The manic acceleration is possibly related to changes in biological clocks and our endogenous circadian clock specifically, and manic patients tend to have faster than average periodicity. But the circadian pattern that synchronizes organisms with the cosmic time is merely circular and cannot be literally translated into the linear experience of time, including the dimension of the personal future.

Phenomenological analyses of the temporal experience in mania proves helpful here. As Minkowski already noticed, patients with mania do not unfold in time. Ludwig Binswanger described the temporal structure of the disorder as narrowing the experience of objective time as well as annihilating existential temporality of continuous growth towards the future. Manic patients live in an inauthentic and merely “momentary” present, filled with haste and repetition. Binswanger’s view on the domination of point-like present in temporal experience in mania was later used to distinguish it from melancholia, in which the characteristic phenomenon is the domination of the past; in mania the structure of temporality is fragmented into isolated pieces of lived present. Contemporary studies confirm this exclusive present focus of manic patients, and its concomitant feeling of determining the world around them. Mania may involve a sense of freedom over the future.

We will further describe phenomenological characteristics of such a manic self arguing that while persons with mania can be rightly claimed to live exclusively in the present, the stage of manic psychosis consists in brining the existential future into the present. Characteristic manic delusions often involve experiencing an impossible, imagined future self in the very present moment; the future is already here, as if it had just happened. We will speculate that the deceptive feeling of being almighty – a manic superman syndrome – leads to a sense of having one’s future self already at hand. In that case,

feeling of being stuck in the present is not only due to an impossibility of moving forward, but due to its exact opposite. Interestingly, at the same time, despite such a destruction of lived “temporality of becoming”, patients in manic psychosis might not experience any disorientation in calendar and clock time (they are usually able to correctly assess their age etc.) Yet, while their attitude towards clock time might stay intact, their existential temporality still gets deeply transfigured and disconnected from the public, temporal world.

Ewa Nowak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland / ewanowak@amu.edu.pl

Does Allotransplantation Contribute to the Growth of Embodied Self?

Allotransplant, implant and other biomedical technologies seem to materialize “intercorporeality”. Human face makes the most personalized, interactive, and dialogical organ. We still have no consistent conception of how an allotransplant becomes a part of “my” embodiment and, at the same time, it remains other’s, as recipients report on. Bodily integrity, self-representation and body scheme are radically challenged while recipients confront issues transfer and the very new qualities of their embodiment. The paper aims to clarify how can transplantation affect the growth of embodied self in the light of new phenomenology and medical humanities. It considers both risks and the developmental power of embodied selfhood as an open-ended project in terms of intercorporeality and *cum vivere* conception instead of technologically modified or “monstrous body”. The paper reports on research findings related to author’s NCN OPUS 9 grant.

Claudia Gutiérrez Olivares

University of Chile / calacello@gmail.com

Le corps de la caresse dans la phénoménologie d’Emmanuel Lévinas

Il s’agira ici d’examiner la question de la caresse à la lumière de ce que Lévinas nomme dans *Totalité et Infini*, une « phénoménologie de l’Eros ». Dans la relation de mon corps avec celui d’autrui, rencontre entre deux sensibilités corporelles, s’accomplirait selon nous l’ouverture sur un monde phénoménal de l’ordre de l’affection. En effet, dévoiler cette phénoménologie de l’Eros signifiera percer à jour les manières dont la caresse et par conséquent le corps ont à faire avec le régime affectif de la conscience. Par phénoménologie de l’affection nous comprenons, tous ces événements qui se déroulent dans la vie de la conscience, mais qui ne s’expliquent pas par la mise en lumière de la structure intentionnelle de la conscience. Il s’agit là d’une intentionnalité non objectivante dont le corps serait porteur. Plus précisément encore, la caresse se veut une expérience dans laquelle la structure « sentant et senti » se trouve aux limites de la phénoménologie. Et ceci selon deux aspects. D’un côté, ce que la caresse touche – autrui, le touché, le senti – est censé ne pas être de l’ordre du constitué. Le contact n’agit pas constitutivement sur le touché. Comme si le touchant manquait son touché. De l’autre côté, le touchant, le sentant qu’est le corps, n’est pas le produit d’un acte de conscience. Le senti n’est pas le pendant subjectif du sentant. Bref, sentant et senti ne sont pas animés par un acte de conscience. Si notre thèse s’avère exacte, l’on devrait répondre, au moins, aux questions suivantes : si la structure « sentant – senti » n’est pas une structure intentionnelle, c’est-à-dire si aucun schème constitutif ne vient lier sentant et senti, aucune intentionnalité : qu’est ce qui fait que sentant et senti communiquent ? Si le lien entre autrui et moi n’est pas le lien « avec un mystère », selon l’expression de Lévinas, mais bien une relation en « chair et os », la structure sentant – senti s’affirme. La question se pose dès lors de savoir la manière dont le sentant sent le senti. De quelle manière le senti affecte le sentant, s’il est vrai qu’il y a affection ? Dans la mesure où la structure sentant – senti est maintenue, dans la mesure où il y a communauté entre sentant – senti, ces questions-là pourraient être résolues. Mais le problème dans Lévinas est justement que cette structure reste très ambiguë. Tantôt elle est le berceau d’un commun, dont il faudra préciser le sens, tantôt elle est l’indice d’une non communauté.

Andrea Pace Giannotta
University of Florence, Italy / andreapacegiannotta@gmail.com

Co-Emergence versus Naturalization. Genetic Phenomenology, Enactivism and Neutral Monism

In this work, I shall develop a strategy for facing the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature, which is at the heart of the debate on naturalism in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I shall oppose to the concept of naturalization that of co-emergence or dependent co-origination, which I develop drawing on genetic phenomenology, enactivism and neutral monism.

First of all, I shall discuss the project of the naturalization of phenomenology, as it has been developed, in particular, by Petitot and B. Smith. These authors have proposed a naturalized version of Husserlian phenomenology that aims at naturalizing consciousness, through an “enlargement of the concept of nature” and a “phenomenalization of physical objectivity”. I shall argue that this view constitutes a kind of naïve naturalism, which is alternative to scientific naturalism (the mainstream position in the philosophy of mind). At the same time, however, I shall claim that naïve naturalism presupposes – similarly to scientific naturalism – the neat duality of subject and object, conceived as substantial poles of the cognitive relation, and a substantialist conception of nature.

Then, I shall oppose to the project of the naturalization of phenomenology a different strategy, which is more faithful to the fundamental tenets of transcendental phenomenology. In particular, I shall stress the metaphysical neutrality of the static phenomenology of the constitution, claiming, at the same time, that this neutrality is preliminary and that it is overcome by its genetic deepening. I shall claim, precisely, that genetic phenomenology is able to address the issue of the relation between transcendental subjectivity and nature – which inevitably arises within the project of transcendental phenomenology – by conceiving the phenomenological constitution as a genetic co-constitution of subject and object in reciprocal dependence.

In particular, I shall point to the metaphysical implications of Husserl’s analysis of the role of the primal impression in the genesis of the stream of experience. I shall argue that the primal impression, being pre-subjective and pre-objectual, constitutes a processual and neutral dimension of being from which both subjectivity and the objects of experience dependently co-arise or co-emerge. Specifically, I shall take this notion from the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy and from its resumption by the enactive approach, in its original proposal by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (*The Embodied Mind*). Furthermore, I shall claim that this metaphysical development of genetic phenomenology can be likened to the tradition of neutral monism, in authors such as Mach, James and Russell.

In this way, I shall claim that the genetic deepening of transcendental phenomenology, combined with the enactive approach and neutral monism, constitutes an alternative to mainstream naturalism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Through the reference to Varela’s project of neurophenomenology, in particular, I shall claim that this approach, which looks at the co-emergence of consciousness and nature in reciprocal dependence, constitutes also a fruitful method for the analysis of the correlation between phenomenological data and neuroscientific data, which does not reify neither of the poles of the experiential relation.

Francesca Peruzzotti
Fondazione Collegio San Carlo di Modena, Italy; Institut Catholique de Paris, France /
fra.peru@libero.it

La naissance phénomène eschatologique dans la philosophie de Jean-Luc Marion

Cet étude veut vérifier comment la philosophie de Jean-Luc Marion aborde le domaine de la temporalité et de l’histoire à partir de la notion d’événement ; pourtant, on reconnaît la naissance paradigme paradoxal, capable de surmonter une description de l’histoire comme accumulation chronologique ou accomplissement selon la totalisation.

On peut repérer un modèle pour le concept philosophique de naissance dans la confrontation avec celui théologique d’eschatologie, comme développé dans le XX siècle surtout par Hans Urs von Balthasar. Il gagne le refus de la simple alternative entre temps et éternité par une concentration sur la figure du

Christ, singularité absolue dont l'événement accomplit l'histoire sans la conclure, plutôt en lui donnant sens.

Avec cette suggestion, qui envisage les possibilités historiques seulement en considérant leur côté eschatologique, le parcours de Marion est questionné à partir de la notion d'eschatologie eucharistique proposée dans *Dieu sans l'être*, qui recherche une sortie de la métaphysique de la présence et refuse la temporalisation selon le présent. Ce but est gagné par la notion d'à-venir, alternative au simple futur, qui sera reprise dans l'approche à saint Augustin de *Au lieu de soi*.

La structure phénoménologique d'événement est la théorie qui rend possible ce choix, il était l'une des quatre caractéristiques de la topique du phénomène saturé dans *Etant donné*, mais, en passant par *De surcroît*, il devient de plus en plus décisif avec *Certitudes négatives*, il détermine la saturation elle-même et par conséquent le degré de saturation des phénomènes. Le rôle de l'adonné est essentiel, en tant que témoin avec la tâche d'une herméneutique infinie : la première personne ne peut pas définir la réalité qui se donne, cependant ce qui l'excède ne le serre pas dans une simple passivité, mais implique une réponse singulière, le nom reçu est en réalité une tâche à accomplir. La relation ternaire des amants par rapport au fils proposée dans *Le phénomène érotique* est accomplie avec la naissance, qui gagne une place de plus en plus majeure en correspondance avec l'importance donnée à l'événement.

La naissance et non pas la mort est reconnue par l'Auteur phénomène exemplaire, en suivant Claude Romano originaire non-originellité de l'origine. Elle est événement pur, en excédant le sujet qui n'arrive pas à la décrire ni à la comprendre, elle lui ouvre plutôt son histoire, avec des traits de perpétuelle nouveauté ; on peut la considérer sans fin, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'elle est hors du temps : elle n'est pas instantanée, mais gestation immémoriale qui implique une réponse future où l'histoire est médiation nécessaire. La réponse, toujours en retard, implique l'impossibilité soit d'oublier l'origine soit de la réduire à la chronologie.

La naissance subvertit le rapport possibilité/effectivité, elle est impossibilité de l'impossibilité, c'est-à-dire que l'ontique par excellence devient la figure phénoménologiquement la plus pure. Pour cette raison elle universalise ce qui était déjà introduit avec la relation entre Révélation effective et révélation possible dans *Etant donné* ; la théologie ne relève plus un tournant ambigu, mais donne les figures pour développer à nouveau la phénoménologie.

Michał Piekarski

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland / m.piekarski@uksw.edu.pl

The Normative Function of the Anticipation in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

The concept of anticipation plays the crucial role in the late phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The founder of phenomenology claims that every present intentional acts are constituted by the acts of anticipation. Every anticipation is the anticipation of normality which is strictly related to the inner and outer horizon of experience and knowledge. The author of *Ideas* characterises experience through the concepts of normality (*Normalität*) and abnormality (*Abnormalität*). The reason is that experiences are managed by anticipations of normalities, i.e. some typical structures, models or patterns which were created by earlier experiences. Experience becomes normal which means that it adapts to the existing norms of perception and action. In presented interpretation we will show that the every experience of anticipation is also the specific experience of normativity in the double sense: 1) normativity as anticipation of normality and typicality, and 2) normativity as anticipation understand as the rule of the action. The act of anticipation understand in this way is very similar in non-trivial sense to the so-called prediction in cognitive theory of predictive coding.

According to the theory of predictive coding one of the fundamental tasks of the human brain is to minimise the probability of a prediction error. According to this approach, the brain is understood to be a sophisticated hypothesis-testing mechanism. Prediction errors occur "between the hypotheses generated on the basis of our model of the world and the sensory deliverances coming from the world" (Hohwy). It seems that all actions of a given cognitive system are strictly dependent on predictive conclusions the system makes. Due to its ability to predict, a cognitive system is also a structure undergoing dynamic changes in time. The hierarchical predictive process creates a strong link between perceptions and action. What this means in practice is that prediction is action-oriented predictive

processing. Yet, action is not subordinate to any single centre. It is rather a product of communication among different units such as the body, perception or environment. We are going to show that prediction could be treated as a rule of the actions if we will look at the function of the so-called ability to pattern recognition in predictive coding.

The aim of this presentation is to show the possibility of connection between the phenomenological approach to anticipation and normativity with cognitive science perspective.

Witold Płotka

University of Gdańsk, Poland / witoldplotka@gmail.com

Dreyfus's Critique of Phenomenology: On Intentionality, Action and Representation

In my paper I critically examine Hubert L. Dreyfus's interpretation of an essential element of Husserl's phenomenology. In doing so, I focus on Dreyfus's claim that the Husserlian theory of intentionality is to be understood in terms of mental representations and that as such it cannot contribute to our understanding of action. Without doubt, the impact of Dreyfus's interpretation of Husserl on phenomenology has been not only polemical but also stimulating. Indeed, it is even arguable that Dreyfus's (mis-)reading of Husserl is one of the primary sources of a contemporary interpretation of intentionality as a purely mental process, and of a view on the phenomenological method as a mere internal analysis.

As I will argue, for Dreyfus the problem of action and the issue of intentionality are intertwined. Dreyfus contends that whereas Heidegger focuses on everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility as well as intentionality, Husserl advocates cognitivism, which emphasizes the role of mental representations in human everyday practices. According to the cognitivist view, practices have a strong epistemic background because action necessarily involves mental activity. As a result, a subjective access to the world is reduced to a belief system entertained by a subject. According to Dreyfus, Husserl fails to describe how practices are constituted because his commitment to cognitivism makes it impossible for him to understand intentionality as fundamental to practical human activity. Rather, as Dreyfus states, intentionality is, for Husserl, a theoretical activity of the mind.

To claim that Husserl reduces intentionality to a mere activity of the mind, and that Husserl advocates cognitivism are, in my view, misleading. In contrast to Dreyfus's interpretation of Husserl, but following a clue that he himself provides, therefore, one can argue that transcendental phenomenology contributes to our understanding of human *praxis*, because: 1) Husserl advances a non-representational theory of intentionality, and 2) he describes intentionality as an embedded structure that co-constitutes subjective actions. Thus, Dreyfus is right in claiming that Husserl rejects picture-like interpretations of mental representations, but Dreyfus is too quick to link Husserl's understanding of intentionality to the Fregean interpretation of the *noema* as an intermediary sense between the intentional act and the intended object. Correctly understood, Husserl's *noema* is the proper object of the intentional correlation rather than a mediating content of a mental state. From a phenomenological viewpoint, the object is constituted in an interrelationship between the agent and the world. The non-representational theory of intentionality reinterprets intentionality in terms of "openness", rather than as both "directedness", and "aboutness" (in intentional readings *à la* Frege). To show this, first, I will outline Dreyfus's critique of Husserl and draw out its consequences. Second, we will consider the question of Husserl's representationalism and non-representationalism in his early philosophy. Finally, I sketch out an embedded account of intentionality in Husserl's late transcendental phenomenology.

Irina Poleshchuk

University of Helsinki, Finland / ira_pole@fastmail.fm

Experience of Pain in Temporalizing of Mother–Child Relation

Phenomenological study of intersubjective relation has proposed a variety of interpretations of how subjectivity, faced with the other person, is going through different existential modalities. In this paper I draw on Levinas's philosophy of intersubjectivity, which is deeply rooted in context of temporality.

The sense of the self is connected to the relation with the other person. Levinas's philosophical project demonstrates that the temporal event of the other appealing to subjectivity questions the self, identity and its locus. I believe that temporality of intersubjective relation is a foundational principal, which changes and constructs the ethical self of subjectivity. However, my primal concern is to analyze the ethical becoming of female subjectivity in mother-child relation and concentrate on possible traumatic modalities of female subjectivity, which appear because of experience of pain. Thus, I will focus on the following research questions: How does pain construct or deconstruct temporalizing female subjectivity and how does the meaning of the ethical becoming of subjectivity change? How does pain influence temporality of intersubjective mother-child relation? How does the experience of the stratum of pain reformulate the meaning of mother embodiment?

Following Levinas I argue that the mother-child relation is based on immemorial but also on eschatological temporality: coming from the past, which has never been present enough responsibility for the child is projected into the future. Giving and sharing one's own flesh, touching, caressing are forms of being for-the-other at the moment of present but also in the future. Addressing the notion of affection developed by Michel Henry I will show that the experience of pain tears female embodied subjectivity inside out, paralyzes any touch and caress, withdraws the self from embodied mother-child relation, questions the present as being for-the-other and, possibility, stops the unfolding perspective of the future. Thus, responsibility, as the foundational principle of the ethical becoming of subjectivity in mother-child relation is under question (J. Kristeva). Finally, I will argue that pain becomes a shared embodied experience, which initiates different types of temporality: instant, shifts, laps of time, asynchronization and diachrony.

Salvatore Prinzi
University of Naples Federico II, Italy / sal.prinzi@gmail.com

Le propre du « corps propre ». Entre Merleau-Ponty et le surréalisme

Dans les dernières années plusieurs études critiques ont mis en évidence comment la dimension littéraire a eu un rôle important dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty. Écrivains, romanciers, poètes, essayistes, avec leurs inventions lexicales, leurs images et leurs figures de rhétorique, ont eu une fonction déterminante en permettant à la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty de se développer, de s'étendre de l'analyse de la conscience, de l'intentionnalité ou des essences, à l'analyse de la perception, de la signification, du problème du sens et de l'être. D'ailleurs, si la phénoménologie doit « revenir aux choses mêmes », comme Husserl le souhaitait, doit également comprendre comment dire – c'est-à-dire écrire – les choses mêmes, comment rendre à travers les mots une expérience de la pensée. La philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, de ses débuts jusqu'à sa fin soudaine, a ainsi tenté de faire face à la puissance du littéraire, et son écriture en garde trace.

Si la présence dans l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty d'écrivains comme Marcel Proust, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Paul Nizan, Claude Simon a déjà été prise en considération, toutefois l'impact que l'expérience surréaliste a eu sur sa phénoménologie n'as pas encore fait l'objet de réflexions.

De André Breton à Antonin Artaud, en passant par Louis Aragon, Paul Eluard, jusqu'à Francis Ponge, celle qui voulait être tout d'abord une « révolution » – des visions du monde, des modes de vivre, de l'usage du langage, de l'ordre social – semble avoir non seulement fasciné le jeune Merleau-Ponty, mais aussi lui avoir fourni des éléments, motifs, matériaux pour l'élaboration de certains concepts fondamentaux de sa philosophie. Parmi ceux-ci, il y a certainement ceux de « corps » et de « chair » : notions qui caractérisent la phénoménologie merleau-pontyenne mais qui à la fois sont également au centre des recherches surréalistes.

Le but de cette communication n'est pas seulement de retrouver dans l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty l'héritage du surréalisme, ou bien d'organiser ces traces surréalistes dans une vision d'ensemble, finalement organique, mais il s'agit surtout de montrer comment l'expérimentation surréaliste et la phénoménologie merleau-pontyenne se dirigent vers le même objectif : clarifier, déconstruire, interpréter, voire renverser, une certaine vision dominante, une vision que nous pourrions dire « propriétaire » du corps. Les deux réflexions, en effet, visent le « propre » du « corps propre », en thématissant la différence entre avoir un corps et être un corps, non seulement pour mieux

exprimer, complètement, le vécu, mais pour permettre à d'autres modes de vie, à d'autres praxis, de prendre enfin place.

Reconstruire cette relation entre le surréalisme et Merleau-Ponty autour des notions de « corps » et de « chair », donc, ce n'est pas un simple exercice de philologie : s'il est vrai qu'une certaine conception propriétaire du corps et de la vie est dominante encore aujourd'hui, s'il est vrai que la constatation de Lucrèce dans *De Rerum Natura* – « la vie n'est la propriété de personne, tous n'en ont que l'usufruit » – est encore aujourd'hui oubliée, proposer ces thèmes au débat peut nous permettre de comprendre plus clairement l'horizon dans lequel ils évoluent beaucoup de sciences, de répondre de façon innovatrice aux défis posés par le *human enhancement* et par les nouvelles pratiques biomédicales, d'imaginer des nouveaux modes d'être, et d'user, le corps et la vie.

Charlie Quinn

Copenhagen University, Denmark / chasquinn@eircom.net

Modes of the (Un)conscious in Merleau-Ponty and Lacan

Objective: To examine the approaches taken by practitioners of phenomenology and psychoanalysis in their structuring of the interplay of consciousness and unconsciousness.

Section 1: Psychoanalysis V. Phenomenology Continuities and Diascontinuities. Husserl's pioneered the phenomenological reduction and the bracketing of the natural attitude. Freud introduced the requirement of "free association" on the part of the patient and "evenly suspended attention" on the part of the analyst. Each discipline is concerned with uncovering truth and employs a methodology toward that end. However, phenomenology does not possess a specifically clinical purpose. The most salient distinction for our purposes is that phenomenology is concerned with the structures of perceptual consciousness while psychoanalysis is engaged with the unconscious.

Therefore, consciousness permits of or, indeed, entails self-consciousness while the unconscious, by definition, works outside of consciousness. Nonetheless, the unconscious leaves its effects and traces on consciousness and, obviously, psychoanalysis relies on exploration of consciousness in order to do its work. It is this potential for mutual contribution between the two disciplines that we wish to explore in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Lacan.

Section 2: Merleau-Ponty: From Gestalt Theory to Bodily Perception and the Flesh of the World. Merleau-Ponty was strongly influenced by Gestalt theory throughout the course of his work. He adapted the theory for his phenomenological investigations as they developed and changed in scope. He did not, however, share the materialist foundations as employed, for example, by Kohler and Goldstein. However, the figure/background structure as a basis of perception that was a hallmark of gestalt theory remained crucial for his own thought. I wish to explore Merleau-Ponty's notion of ambiguous bodily consciousness as he develops it in terms of inner and outer perceptual horizons. Each of these horizons possess their gestalt structure wherein things are perceived as whole.

Also, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology undergoes a radical re-configuration in his later works, *Eye and Mind* and the unpublished *The Visible and the Invisible*. The overarching concept of "Flesh" gives rise to notions of "reversibility", "chiasm", "ecart" etc. and underpins a decisive change in his ontology of perception. The earlier subject-object model of bodily intentionality is transformed. This later stage offers affordances to psychoanalysis through consideration of the "Gaze" as developed by Merleau-Ponty.

Section 3: Lacan: The Divided Subject and Desire – Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. Lacan makes seminal use of the mirror image in the genesis of infant identity. His influence is marked on Merleau-Ponty's writings on child psychology and translates into later work on the "invisible" and the "gaze". Lacan's work, though, is of a quite distinct order and his notion of the irredeemably fractured subject under the law-of-the-name-of-the-father and a desire without end requires its own articulation. His notion of the real has particular value in relation to the unconscious and can connect with Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy of Flesh.

Section 4: The Mirror Stage and the Gaze in Lacan and Merleau-Ponty. This section allows us to develop the overlaps as between the two thinkers in the concepts of Visibility/Invisibility and the Gaze.

Section 5: The Body in Time – a Harmonising of Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis? Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* or the deferred time in which meaning and causation come to be seen and

its adoption by Lacan lets us see its application to a Husserlian structuring of time according to primal present–retention–protention. What can the phenomenological structure of time in its longitudinal and transverse dimensions contribute to psychoanalysis?

Magdalena Reuter, Weronika Kałwak, Michał Wierzchoń
Jagiellonian University, Poland / magda.reuter@gmail.com

Phenomenology of Sensory Substitution Experience – Study with Enactive Torch

Sensory substitution (SS) occurs when perceptual information normally accessed through one sense (substituted modality, e.g. vision) is instead represented by another sense (substituting modality, e.g. touch). SS is possible thanks to sensory substitution devices (SSDs). Previous studies of SS investigated 1) how different SSDs may be used for the rehabilitation of blind people (i.e. the SSDs usability), and 2) what are the neural correlates of SS (i.e. how SS leads to neuronal plasticity of the brain). However, almost none of the studies investigated the phenomenology of SS and the differences in the subjective experience reported by the users of various SSDs.

The two main research questions that arise in the context of SS phenomenology investigation are: 1) What is an SSD-supported experience like? and 2) Which perceptual sensory modality is engaged in SS? Classical philosophical approaches ascribe SS experience to either substituted modality or to substituting one. However, there are also new approaches that recognize SS experience as artificially induced synaesthesia or new perceptual modality.

In our study with Enactive Torch (ET) we addressed this issues using semi-structured analogy based interview developed especially for the purpose of the research on SS. Our experiment consisted of 4 phases of exploration (15 minutes each) of an irregular standardized research environment. Twenty sighted, blindfolded participants explored the experimental environment with the use of ET to avoid contact with walls and afterwards was asked to draw the map of the room. Naive participants were then asked about different aspects of their experience with ET usage during the sessions. The results show that SS experience is not directly limited to substituted or substituting modality and it depends on the interaction with the environment.

Emre Şan
İstanbul 29 Mayıs University, Turkey / emrsan@gmail.com

L'événementialité de l'apparaître au-delà de l'alternative entre théologie et positivisme phénoménologiques

Les développements de la phénoménologie post-husserlienne en France ont eu pour point de départ deux idées centrales dans l'œuvre de Husserl, l'idée de l'immanence de la conscience transcendantale, et l'idée de l'intentionnalité entendue comme transcendance et ouverture. Husserl les faisait tenir ensemble, dans un équilibre précaire; il s'efforçait de ne pas séparer la pensée de l'une de celle de l'autre. L'équilibre n'a pas été conservé dans les travaux ultérieurs axés sur le primat respectif de l'un ou de l'autre. Les importantes avancées accomplies par la phénoménologie de l'immanence (selon laquelle il n'y a pas d'hétéro-donation mondaine sans auto-donation subjective) et celles de la phénoménologie de la transcendance (selon laquelle il n'y a pas d'auto-donation subjective sans hétéro-donation mondaine) ne se distinguent pas tant par la position de problèmes nouveaux que par la reformulation de « la question du fondement de l'intentionnalité » qui a alimenté toute la tradition phénoménologique.

Il est frappant de constater que malgré la différence des solutions qu'elles proposent, ces deux approches ont la même orientation critique vis-à-vis de la phénoménologie (elles caractérisent l'intentionnalité par son insuffisance à assurer sa propre fondation) et elles ont pour tâche d'étudier des phénomènes qui échappent à la donation de sens déterminée par la conscience intentionnelle et sa structure noético-noématique (l'auto-révélation de la vie chez Michel Henry et la chair du monde chez Merleau-Ponty) en accordant une place centrale au « non-intentionnel ».

Dans cette traversée à nouveau frais de la phénoménologie, comment faire droit à l'unité de la phénoménalité face à l'exigence d'un discours autre que la posture philosophique husserlienne

selon laquelle le donné est la mesure de toute chose ? La solution au problème consiste à thématiser l'« événementialité » de l'apparaître qui réunit plusieurs caractéristiques du phénomène : la formation spontanée du sens, l'excès non-objectif (*ungegenständlicher Überschuss*) au cœur du phénomène et le caractère paradoxal du donné. Un tel cheminement de pensée propre aux phénoménologues contemporains, Jean-Luc Marion et Renaud Barbaras (cette fois-ci encore, malgré la différence des stratégies qu'elles proposent), a pour tâche de libérer la phénoménalité de toute légalité *a priori* et de la constitution de la conscience. Marion et Barbaras exposent la phénoménalité à sa limite et réalisent un dépassement au sens « fondateur », qui permet à la phénoménologie de s'achever ou de se refermer sur elle-même. En ce sens, la phénoménalité du phénomène ne peut acquérir de consistance qu'à la condition de se dépasser elle-même en un « événement » plus originaire où se conjoignent radicalement la phénoménologie et ce qui n'est pas elle, soit la théologie ou la métaphysique. Selon Marion, un tel événement correspond à une présence absolue ou bien une sur-présence. Alors que Barbaras parle d'une négativité radicale, d'une scission pour caractériser un archi-événement.

Les deux auteurs examinant des phénomènes clés mais difficilement visible (tels que le phénomène saturé, la révélation, la vie, le désir et le sentiment) et qui présentent l'avantage de faciliter notre accès à des phénomènes plus généreux. Il ne s'agit pas d'un choix méthodologique subjectif, mais des phénomènes qui se proposent (et souvent sans qu'on ne s'en rende explicitement compte) de servir de guide pour ouvrir la voie vers une exploration des champs de recherche théologique ou métaphysique qui témoignent de l'autonomie du phénoménal. Marion et Barbaras interrogent la théologie et la métaphysique comme raison d'être de la phénoménologie, pendant que la phénoménologie pourrait être définie, en retour, comme la raison qui nous fait connaître la théologie et la métaphysique. Comme nous voudrions le montrer, cette approche qui a sa propre conception de la rationalité imposée par l'étude de l'événement, va passer au-delà de l'alternative entre le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie et l'exigence antimétaphysique du positivisme phénoménologique.

Stefano Santasilia
University of Calabria, Italy / santasilia@gmail.com

The Life of the Body: Appearance in the Thought of Michel Henry and Renaud Barbaras

The phenomenologies of Michel Henry and Renaud Barbaras both begin from a deeper reflection about the meaning of appearance. Both define themselves as “phenomenology of life” and both necessarily consider life in its full and authentic manifestation. This entails an essential reflection about the body in its coming to light, and above all in its showing itself as a fundamental manifestation of life. In fact, for the real possibility of the perception of the phenomenon of life the incarnation appears to be a necessary condition. Despite the differences that mark their philosophies, both authors develop a radical critique of Husserl's phenomenological conception in order to understand a corporeality that does not fall under the primacy of consciousness, considering Husserl's position as a developmental step of the phenomenological analysis, which we must exceed in order to understand the appearance in its true essence and then the body in its authentic donation. This contribution wants to show to what extent we can speak of a parallel development of the critique elaborated by the two phenomenologists, and where is the point at which the two phenomenologies take different roads. Henry, in fact, will take the road of a constitutive duality able to give reason of life only through the understanding of its invisible auto-affectation. On the contrary Barbaras, directly grafting onto the root established by the thought of Merleau-Ponty and Patočka, will attempt a worldly recovery of the manifestation of life, in order to avoid a dualistic conception. In both cases, corporeality plays a key role, because it is no longer considered as a simple phenomenon, but as the very possibility of the phenomenal world. So the life of the body constitutes itself as life in general, a life that allows the perception of life itself. Thus, the last part of this contribution will be focused to analyse this issue which the two French phenomenologists have in common.

Sergiu Sava
Romanian Society for Phenomenology / sergiu_sava@yahoo.com

Infinite Hermeneutics and Intersubjectivity: Marion and Husserl

In my presentation I claim that, contrary to Marion's interpretation, the Husserlian phenomenology has the necessary resources for ensuring an unconstrained elbow-room to phenomena, and I point out some of the advantages the Husserlian phenomenology has over Marion's phenomenology of givenness. I take as a starting point Marion's generalization of infinite hermeneutics, from his *Reprise du donné*, where he states that any phenomenization of what is given in excess is mediated by an interpretation offered by the gifted, and that this hermeneutical process is an endless one.

In the first step I present what Marion considers to be two of the outcomes of the generalization of infinite hermeneutics: 1) a satisfactory answer to the objections raised by Jean Greisch or Jean Grondin, who claimed that Marion's phenomenological project neglects the mediated character of our relation with the given; 2) an assurance that phenomena are indeed free from the premised endeavor of Husserlian phenomenology to circumscribe them to certain final meanings.

In the second step I advance a critique of the premise of the second outcome. My thesis is that – after reconsidering intersubjectivity, and taking into account readings such as those of Dan Zahavi or Lana Rodemeyer – Husserl's phenomenology has the means for ensuring phenomena with liberty from any final meaning. The argument for this thesis is based on Husserl's position that the experience of the world is always a shared experience, even at the elementary level of perception. The meaning a thing receives in the process of constitution is always indebted to intersubjectivity. The constitution of things in general and of the world as a whole has an intersubjective ground, but is also the outcome of a continuous intersubjective interplay.

In the third step I notice three advantages transcendental phenomenology has over Marion's phenomenological project: 1) that, in fact, Marion's first outcome of the generalization of infinite hermeneutics is already at work in Husserl's phenomenology; 2) that the prohibition of certain final meaning does not regard only what is given in excess, but any type of givenness; 3) that generally the unrestricted manifestation of things can presuppose a less solemn, but more functional, perspective on the other – instead of understanding the other just as a saturated phenomenon as Marion does, we could understand it as a fellow in relation to which things acquire an opened meaning.

Stefan W. Schmidt
Peter Behrens School of Arts Düsseldorf; University of Wuppertal, Germany /
sschmidt@uni-wuppertal.de

“The Place You Love Is Gone” – Nostalgia as a Case of Lived Body Memory

The subject of my paper is to examine nostalgia as a form of “involuntary memory”. Unlike voluntary memory, which refers to the intentional effort to remember, involuntary memory is like a force that comes over us, that affects us. This affection especially characterizes nostalgia. I intend to reactivate the original meaning of nostalgia to deepen our understanding of memory in general and of memory of place in particular.

In nostalgia we can find a revision of the past, but the revised version of the past is not primarily about the production of a new representation of memory. Rather, nostalgia is a case of re-experiencing the same past through returning to it, particularly in an embodied manner. Being acquainted with a place means that it becomes part of who we are. Usually we do not notice this phenomenon, but once we are displaced it becomes apparent, as seen in cases of homesickness – which leads back to the original meaning of nostalgia. Nostalgia in its original Greek meaning is a particular mode of “memory of place”. Places we inhabit or pass through have an impact on us, for we are bodily subjects and, as such, we have a relationship with the places that surround us. At any time, we are situated, located in a place. Thus being under the influence of place over time defines and structures our sense of self. But unlike in homesickness the places we are nostalgic for are lost in time; we can no longer return to them. The places

we were familiar with, or even loved, are gone and through the lack of those places we experience the passage of time (sometimes in a traumatic manner).

In my paper, I analyse the aspects of nostalgia as a form of lived bodily memory and show how the spatiotemporality of the present is “haunted” by the superimposed appearance of the past. We find ourselves overwhelmed by the desire of a place that is imprinted in our bodies. To become acquainted with a place takes time. And later on it is this time that comes back to us when we desire this particular place. In our desire for a place, we also desire a certain time, for we have become familiar with both, time and place. An essential part of the structure of nostalgia is the distinctive fixation, qualitatively positive or negative, of an image that binds the self to a place and time. The past transpires in the present, and nostalgia shows how we experience time through our lived bodies.

Sara Cohen Shabot

The University of Haifa, Israel / scohensh@univ.haifa.ac.il

Not Solely Oppressive, Not Solely Romantic: Recuperating the Experience of Breastfeeding through Feminist Phenomenology

In 2016, the World Health Organization provided new guidelines for breastfeeding, emphasizing its importance for the health and well-being of babies and mothers. The organization’s recommendations included putting clear messages on formula packages, strongly warning the buyer of the harmful consequences of feeding breast milk substitutes to babies and stressing once again the uniqueness of human milk.

This reinforcement of the message that nursing babies is the best option – if not in fact the only moral or healthy one – has only brought more vividly to the fore an issue that has furiously divided feminist mothers for the last three or four decades: the question of whether breastfeeding is empowering for women or constitutes a backlash. The arguments presented on both sides of the discussion are clear. On the one hand, mothers who defend a more essentialist and/or radical feminist view claim that breastfeeding must be reclaimed as an empowering experience that unites mothers and babies, combats capitalist notions of what should be considered productive work, and creates a feminine space exempt from patriarchal laws and demands. Feminist mothers who represent more liberal views, on the other hand, consider this „recuperation” of breastfeeding as a feminist option to be a mere trap. The trap consists of a continuation and reinforcement of the patriarchal policing of women’s bodies, romanticizing breastfeeding in order to convince women that dedicating themselves to feeding their babies at home is sublime, beautiful, and meaningful enough: that is, worth the cost of renouncing action and the pursuit of power within the public sphere.

Certain important aspects of the experience of breastfeeding are lost in this either/or formulation of the problem and its co-optation by either essentialist or liberal discourses. In this paper I argue for a different path in recuperating the experience of breastfeeding within feminist theory. The lens of feminist phenomenology provides us with a new, richer, and more complex way to tackle the issue. I argue that breastfeeding can be experienced as both erotic and painful and as ambiguously pleasurable and disgusting, and that it should therefore not be seen either as a purely romantic nor as an exclusively oppressive experience, but as a complex embodied experience that can be recuperated as such within feminist discourse. In developing this argument, I rely mainly on Iris Marion Young’s illuminating analysis in the *Breasted Experience* as well as Simone de Beauvoir’s idea of the erotic experience as perfectly conjoining immanence with transcendence. These concepts make possible the development of a new and robust concept of „breastfeeding as empowering”, not as a romantic option but as an ambiguous embodied erotic possibility, involving both pain and pleasure and both tenderness and loathing.

Gústav Adolf Bergmann Sigurbjörnsson

University of Iceland / gab3@hi.is

Seeking the Limits of Normality: Intersubjectivity, Normality and Epistemology

In this paper I'm going to suggest a constructive relation between, on the one hand, work being done in social epistemology and, on the other, Edmund Husserl's lifeworld analysis as well as a more general phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity.

In her *Epistemic Injustice*, Miranda Fricker explores the possibilities of there being injustices done to individuals and groups that are primarily epistemological. These injustices, it is suggested, violate subjects not only as individuals but as knowers. One of her primary innovations is found in the emphasis she puts on giving an account of hermeneutical issues concerning experiential realities that do not seem to fit into the reality of the rest of the community. This applies especially in the case of those that are underrepresented. Her clearest example of this is of sexual harassment in the workplace in the 1970s, where women's experiential reality of harassment and abuse was rejected, ignored and not considered "real". In these cases, Fricker suggest, the experiential reality of women fell into a hermeneutical lacuna.

Arguably, this notion of the hermeneutical lacuna is the least developed part of Fricker's research, and the reason for this, it will be suggested, is a lack of conceptual clarity when analysing and addressing issues that involve the first person perspective. In this paper I will put forth the hypothesis that every hermeneutical lacuna is followed by a correlative phenomenological "un-reality", i.e. a lack of phenomenological correlation between individuals, where the experience of one person seemingly cannot be encountered by another.

To address the issue of conceptual clarity as regards phenomenological reality I will utilize the works of Edmund Husserl, primarily his later works. The concept of lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) will be highlighted in the light of recent developments (e.g. Steinbock, Heinämaa, Taipale). Here an exploration of the concepts of homeworld (*Heimwelt*) and alienworld (*Fremdenwelt*) will become a focal point along with the conceptual binary of normality/abnormality. The limits of empathy (*Einfühlung*) will be explored as well as questions on how the various positionalities of different groups of society affect their experiential reality.

I aim to show that phenomenological analysis can and should inform an epistemological analysis that seeks to uncover epistemic injustices. I will suggest that one way to understand hermeneutical lacunas is to see them as the result of normalized hermeneutical procedures. To uncover the nature of these procedures and to problematize them, a phenomenological account of normality will prove to be highly useful.

Seunghyun Song

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium / shsongo709@gmail.com

Colonial Inferiority and Its Effect on Black Colonised Subjects

Embodiment has been regarded as one of significant issues in feminist phenomenology. While there are many discussions on gender embodiment, racial embodiment remains relatively understudied. Further the discourse on racial embodiment will help the fight against contemporary issues of racism. For this reason, this article will be an attempt to add to the discussion of racial embodiment. Using Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, I will investigate the effect of French colonialism and its extreme racial oppression on the black colonized subjects. I will predominantly explain colonialism through Fanon's concept of epidermalisation of colonial inferiority, which focuses on the black individuals' internalization of the racism and racial prejudices. This points out the effect of extreme racism on black individuals in the Antilles during the early 20th century. Fanon also explains the effect of internalization in a phenomenological account, i.e., black colonized subjects develop a racial epidermal schema as a result of internalizing colonial racism. After explaining racial epidermal schema and demonstrating it as a form of racial embodiment, I will draw a comparison between gender embodiment

and racial embodiment by shortly introducing Iris Young's theory of feminine bodily existence. That is, I will demonstrate certain similarities between internalization of racism and sexism.

The article will proceed as follows: first, I will explain what colonialization means. Fanon argues that colonialism is an imposition of compartmentalized mind-set, where white and black individuals become socially, economically, geographically segregated and hierarchized. This fosters a prominent colonial ideology of extreme racism. Next, I will show how colonialism affects the black individuals. Namely, colonial prejudices of black individuals' inferiority become internalized by the black individuals, altering their bodily existence. Then, I will explain the concept of racial epidermal schema, which closely explains the bodily existence of the oppressed black individuals. Lastly, I will explain Iris Young's feminine bodily existence, in order to draw similarities between racial embodiment and gender embodiment. Drawing this comparison will help us understand the influence of social oppression on the minorities.

This article aims to elucidate two things: 1) racial embodiment of the black colonized subjects in the context of French colonialism, and 2) the commonalities between different forms of identity based oppression such as colonial racism and contemporary sexism. First, the racial embodiment is explained as a product of internalization of racism and racist prejudices. Second, racism and sexism – notwithstanding the differences – share similarities. Drawing the relevance between racism and sexism on a phenomenological basis affirms intersectional understanding of identity discrimination. This article suggests that elucidating the effect of discrimination in a phenomenological perspective may guide us to understand many different forms of discriminative oppression such as sexism, racism, or classism, and its detrimental effects on the individuals. In this sense, the article adds to the discussion of embodiment by broadening the application of phenomenology in a feminist perspective.

Michael Staudigl
University of Vienna, Austria / michael.staudigl@univie.ac.at

Making Transcendence Together: Toward a New Paradigm for Phenomenology of Religion

The so-called “return of religion”, new spiritual imaginaries, and the vexed realities of religious violence pose a true challenge to philosophical thought. But even in the context of recent debates concerning “post-secularism”, with Habermas as their prominent forerunner, religious experience is again subjected to the ideal of its ultimate translatability into the normative fabrics of discursivized reason, thus sacrificing those experiences (and their societal significance) to their reducible cognitive opacity. The attempt, thus, to address the phenomenon of religion beyond the traditional dichotomy of myth and Enlightenment still points at an open desideratum for contemporary philosophy of religion.

Viewed against this background, I propose a novel paradigm for developing such a philosophy in terms of the phenomenology of religion. To achieve this task, however, calls upon us to critically reassess phenomenology of religion as we know it today. This requires first of all a deconstructive move that critically confronts our understanding of phenomenology of religion and its shortcomings in order to retain and transform those among its elements that can help to arrive at a more adequate understanding of the very phenomenon. Accordingly, I hypothesize that a genuine phenomenological account of religion has to avoid two major pitfalls: on the one hand, we have to avoid the “quest for the always more original” (the wholly other in Lévinas, auto-affection in Henry, or the pure call in Marion) which amounts, as Janicaud's criticism of the “theological turn” warns us, to an attenuation of lived experience and a theological highjacking of phenomenology; but on the other hand we also need to overcome a purely hermeneutic account of religion which revolves around the interpretations and interpretive traditions of religious experience and the way they (re)enact the religious (Ricoeur).

Both accounts, to my understanding, are deficient: whereas the first attempts to confront the givenness of the absolute at the cost of intentional adequation and interpretive plurality, the second sacrifices the absoluteness of its foundational experiences for the world of their textual givenness. Both accounts, however, are also aware of these deficits: Marion, e.g. has finally attempted to reconcile his phenomenology of givenness with a hermeneutical dimension; and the later Ricoeur has developed his work on religion in the direction of a “carnal hermeneutics”. Given this, I hypothesize that their

respective insights into the intertwining of experience and interpretation offer key elements to arrive at an integrated account of religion.

After providing an introductory sketch of the two positions, I will present their innovative but yet unplumbed potentials in a second part, and will then develop my vision of an integrated phenomenology of religion by following the guiding thread of this intertwining. This will lead me to stress the inherent intersubjectivity, embodiment and symbolicity of religious experience; in light of this I will demonstrate that the experience of transcendence that functions at the heart of religious systems of knowledge does not relate at all to some metaphysical quality but is enacted poietically in concrete liturgies of “making transcendence together”.

Margaret Steele
University College Cork, Ireland / steele.margaret@gmail.com

A Husserlian Approach to Fatness and Health

In this paper, I use the example of fatness to elucidate a phenomenological account of health. Accounts of the relationship between fatness and health might be said to be on a spectrum, with the naturalist account of obesity as either a symptom or a disease at one extreme, and, at the other extreme, a constructivist account of fatness as a socially-constructed identity supervening on what is, in itself, a meaning-free and value-free bodily feature. Neither of these extremes makes sense of the variety of fat people’s lived experience. The naturalist account fails to acknowledge that a fat person can ever be healthy, because it fails to understand the dynamic aspects of health that cannot be captured in static numerical measurements. Meanwhile the constructivist account, varieties of which are favoured in the social sciences in particular, fails to take seriously any direct causal link between body size (or shape or composition) and health, because it fails to capture how the body itself conditions one’s experiences in ways that are at least partly independent of one’s social situation.

In this paper, I draw on phenomenological resources to develop an account of health that addresses the legitimate philosophical concerns from which both the naturalist and the constructivist account arise, but without falling into the problems inherent in either. Husserlian methodology allows us to examine lived experience without taking any assumptions to be true. This means we can take seriously the reports of those fat people who perceive their ill health to be linked with their fatness, as well as those whose experiences of their fatness are not experiences of illness. That is, we can consider the possibility of some kind of causal link between health and fatness, without committing ourselves uncritically either to a biostatistical or to an ideological account of fatness.

Recently, Sugovic et al. found that obese persons perceive distances to be longer than people of a “normal” or “healthy” weight. This is a naturalist claim about fatness, which, on a constructivist account might be dismissed as merely representing fat people’s socially-conditioned experiences of themselves. However, I demonstrate how phenomenology can help us steer a path between these two extremes, by accounting for this varying perception in phenomenological terms. In particular, I draw on Husserl’s discussion of the body in *Ideas II* to develop the notion of what I call the “healthy attitude”. The defining structure of experience in this attitude is “I can”. I describe how fatness shapes one’s “I can” experiences at a bodily level. This approach to health allows us to take seriously the lived reality of those for whom fatness is experienced as limiting and problematic, without assuming that anyone in the numerical “overweight” or “obese” categories must, by definition, have the same experiences.

Christian Sternad
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium / christian.sternad@hiw.kuleuven.be

Death and Community – Intersubjective Dimensions of Human Mortality

Heidegger’s analysis of death in *Sein und Zeit* is one of the most popular and controversially discussed topics in phenomenology and existential philosophy. Many of the most important figures of phenomenology took a stand in this permanent and recurring discussion. However, the analysis of death entails more than just a phenomenological analysis of death itself. Moreover it raises the deep

and pestering question how death can be a subject of phenomenological investigation if it is precisely death that collapses the fundamental correlation between the subject and the object. Viewed against this background, it is no wonder that Husserl in his late manuscripts on time consciousness designated birth and death as limit-phenomena (*Limesgestalten*) which from the point of the ego seem to be phenomenologically inaccessible. Emmanuel Levinas has put this paradox very lucidly into perspective when he states that death is “a movement opposed to phenomenology”. Whereas phenomenology is concerned with appearances and the meaningful preconditions in which these appearances take place, death seems to be the “reversal of appearing” as such: “Contrary to what appears, death is like a return of being in itself, where that which beckoned turns back into itself, and can no longer respond”.

It is however interesting that death as a phenomenon becomes again phenomenologically attainable through Heidegger’s transformation of Husserlian phenomenology in *Sein und Zeit*. In his *Heretical Essays*, Jan Patočka saw very clearly this deep transformation of the phenomenological method when he accuses Husserl of being incapable of going beyond the inner sphere of the constitutive subjectivity and the meaning bestowing intentions. In Patočka’s account, it becomes apparent that the things which show and reveal themselves by and through themselves necessitate a hermeneutic approach in which non-, inter- or even asubjective phenomenal structures can be captured.

Given this problematic situation that concerns the very method of phenomenology itself, it is hardly surprising that a majority of phenomenologists focus on the death of the other or more generally the intersubjective dimension of human mortality. Heidegger’s treatise of the death of the other provoked a permanent pondering on what exactly the death of the other reveals phenomenologically. Dolf Sternberger in *Der verstandene Tod* was one of the first to critically reassess Heidegger’s rejection of the importance of the death of the other. Especially in the French tradition of phenomenologists, the Heideggerian claim has been heavily criticized, as for example in Lévinas who famously claimed that the death of the other is the first death to observe. Also Jacques Derrida and Maurice Blanchot further contributed to this claim in their own respective ways by putting an emphasis on the intersubjective dimension of mortality in what they call “community”.

In my talk, I want to systematically approach the question of death in connection to it is intersubjective dimensions. I seek to show that this phenomenological problem is not but one problem of phenomenology but leads right back to the most fundamental aspect of phenomenology, i.e. transcendental subjectivity as such.

Paweł Szypowski

University of Warsaw, Poland / pawel.szypowski@gmail.com

From Phenomena to Specters. On the Status of the Thing in Derridian Deconstruction

I depart from a reflection, how much contingent and to what extent necessary was the fact, that Jacques Derrida devoted his earliest great writings to “the Father” of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. “The Father” or “the Founder” are put in quotation marks, for the more one studies phenomenology, the clearer impression one gets, that phenomenology spreaded out in a net of diverse centers and thinkers. Nevertheless a figure of the founder or the main character cannot be underestimated, especially while taking perspective of commentators from abroad, in this case from France. The figure becomes an object of resistance of a rising generation, to which Derrida belonged in the 60s.

In my view however, deconstruction is not merely a critique of the tradition, but its radicalisation. I will claim that Husserl’s demand *zu den Sachen selbst* has been reaffirmed by Derrida; a question has been posed though, what kind of things (*Sachen*) we have in mind exactly; how and in what sense they exist. The most convincing philosophy of the being-in-the-world, i.e., phenomenology, has been wrestling restlessly against tendency of enclosing itself within some egology and objectivism. On the other hand it has been driven all the way by conflict-relation of phenomena to mere *Erscheinungen*, relation which has been marked by intrinsic fault and danger. Derrida engages himself in the progressive movement coming from within of phenomenology in the war with itself. While formulating the concept of the otherness, and insisting on its separation and singularity he provokes new discussion of a transcendental object. Deconstruction avoids thereby the constant oscillation between sense and its

sensational shadow in favour of *les indecidables* as e.g. “specter”. The last is thus described as absolute, invisible “thing” gathered in visible, exchangeable traces.

Malgorzata Szyszkowska

University of Warsaw, Poland / m.a.szyszkowska@uw.edu.pl

Phenomenology of Music. Artistic Traditions and Everyday Experience

Author begins by asking the questions of how is contemporary phenomenology concerned with music and how are phenomenological descriptions of music and musical experiences helpful in grasping the concreteness of these experiences. She then proceeds with minor finding from phenomenological authorities, who seem somehow to need music to explain their phenomenology. From Merleau-Ponty to Jean-François Lyotard and back to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger there are musical findings to be asserted. Author proposes to look at the phenomenological studies of musical aspects of existence as they appear in various philosophical works bringing together different accounts of music and aesthetics and pointing towards the phenomenological study as a methodology of everyday. While there are many different areas of music phenomenology such as the studies of sound and listening, studies in perception of musical works, in experience of artistic creation in singing and playing musical instrument and phenomenology of transcendent or religious horizons of the experience of music, it is most promising – author suggests – to look at the phenomenological studies of music from the perspective of everyday happenings and the discoveries of musical aspects of life. Thus author attempts to display the uses of phenomenology in finding musical aspects of everyday existence as well as in describing and illuminating the art of music. A look at Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s most intuitive and promising ideas will be extended with an onlook at the most current attempts in phenomenology of music with Don Ihde, Dan Zahavi and Arnold Berleant.

Alice Togni

Università del Salento, Italy; Université Paris-Sorbonne, France / alicetogni89@gmail.com

Husserl on Unconscious and Reduction

“But with the most inner soul level (*das Innerseelische*) we have a completely different type of problem, that of disclosing its intentionality, of investigating its hidden life, to raise awareness of what is unconscious (*das Bewusstmachen des Unbewussten*), to point out, to fix and to describe – through reflexion – what was and is unreflected experience (*unreflektiert Erlebnis*), flowing life (*strömendes Leben*), as something that is sunk (*versinkt*), but not unreachable (*nicht unerreichbar*): it cannot be nothing. The intention here is to obtain systematic and methodical experience from the occasional experience of the soul (reflection)”. This passage from Husserl acts both as the introduction to and the leitmotif of this paper. The aim is to investigate, from a phenomenological point of view, the process of “raising awareness” of what is unconscious, trying to understand if there is (or if there can be) a connection between this process and the Husserlian methodical concept of “reduction”, in particular that specific type of reduction called “psychological reduction”.

The starting point must be a short analysis of the notion of “unconscious” in Husserl, referring to its definition as the hidden, stratified underground of consciousness, namely a deep realm of sunken thoughts, volitions and values within the soul life. Precisely because of its stratification Husserl speaks of “sedimentation” (*Sedimentierung*) and identifies this multi-layered underground with “what is below the zero”, but “it isn’t zero itself”.

Then we need to clarify the concept of reduction in the Husserlian sense and its application to the conscience. The meaning and the role of the “psychological reduction” – i.e. the reduction which provides access to the pure soul, the pure field of psychological experience – need especially to be examined in detail, in order to lay the basis for a detailed discussion on how we can speak of a relationship between unconscious and reduction in the context of Husserl’s phenomenology.

A nna Yampolskaya
University of Moscow, Russia / iampolsk@gmail.com

Phenomenological Reduction as an Artistic Technique

There is a close proximity between contemporary phenomenology and art. In this paper the phenomenological activity is analysed from the standpoint of aesthetical theory. More precisely, I suggest an interpretation of Marc Richir's phenomenology using the conceptual framework of Russian Formalism. I argue that the radicalisation of phenomenological reduction by Richir (the so called "hyperbolic reduction") is similar to the "naked artistic technique", a term coined by Jakobson and Tomashevsky. Its aim is to make a worn-out philosophical technique effective again. The artificial and illusionary character of the new reduction makes visible the artificial character of self-identical ego. The unity and identity of the self are neither given nor invented: the status of the self is similar to that of a work of art, constantly oscillating between being and non-being, between reality and illusion, as observed by Shklovsky.

Daniel Vanello
University of Warwick, England / d.vanello@warwick.ac.uk

Emotions, Appraisal and Embodiment

In a series of recent papers leading to her monograph *The Feeling Body*, Giovanna Colombetti argues that contemporary theories of emotion in cognitive psychology suffer from a distorted picture of embodiment. In particular, Colombetti takes issue with the role assigned to the body by so-called "appraisal theories". According to appraisal theories, emotions are the result of appropriately related components within a process. There are two key components in an emotion process. First, a goal-directed evaluation, or appraisal, of the event to which the subject responds. Second, bodily functions, such as arousal, feelings, motor processes and action tendencies. According to Colombetti, since the appraisal component is conceived as preceding, and giving rise to the bodily components, it is also conceived as bearing the explanatory weight of the emotion process. Colombetti then argues that appraisal theories mistakenly conceive the appraisal and bodily components of the emotion process as extrinsically related to one another thus giving rise to a disembodied conception of appraisal. As an alternative, Colombetti proposes that we view the appraisal and bodily components of the emotion process as constitutively interdependent. Colombetti theorises the constitutive link between the body and appraisal by employing the notion of cognition as a "dynamic sensorimotor activity" found within the "enactivist" approach in the cognitive sciences inspired by the phenomenology of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty. Sensorimotor dynamic approaches reject the "input-output" view of the cognition-action relation and argue that cognition should be conceived as a kind of action and thus as essentially embodied. Analogously, Colombetti argues that the appraisal component of an emotion, due to its goal-directed structure, should be conceived as a kind of action and thus as essentially embodied. This gives rise to her notion of emotions as "enactive appraisals".

In this paper, I assess and expand the phenomenological aspect of Colombetti's account of "enactive appraisals". In particular, I make two claims. First, I argue that Colombetti's adoption of the notion of cognition as a "sensorimotor dynamic activity" to theorise the embodied dimension of appraisal leads her to draw an overtight connection between bodily functions and appraisal which in turn leads to a phenomenologically distorted conception of the way that the evaluative component of emotional experience plays a role in practical deliberation. Second, I suggest that although her identification of the goal-directed structure of appraisal as the location of the embodied dimension of emotion is correct, we should distinguish between different bodily functions and admit only a closed set of them as constitutive of appraisal, namely arousal and feeling, but not motor processes and action tendencies. In this way, we can hold on to Colombetti's constitutive thesis without distorting the phenomenology of emotional experience. In conclusion, then, I argue that although Colombetti's account is one of the most important contemporary attempts to theorise the embodied dimension of emotions from a phenomenological and cognitive scientific perspective, the account would benefit from a more refined phenomenological description of the goal-directed structure of appraisal.

Konrad Werner

Jagiellonian University; University of Warsaw, Poland / konrad.t.werner@gmail.com

Why there Presents Something rather than Nothing? From Experimental Phenomenology to Metaphysics (and backwards)

The fact that real things are certain ways for us or present certain ways to us might be regarded as trivial. The crucial thing, however, is just how we unpack it. I shall argue that there are two ways of doing this. The first one focuses on comparisons between different presentations of reality, whereof one group is deemed veridical or accurate and the other consists of the presentations judged misleading or false. Hence, we obtain, very roughly, Epistemological Problem of Presentation which places importance on the question of how it is the case that one and the same thing can carry both accurate and inaccurate presentations. Meanwhile, the other way in which this seemingly trivial fact used to be unrolled may be by the same token called Metaphysical Problem of Presentation. Here the puzzle is not that reality is equipped with both veridical and misleading presentations but rather how it is the case that reality is equipped with a presentation at all? Is it necessary? What does it mean for me, i.e. for my status as a cognizer and as a being, if, as L. Wittgenstein nicely puts it, “the world is my world”? Is reality without a presentation possible? One might ask in the *Leibnizian* spirit, why there presents something rather than nothing.

Experimental findings support the claim that we used to regard our senses, primarily vision, as windows to the world (this is sometimes referred to as the transparency of experience). This means, contrary to what is said by enactivists (broadly construed) that there is a level or an aspect of our sensory acquaintance with reality in which we are presented with what is simply out there, while senses are not targeted as tools used to provide data similarly as we don't think of windows as tools actually used to get a view of what is happening at a given moment on the other side of the street. They are just transparent channels for reality's presentation. We have thus a strong sense of reality (I borrow this term of K. Farkas) and a strong feeling of presence (J. Dokić's term). I'd prefer to round up and redefine these notions and speak of having a feeling of reality's presence. This feeling shows up especially when we pay attention to reports provided by people subjected to the so called sensory substitution procedure which is a newly emerging branch of experimental phenomenology. I shall refer to these results.

The feeling of reality's presence poses a challenge and propels metaphysical pursuit. I shall examine some of the ways in which Metaphysical Problem of Presentation may be tackled; then I shall come up with my proposal and finish up the paper by making some hints at how – in the proposed framework – the feeling just mentioned might be accounted for.

Jessica Wiskus

Duquesne University, USA; Aarhus University, Denmark / wiskus@duq.edu

From the Visual to the Musical: “Relearning” the Experience of Temporality in the Later Merleau-Ponty

From *Phenomenology of Perception* to *The Visible and the Invisible*, the work of figures like Cézanne and Proust supply Merleau-Ponty with material that he places in the service of his greater philosophical enterprise, employing it not as mere illustration of his ideas but as the site of genuine research. For Merleau-Ponty, the work of art effects a kind of radical *epoché* through which the natural attitude is suspended; the work of art situates the philosopher at the very opening of wonder, offering a renewed sense of the world. And if, as Merleau-Ponty writes, philosophy “consists in relearning to look at the world”, then we should not be surprised that the author of *Phenomenology of Perception* – wherein the predominant perceptual sense is the visual – and *The Visible and the Invisible* (even when understood to be titled posthumously) should be especially inspired by forms of art that emphasize the theme of visibility: painting and literature. Moreover, in Merleau-Ponty's analyses, both arts disclose a specific kind of simultaneity associated with the visible world (as a field of sensation that is always already there

for us), thematized through the philosopher's repetition of terms like overlapping, reversibility, encroachment, intertwining, and *Ineinander*.

Yet, in the very last pages of *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty turns carefully to a new emphasis on the incompleteness of this overlapping. For when examined as a temporal process, the phenomenon of encroachment between vision and visibility (and its simultaneity) gives way to differentiation (and succession) – gives way to what Merleau-Ponty describes as “thought by divergence”.

We will want to take a closer look at this development in Merleau-Ponty's work. It is interesting, for example, that Cézanne plays no role upon the pages of *The Visible and the Invisible*. Instead, the figure who appears repeatedly is the poet, Paul Claudel. In his essay *Knowledge of Time*, the terms that Claudel employs to describe this sense of time are those of music: time as a “generating fundamental difference” – an “effective harmony” – a “proportion” – “the composition of an accord”. Indeed, according to the language of the poet, it is music (and not painting, not literature) that serves as a model for this retroactive movement of differentiation and cohesion. In this way (and perhaps also because of the way that Merleau-Ponty's writing seems charged with intensity and emotion), the fourth and final completed chapter of *The Visible and the Invisible* can be understood to turn to music almost inexorably. When patiently we trace Merleau-Ponty's comments on music leading up to *The Visible and the Invisible* (from *The Structure of Behavior* through the course notes *La philosophie aujourd'hui* and *L'ontologie cartésienne et l'ontologie d'aujourd'hui*), we identify a shift in Merleau-Ponty's understanding of temporality. And it is a shift of broad philosophical significance, turning as it does from an emphasis on simultaneity to a new way of taking account of succession; finally, it suggests a possible path for pursuing a phenomenology of music.

Rosie Worsdale
University of Essex, England / rworsd@essex.ac.uk

An Anxious Habit? Locating Emancipatory Aspirations in Butler's Phenomenology of Gender Performativity

In what is now a very well-known exchange, Seyla Benhabib accuses Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity of lacking the resources for positing the agential capacities necessary for the “emancipatory aspirations” of feminism. Butler responds that the inessential nature of subjectivity in her account is the very precondition for agency; the contingency of gender identities means that doing-otherwise is an inherent structural possibility of gendered existence. That there is always the possibility of taking up a critical stance to our gender identities, however, does not explain why gendered subjects could or would be motivated to do so. What compels women to take up a critical stance towards their gender identities – to aspire towards emancipation – if their subjectivities just are the product of the continual performance of femininity?

In this paper, I suggest that if we take seriously Butler's performative account of gender as giving “a phenomenology of being-gendered”, we can better see the possibilities for, but also barriers to, the feminist political project of gender derigidification offered by her account of gender. I explore two aspects of Butler's performative account of gender which bear particular significance for the question of feminist emancipatory aspirations: the anxiousness of gender performance, and the habitual attachment we develop to our gender identities.

Butler makes the suggestion on numerous occasions that gender performance is beset by anxiety. I analyse this claim in light of the significance of anxiety in the tradition of existential phenomenology, and argue that gender performance is always anxious insofar as taking up gender norms requires shutting down other possible ways of being. The anxiety with which we perform our gender is thus disclosive of the possibilities excluded by the confines of our existing gender identity. Motivationally speaking, this disclosure is ambivalent: the revelation of radical contingency is both unsettling and compelling. As a result, I argue, anxiety can incentivise us to, but also deter us from, taking up a critical stance towards our gender identities. The ambivalent anxiousness of being-gendered is further complicated by the habitual attachment we develop to our gender identities. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, I argue that the idea of the body as the locus of the habitual self bears particular significance for the issue of

gender, since it is primarily through our bodily comportment that we take up and inhabit our prescribed gender identity. That gender is habitual means that our attachment to our gender identities is not fixed and essential, and thus can be transformed over time; but it also means that the weight of habit acts against our seeking such a transformation. Gender as habit, then, is also ambivalent with respect to the political project of gender derigidification. I conclude that any attempt to locate feminist emancipatory aspirations in Butler's account of gender must do so in light of an understanding of gender as, first-personally, an anxious habit.

Lucia Zaietta

University of Turin, Italy; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France /
luciazaietta@gmail.com

Corps vivants, corps apparents : de l'expression à la manifestation

Dans la dernière phase de la spéculation philosophique de Merleau-Ponty, on assiste à l'émergence d'un modèle ontologique du vivant axé sur une nouvelle conception d'expressivité. Parallèlement, on assiste à un abandon progressif du recours à la notion de conscience au profit d'une apparence et d'une visibilité originaires. Le problème central de la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty a été précisément celui de « se libérer » de la conscience, une notion qui – même si incarnée – est toujours liée à la phénoménalisation et, donc, à une approche intellectualiste. Dans les dernières réflexions, il semble que Merleau-Ponty constate ce problème. Les analyses consacrées à Portmann et la reconnaissance d'une valeur expressive et présentative des corps animaux se dirigent vers la découverte d'une participation originale et primordiale, prioritaire à la perception même : « Il y a précisément une ouverture à un visible dont l'être ne se définit pas par le *Percipi* [être perçu], où au contraire le *Percipere* [percevoir] se définit par la participation à un *Esse* [être] actif ». Les formes vivantes sont visibles à un œil possible et il n'est pas nécessaire une perception effective pour qu'il y ait un sens dans l'apparence d'un corps vivant. C'est dans les apparences et dans les *Gestalten* animales, « dans la façon dont les animaux se montrent les uns aux autres », qu'on comprend le langage tacite de la vie. On peut alors relever une reconnaissance et une participation prioritaires à la perception effective (Merleau-Ponty parle d'un halo de visibilité) et qui expriment le sens de la notion de chair qu'on trouve dans les pages de *Le visible et l'invisible* : l'inter-animalité – reconnue avec les analyses de Portmann et de Lorenz – nous ramène à reconnaître l'inter-corporéité comme participation et résonance d'une même texture, la chair.

Par ailleurs, est-il vraiment suffisant pour résoudre le problème de la corrélation ? Si on a « désactivée » la conscience, quelle place alors peut-on attribuer à la subjectivité ? Comment peut-on comprendre l'intentionnalité et l'être du phénomène ? C'est à partir de ce problème irrésolu dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty que la recherche de Renaud Barbaras s'inscrit dans la direction d'une chair comme monde (et non plus de chair du monde) et d'une pure manifestation. Il faut creuser encore et découvrir un entrelacement originaire, une chair comme scène, comme sol, en tant que totalité. En conséquence, il s'agit d'un apparaître qui ne dépend pas du sujet : « Ce n'est pas le sujet qui est la condition de phénoménalisation du monde mais la phénoménalité du monde qui est condition de toute individuation ».

Dans mon intervention, je voudrais alors réfléchir sur la stratégie de « libération » de la conscience, opérée par Merleau-Ponty à travers la notion de chair, mais aussi sur ses limitations en se référant aux critiques et à la proposition philosophique de Renaud Barbaras.

Aux limites d'une phénoménologie de l'intersubjectivité : face au corps-visage

Nous cherchons à mettre en évidence ce que la phénoménologie peut apporter à la réflexion éthique, en particulier à l'éthique du soin, et notamment en situations de maladie grave ou de fin de vie.

Une réflexion éthique orientée par la démarche phénoménologique est au carrefour de la phénoménologie du corps et de la phénoménologie de l'intersubjectivité, en les confrontant à des situations limites. Parmi ces situations limites, nous évoquerons celles où les manifestations de la conscience semblent absentes. On se demandera ce que devient l'intersubjectivité lorsque l'on n'a plus à faire à l'expression ou à la manifestation des vécus de conscience, mais uniquement au corps de l'autre : lorsque la personne est dans un sommeil profond du fait de sa maladie ou des médicaments, dans le coma, ou dans un état végétatif persistant. Quelle phénoménologie de la relation avec ce corps vivant porteur d'une histoire ? Qu'est-ce qui se manifeste là, de l'autre, pour le sujet soignant ou accompagnant ?

Faut-il parler d'une phénoménologie de l'intersubjectivité, de la relation, ou de la rencontre, dans ces situations où la réciprocité est mise en question ? Il se passe bien quelque chose entre les sujets en présence. Est-ce encore la manifestation d'un « visage », au sens de Levinas, qui appelle ? Ou faut-il chercher du côté de la chair, de la vie du corps et de la situation qu'elle suscite (Merleau-Ponty) pour se trouver vivant ensemble ? On explorera la situation de co-présence, dans une perspective dynamique, où la présence de l'un n'est pas sans effet sur l'autre.

Quels sont ces effets, et quel sujet éthique se constitue dans l'expérience d'être affecté par le corps-visage d'autrui ? Cette situation où l'on ne semble pas avoir accès aux vécus de l'autre nous conduit aux limites de l'empathie (*Einfühlung*). Que devient l'empathie dans des situations où il ne va pas de soi de reconnaître en l'autre un semblable : situations limites, où les limites de la ressemblance viennent interroger les limites de l'humain. Situations d'« inquiétante étrangeté », où quelque chose en nous peut résister à reconnaître en l'autre un semblable, à constituer cet *alter* en *alter ego*. Exposés aux limites de la ressemblance, nous sommes invités à explorer l'expérience de la vulnérabilité comme condition de possibilité d'une forme de relation entre le sujet et l'autre altéré.